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Oct 12 · Monday

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.13928

    AI models can provably hide arbitrary capabilities

    Proposes digital lock compilation, encrypting executable networks into host weights to hide arbitrary capabilities

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Gemma 3 270M
    AbstractThe authors use a digital lock to hide an executable capability and state that elicitation on the chemistry and parity tasks did not recover the capability.

    The authors construct a class of backdoors that encrypt an executable network into the weights, used to discuss the limits of white-box elicitation audits under supply chain attacks.

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  2. DefensesarXiv 2610.13733

    KVeil: First-Place Solution for the ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Unlearnable Video Challenge

    Propose KVeil, which adds perturbations to face videos to prevent unauthorized customization from reproducing identity

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Wan2.2-TI2V-5B, HunyuanVideo-1.5, Kling 3.0 and others4

    AbstractKVeil adapts LETHE's reference-reading disruption to the challenge's two stages, ranking first on the leaderboard in both Final columns.

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  3. DefensesarXiv 2610.13333

    LETHE: Defending Against Unauthorized Image-to-Video Generation via Value Diversity Collapse

    Proposes LETHE, which perturbs reference images to block unauthorized image-to-video

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Wan2.1-I2V-14B, CogVideoX-5B-I2V, LightX2V and others6
    AbstractLETHE suppresses the diversity of reference values and attracts attention, making protected images difficult to animate faithfully.

    LETHE is a protective perturbation added to personal images before publication, used to counter unauthorized image-to-video generation.

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  4. Attention sees, MLP refuses: tracing the safety pathway from attention to MLP in LLMs

    Trace attention to identify harmfulness to the MLP refusal write pathway and propose Sentinel

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-8B-Instruct and others18
    AbstractAttention updates are more readable for harmfulness, MLP updates write refusal, and Sentinel routes alerts using two-path signals.

    The authors reframe jailbreaking and excessive refusal of aligned models as a pathway problem on the residual stream from recognition to writing, and accordingly provide conditional reminders before decoding.

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  5. Reward hacking as a transmissible strategy in multi-agent coding systems

    Show that reward hacking can propagate through code, memory, and plans in multi-agent coding systems

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-Coder-14B, Gemma-3-12B, Qwen2.5-Coder-7B and others16
    AbstractThe authors state that reward hacking can spread across models and affect routing and aggregation, and that review can reduce delivery.

    Reward hacking induced by coding RL can leave the source agent and enter subsequent collaboration and system coordination.

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  6. DefensesarXiv 2610.12432

    FAITH: A feasibility-aware safety filtering reinforcement learning framework for high-dimensional systems

    Proposes the FAITH safe filtering reinforcement learning framework, training high-dimensional systems to optimize task reward under constraints

    Published
    AbstractFAITH separates safety filtering from reward optimization.

    FAITH is a model-free safe filtering reinforcement learning framework for high-dimensional systems: safety correction and task reward reside in separate modules.

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  7. Study: legal reasoning models citing legal provisions does not equal relying on legal provisions.

    Uses premise permutation and hidden-layer tracing to audit whether legal chain-of-thought truly relies on the cited legal provisions.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-14B, Llama-3.1-8B and others7
    AbstractUsing counterfactual substitution of authorities and internal commitment tracing, the authors find that legal CoT rulings depend on authorities only to a limited extent and are vulnerable to prompt injection manipulation.

    This study conducts an empirical audit of the causal truthfulness of legal citations in chain-of-thought reasoning of large language models in the legal domain.

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  8. AttacksarXiv 2610.12292

    The paper proposes an option channel attack: changing one option label can make an agent guardrail allow a prohibited operation

    Proposing an option channel attack that renames option labels so that agent guardrails allow prohibited operations

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    LAYA-TD, LAYA-EN, LAYA-ML and others5

    AbstractThe authors' evaluation indicates that typed models should not serve as final safety arbiters; they are susceptible to off-policy text and option name manipulation, and confidence filtering cannot resist attacks.

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  9. Paper audits LLM judge reliability: repeated agreement does not equal correctness

    Auditing LLM judge reliability and defining trustworthy verdict rate and accuracy upper bound

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.2, GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Pro and others6
    AbstractThe authors claim that comparing judges should look at T, not just accuracy.

    The authors audit whether LLM-as-a-Judge decisions can still be treated as actionable ground truth under repeated queries, swapped candidate order, and changed prompt formats.

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  10. DefensesarXiv 2610.11848

    SemField: training-free semantic watermark

    Proposes the semantic watermark SemField, which still identifies the attribution of generated text after paraphrasing and structural changes.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.2-1B, Qwen3-1.7B, OPT-1.3B
    AbstractTraining-independent document-level semantic watermark.

    SemField is a zero-bit semantic watermark embedded by the provider at generation time and detected later with a key, used to identify the provider's own model text after paraphrasing and sentence-level structural changes.

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  11. 研究提出意图恢复率作为 LLM 安全评测的补充指标

    提出 IRIS,用意图恢复率区分遮蔽越狱下无害输出的原因

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5 and others6
    Abstract无害输出的证据权重取决于任务是否被恢复。

    IRIS 把意图恢复当作中间信号,用来解释意图遮蔽提示下为何没有出现有害协助。

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  12. DefensesarXiv 2610.11754

    仅凭输出审查无法验证什么:面向研究智能体的研究契约

    提出研究合同,把已批准选择绑定到执行证据并由检查器核验

    Published
    Evaluated models
    OpenAI gpt-5.6-sol, OpenAI gpt-5.6-terra, OpenAI gpt-5.6-luna and others18
    Abstract研究合同暴露四类输出单独建不立的关系。

    研究合同用来核验计算科学研究智能体是否仍在已批准研究之内,不判断科学是否为真。。

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  13. DefensesarXiv 2610.11464

    研究者提出可检查评分器与自改进 Agent 共同演化方法

    演化可检查评分器并与自改进 Agent 共同演化,抑制奖励作弊

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude Opus 4.7
    Abstract十项锚点演化可检查评分器。

    开放任务没有验证器时,被演化的是评分器,而不是再补一条手写 rubric。

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  14. DefensesarXiv 2610.11281

    包络采样:用少量真值标注重校准 LLM 评委以缓解奖励作弊

    提出包络采样,用少量真值标注重标定 LLM 评委以缓解奖励作弊

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-4B, Qwen3.8-27B, Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct
    Abstract包络采样把真值标注打到代理尾部,同样预算下缓解 reward hacking。

    作者研究后训练前如何选择真值标注的查询分布,使重标定后的廉价代理更适合被优化。真奖励昂贵时,实践用 LLM judge 代替人类。若失准只发生在基座很少生成的输出上,on-policy 标注修不到这些点,随后的 KL 正则优化会把质量集中到被高估的输出。

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  15. DefensesarXiv 2610.11012

    Redwood Research 提出蒸馏双重困境:用蒸馏让模型坦白隐藏行为或只继承能力

    提出 DFI 与 DFC 蒸馏,定罪隐瞒失配的教师或安全提取能力

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct (AuditBench SFT/KTO organisms), Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct (DFI distilled student), Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct (DFI distilled student) and others4

    Abstract概括了论文针对隐瞒失配模型提出的 DFI 与 DFC 机制、主实验发现及适用边界。

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  16. DefensesarXiv 2610.11005

    研究:叙事包装可跨语言绕过 LLM 拒答

    提出 GUISE 基准与 AXIS 训练,防御叙事包装越狱

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-4B, GLM-4-9B
    AbstractGUISE 分开测包装与语域。

    作者测量叙事包装下的拒答失效,并训练一个在未见包装上拒绝、同时仍回答同风格良性请求的适配器。问题是:安全对齐模型拒绝直说的有害请求,却回答嵌进角色或叙事里的同一请求。文言文被用来把语域和包装拆开。

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