Paper evaluates prompt injection detector calibration and delayed decisions
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An arXiv paper released on October 15, 2026 compares four types of prompt injection detectors on 47,611 held-out samples, with evaluation covering direct and indirect prompt injection, difficult benign inputs, obfuscated samples, and distribution shift. Results show that the LLM judge has the highest AUROC at 0.897, followed by Jev at 0.871, Llama Prompt Guard 2 86M at 0.757, and 22M at 0.714. The paper argues that probability outputs alone are insufficient to support reliable safety decisions under distribution shift, and examines allow-block-defer policies.
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- From Detection to Decision: Calibration and Deferral for Prompt-Injection Detection
arXiv · 2026-10-14 · Deep reading
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- arXiv: Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection, Poisoning & DefensesFrom Detection to Decision: Calibration and Delayed Decision for Prompt Injection Detection
An arXiv paper compares four types of prompt injection detectors on 47,611 held-out samples in terms of detection, probability calibration, and allow-intercept-delay policies, arguing that probability outputs alone are insufficient to support reliable safety decisions under distribution shift. The evaluation covers direct and indirect prompt injection, difficult benign inputs, obfuscated samples, and distribution shift; the LLM judge achieves the highest AUROC at 0.897, followed by Jev at 0.871, Llama Prompt Guard 2 86M at 0.757, and 22M at 0.714. The paper finds that Jev's native probabilities are not stably better than post-hoc calibrated classifier scores, and temperature scaling improves calibration but not discrimination. At a 1% empirical false negative rate target, all evaluated gated review systems require an escalation rate above 91.8%, with substantial false positive rates. The authors argue that effective LLM safety systems require joint evaluation of detection, calibration, reviewer behavior, and operational decision policies.