ReFuse: Detecting dLLM jailbreaks using pre-decoding states
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A paper published on November 7, 2026 proposes ReFuse (Representation Fusion), an inference-time jailbreak detection method for diffusion large language models (dLLMs). The paper points out that dLLMs generate responses by iteratively refining masked tokens in parallel, and recent attacks are exploiting properties such as their bidirectional conditioning and parallel masked-token refinement; yet the same properties also bring a new detection surface: jailbreaks can be identified from the hidden states at masked response positions before any token is generated. The method trains separate linear classifiers on the prompt representation and the pre-decoding response representation, each of which misses attacks the other catches, and ReFuse fuses the two classifiers' sigmoid harmfulness scores without modifying model weights or the decoding process. On LLaDA-8B, the average attack success rate across multiple jailbreaks drops from 63.29% with no defense and 11.27% with the prompt classifier alone to 3.31%, while the average benign refusal rate on standard utility benchmarks remains below 1%.
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- Beyond the Prompt: Leveraging Pre-Decoding States for Jailbreak Detection in dLLMs
NeurIPS 2026 · 2026-11-06
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- arXiv: Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection, Poisoning & DefensesBeyond Prompts: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks in Diffusion Large Language Models Using Pre-Decoding States
The researchers propose ReFuse (Representation Fusion), an inference-time jailbreak detection method for diffusion large language models (dLLMs). The paper notes that dLLMs generate responses by iteratively refining masked tokens in parallel, and recent attacks exploit properties such as bidirectional conditioning and parallel masked-token refinement, while the same properties also create a new detection surface: a jailbreak can be identified from the hidden states at masked response positions before any token is generated. The method trains separate linear classifiers on prompt representations and pre-decoding response representations; each classifier misses attacks the other catches, and ReFuse fuses the two classifiers' sigmoid harmfulness scores without modifying model weights or the decoding process. On LLaDA-8B, the average attack success rate across multiple jailbreaks drops from 63.29% with no defense and 11.27% with the prompt classifier alone to 3.31%, while the average benign refusal rate on standard utility benchmarks stays below 1%.
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