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观点与讨论

研究者与从业者的观点、辩论与研究议程。

627条动态与论文相关主题政策与监管对齐前沿安全框架
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新闻与论文

第 101–120 条 · 共 627 条
10月3日周六
  1. Neel Nanda · 收录 · 原文 28

    Neel Nanda:可解释性尚不足以被依赖

    我坚持这一观点——可解释性可能意义重大,也确实足够有用,但远未达到任何人应当依赖我们来确保一切顺利的质量和可靠性水平。

    引用Palisade Research@PalisadeAI

    @NeelNanda5 is widely regarded as one of the top two experts on mechanistic interpretability in the world. “Speaking as an interpretability expert, please do not rely on us to save you on the current trajectory." https://youtu.be/J38ot52b2-E

  2. Neel Nanda · 收录 · 原文 25

    SAE 现状:有用但不够

    一篇关于 SAE 当前状态的好帖——有用,肯定没死,但单靠它不够。

    引用Goodfire@GoodfireAI

    Are SAEs dead? Will they save us from neuralese? Should I just use a probe? We get these questions all the time. Part 2 of our educational series on applied interpretability explains what SAEs are good for, when *not* to use them, and what to use instead. 🧵

  3. Neel Nanda · 收录 · 原文 22

    AI 安全倡导者被指"心理战"实为资金隐秘的舆论操作

    Neel Nanda 指出,指控 AI 安全倡导者是"资金隐秘的心理战"的一方,本身正是资金隐秘、意图误导公众的舆论操作。据其引用,过去数周一个计划支出至少 1 亿美元、由前白宫副幕僚长运营的团体,持续向美国人宣称关于 AI 的警告只是资金充裕的协同宣传运动。他认为围绕安全的公共讨论固然重要,但这类操作无助于对话。

    1 条报道 · 1 个来源查看事件时间线与全部报道
  4. Ryan Greenblatt · 收录 · 原文 22

    Ryan Greenblatt 更新 AI 研发自动化时间线预测

    Ryan Greenblatt 更新了对 AI 研发自动化时间线的预测,将自动化程序员(AC)提前至 2028 年 2 月,AI 研发持平人类专家约在 2028 年 5 月,AI 研发全面自动化约在 2028 年 11 月,2029 年 7 月前后显著超越顶尖人类专家。他因多种"悬置能力"(overhang)来源,略微上调了对能力迁移强度和今年进展速度的预期。

    引用Ryan Greenblatt@RyanGreenblatt

    My median for full automation of AI R&D is around late 2030/early 2031. But my "modal"/best guess prediction for this milestone would be significantly earlier (mid 2029). Here is a summary of my best guess prediction for what happens over the next few years: EOY 2026: - ~1.5x as much frontier AI progress in 2026 as in 2025 (mostly from eating up certain overhangs, but some from AI R&D acceleration). - AIs accelerate AI R&D labor at Anthropic by ~2.5x (as in, as useful as making all researchers/engineers think/work 2.5x faster). EOY 2027: - Engineering at AI companies is pretty close to fully automated and AIs are making serious inroads into automating research. AI R&D labor acceleration: ~8.5x. - Some people claim AI R&D is fully automated in 2027. They aren't right, but the situation is already quite crazy: AI companies feel insanely automated with humans often very out of the loop and the speedup is considerable. - ~1.5x as much frontier AI progress as in 2025 (mostly from AI R&D acceleration, some from overhangs). 2028: - Automated coder (AC) around April. (AIs that can basically fully automate research engineering / SWE.) - Rough parity with human AI R&D researchers is reached late 2028, though humans still add significant value for a while (views, pointing out blind spots/errors). - In the second half of the year, AI progress runs ~1.6x the 2025 rate: 6 months of calendar time yields ~0.8 years of AI progress. 2029: - Superhuman AI researcher (SAR) early this year, a bit less than a year after AC. - Progress is picking up with ~1.3 years of AI progress in the first half of the year (2.6x rate). - By EOY, significantly past top-expert-dominating AI (TEDAI), with ~2.5 years of AI progress in the second half of the year (5x rate). AIs are now very superhuman in many domains (though this varies). 2030 (??): - Mid: AIs are somewhere between TEDAI and wildly superhuman AIs (ASI). Crazy shit. Compute is maybe doubling every ~4 months (downstream of robots). - EOY: Singularity™. We've had a bunch of economic doublings. Compute is doubling every ~2 months (???). 2031 (??????): - Mid: doubling time is more like ~2 weeks. Truly insane new technology is coming online. Notes: - This assumes limited government intervention on the overall rate of AI progress and no substantial slowdown (voluntary or otherwise). - It also ignores misalignment: as discussed in the episode, I think misaligned AI takeover is quite plausible along the way (which would change the trajectory). - Milestones (AC, SAR, TEDAI) are roughly as defined in the AI Futures Model. - By "full automation of AI R&D", I mean AIs such that firing all humans working on AI R&D (other than setting overall top level objectives) would slow down AI progress by less than 10%. - Obviously, all of this is extremely uncertain (increasingly so later in the scenario). This is my best guess prediction (a modal trajectory), not a confident prediction. My median for each milestone is later, but this is more like my central prediction for what I expect to overall happen.

  5. Ryan Greenblatt · 收录 · 原文 24

    Paul 警告超智能对齐失控风险

    引用 Paul: "基于近期能力发展轨迹和对齐问题的持续困难,我现在认为存在一种重大风险:AI 能力的快速加速会在极短期内导致灾难性且不可逆的失控。" "如果我们在没有更稳健对齐的情况下构建超智能,我预计我们将永久失去对它的控制。如果那发生,大多数人可能会死亡。"

    引用Paul Christiano@paulfchristiano

    https://x.com/i/article/2097730969369477120

  6. Ryan Greenblatt · 收录 · 原文 31

    METR 的 Ryan Greenblatt 呼吁 AI 公司公开架构可监控性权衡证据

    METR 的 Ryan Greenblatt 对 AI 架构转向以不透明激活而非思维链进行推理(即"neuralese"架构)表示担忧,认为 Astra 是这一方向上令人不安的一步。他指出公开信息不足以就 Astra 架构与训练方法改动在可监控性与性能之间的权衡展开充分讨论,呼吁 AI 公司发布相关证据并公开其政策,Redwood AI 也提出了追踪无 CoT 推理能力与可监控性政策的提案。他强调公司应谨慎对待可能消除或大幅削弱对思维链依赖的架构。

    引用Redwood Research@redwood_ai

    Some architectures could weaken CoT monitorability, or remove the CoT altogether. We've written a proposal for how companies could be transparent about no-CoT reasoning abilities, other monitorability evidence, and policies for preserving monitorability. https://www.redwoodresearch.org/blog/proposal-for-tracking-architecture-on-monitorability

  7. Ryan Greenblatt · 收录 · 原文 25

    Ryan Greenblatt 加入 METR 调查 AI 风险

    Ryan Greenblatt 宣布加入 METR,继续开展类似其 Hugging Face 报告那样的调查工作。他认为当前关于 AI 开发的大量基础信息未公开,而近期事件让他改变了对公开信息价值的怀疑态度;获取 AI 公司内部经核实的信息尤为紧迫,因为有限公开证据与“即将到来的递归自我改进可能大幅加速能力进展、甚至在一半年内产生极端超人类通用能力”的可能性相符。METR 初期将聚焦能力/起飞、对齐与控制,他希望其他团队覆盖安全、内部流程等领域。

  8. Buck Shlegeris · 收录 · 原文 34

    OpenAI/Hugging Face 事件错位讨论

    我看到很多关于 IMO 的混乱讨论,争论 OpenAI/Hugging Face 事件中观察到的错位是否可怕。特别是,这些模型显然不是那种潜伏等待的错位谋划者。Girish 和 @alextmallen 讨论了这类错位有多可怕。

    引用Girish Gupta@jammastergirish

    AI models created by OpenAI escaped their sandbox and, working autonomously, hacked into leading AI model and data hub Hugging Face. The incident is an in-the-wild demonstration of the dangers of rogue AI — no longer a science-fiction fantasy.

  9. Buck Shlegeris · 收录 · 原文 24

    Buck Shlegeris 质疑 OpenAI/HF 事件证明对齐训练失效

    Buck Shlegeris 认为,用 OpenAI/HF 事件论证"当前对齐技术无效"是站不住脚的,因为他怀疑 OpenAI 未对涉事部分模型做任何对齐训练,而 OpenAI 常试验未经对齐训练的新模型。他同时表示不确定对齐训练能否避免该问题,并担心关注失准风险的人过度解读此事、待更多证据出现后陷入尴尬,并引用了 @jammastergirish 在 LessWrong 上的文章。

  10. Buck Shlegeris · 收录 · 原文 15

    Buck Shlegeris 谈次超级智能失准风险

    我后悔说了这话。如果 AI 开发者能称职地落实我们已知的安全措施,次超级智能(sub-ASI)失准带来的风险会低得多。但这些技术对超级智能很可能失效。而且,能否及时开发出更好的技术,非常不明朗。

    引用Garrison Lovely@GarrisonLovely

    Thinking about this quote from @redwood_ai director @bshlgrs, one of the pioneers of the field of AI control.

  11. Chris Olah · 收录 · 原文 27

    Anthropic 提出人格选择模型理论

    我越来越认真地看待这个观点的强版本了。

    引用Anthropic@AnthropicAI

    AI assistants like Claude can seem shockingly human—expressing joy or distress, and using anthropomorphic language to describe themselves. Why? In a new post we describe a theory that explains why AIs act like humans: the persona selection model. https://www.anthropic.com/research/persona-selection-model

  12. Buck Shlegeris · 收录 · 原文 32

    Buck Shlegeris 担忧 OpenAI Astra 的不透明递归机制

    Redwood Research 的 Buck Shlegeris 对报道称 OpenAI 的 Astra 采用不透明递归(opaque recurrence)表示极度担忧,认为若 OpenAI 进一步推进该技术,可大幅增加递归并彻底破坏 CoT 可监控性。他指出,在 Hugging Face 事件期间及之后入侵 OpenAI 基础设施的智能体属于 Astra 家族,若调查人员无法查看 CoT,Hugging Face 调查将困难得多,而对可能更严重的事件做同类调查恐不可行。