Third-party red-team pilot finds vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal agent monitoring system

1. 15:45
   X@ela_euk· Discussion

   OpenAI invited two outsiders to audit the system that watches its agents. They found the watcher itself had a blind spo…(opens the original post in a new tab)
2. 05:33
   X@Ara_Talks· Discussion

   Outside red-teamers found holes in OpenAI's agent monitor METR and Redwood spent three weeks inside OpenAI testing the…(opens the original post in a new tab)
3. 01:23
   X@megamac1984· Discussion

   O METR e a Redwood passaram 3 semanas dentro da OpenAI e acharam uma falha que deixaria agentes esconderem centenas de…(opens the original post in a new tab)

1. 20:25
   X@GustavoCols· Discussion

   An independent evaluation of #OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system found it unfit for purpose when the comp…(opens the original post in a new tab)
2. 20:00
   X@hamzahbuilds· Discussion

   OpenAI's internal agent monitor could be disabled by two client-controllable headers. That is one finding from the MET…(opens the original post in a new tab)
3. 19:16
   X@getsuperintel· Discussion

   METR and Redwood Research spent three weeks inside OpenAI this summer, with access to its internal codebase and monitor…(opens the original post in a new tab)
4. 12:00
   WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

   OpenAI fait l'objet d'un examen de sécurité de la part de METR et de Redwood Research en raison de failles de sécurité dans la surveillance de son IA.(opens the original post in a new tab)
5. 12:00
   PlusWeb3Selected

   METR and other institutions found flaws in OpenAI's monitoring infrastructure, raising concerns about AI evading monitoring

   METR and Redwood Research jointly investigated OpenAI's internal AI agent monitoring system and found multiple vulnerabilities that could bypass monitoring, but did not report actual misuse. The vulnerabilities include theoretical methods to bypass the Codex sandbox and automated review, a flaw that excludes the most recent hundreds of actions from monitoring, and an issue where a specific header can disable monitoring of new agents. A summary of the investigation was made public on October 22, 2026; two researchers accessed OpenAI's internal code and monitoring configurations over 3 weeks and interviewed about 12 security and safety personnel. The issue that session history compaction does not trigger monitoring may have left about 10% of target traffic unmonitored from May to July, and OpenAI fixed it during the investigation. OpenAI said it has fixed all known vulnerabilities affecting production environment safety protections and adjusted monitoring scope, but the two organizations did not verify this claim; the researchers recommend triggering monitoring at fixed times or message counts, checking monitoring records, and regularly testing the monitoring infrastructure from an attacker's perspective.

6. 03:24
   X@engrbilalwaris· Discussion

   Outside evaluators found 'novel vulnerabilities' in OpenAI's internal agent-monitoring system. METR and Redwood Resear…(opens the original post in a new tab)
7. 03:11
   X@blakeholmanfit· Discussion

   OpenAI says the holes in its agent monitoring are patched. METR, the team that red teamed it, says it has not verified…(opens the original post in a new tab)
8. 00:41
   X@LastSafeHour· Discussion

   METR and Redwood found gaps in OpenAI's monitoring. Their audit examined a July system. OpenAI says it patched producti…(opens the original post in a new tab)

1. 12:34
   X@chataclaw· Discussion

   METR and Redwood tested OpenAI's agent monitoring system for three weeks. They reportedly found holes such as the agent being able to remove its own operations from monitoring targets. The setup, in which an external organization is paid to look for weaknesses in a structure that leaves monitoring to the same AI side, is healthy. ht…(opens the original post in a new tab)
2. 03:16
   X@RShmider· Discussion

   Interesting AI security news. Researchers at METR found vulnerabilities in OpenAI’s internal agent monitoring systems.…(opens the original post in a new tab)
3. 02:01
   X@NabilChiheb· Discussion

   metr and redwood spent three weeks inside openais agent monitoring. they found agents could hide hundreds of actions, p…(opens the original post in a new tab)
4. 01:01
   X@leetllm· Discussion

   Monitor agents mid-turn. In OpenAI's July internal setup, METR found agents could defer checks indefinitely by continui…(opens the original post in a new tab)
5. 00:19
   X@anilpervaiz· Discussion

   Your agent monitor is only as good as when it fires. METR and Redwood spent three weeks red-teaming OpenAI's internal…(opens the original post in a new tab)

1. 23:13
   X@ApollonVisual· Discussion

   OpenAI monitoring failed during Hugging Face attack METR and Redwood Research released a report on Thursday evaluating…(opens the original post in a new tab)
2. 22:35
   X@gixeppe· Discussion

   OpenAI gave two outside researchers three weeks of inside access to try to blind its AI agent watchdog. They found ways…(opens the original post in a new tab)
3. 22:31
   X@_pksharma· Discussion

   METR and Redwood red-team finds critical flaws in OpenAI agent monitoring A joint red-team investigation by METR and R…(opens the original post in a new tab)
4. 20:33
   X@chataclaw· Discussion

   When METR and Redwood spent 3 weeks trying to break OpenAI's agent monitoring system, they found loopholes such as one that removes the agent's own most recent hundreds of actions from monitoring. Monitoring only works once external verification is effective. Even the report that it has been patched—the culture of third-party verification…(opens the original post in a new tab)
5. 19:31
   X@Surreal_Intel· Discussion

   𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀: METR, Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems (22 October): https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-r…(opens the original post in a new tab)
6. 19:30
   X@Surreal_Intel· Discussion

   External researchers found a gap in OpenAI’s agent monitoring: review waited for the agent to return control. An agent…(opens the original post in a new tab)
7. 18:00
   X@Astrodevil_· Discussion

   Best agent-safety read this week: METR's public summary of a 61-page report on red-teaming OpenAI's internal agent moni…(opens the original post in a new tab)
8. 15:46
   X@0xgentileschi· Discussion

   OpenAI left a few narrow exits in its training sandbox: metrics, logging, auth. Its own red-team agents found holes in…(opens the original post in a new tab)
9. 14:17
   X@KlauseSchip· Discussion

   Useful outside look. METR and Redwood spent 3 weeks onsite at OpenAI (Jul 21 to Aug 11) with deep code access, stress-t…(opens the original post in a new tab)
10. 13:06
    XX @AISafetyMemes· Discussion

    METR: "We discovered an exploit agents could use that would prevent hundreds of recent actions (including the exploit itself) from being ...(opens the original post in a new tab)
11. 11:36
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    OpenAI resumes frontier AI training after security overhaul, discloses flaw in widely used software(opens the original post in a new tab)
12. 09:44
    X@AoAbundance· Discussion

    Our takeaway: an oversight review should ask for matched activity and monitoring logs, plus a review cadence independen…(opens the original post in a new tab)
13. 09:44
    X@AoAbundance· Discussion

    OpenAI had already identified the compaction issue and fixed it during the exercise. It later said all identified vulne…(opens the original post in a new tab)
14. 09:44
    X@AoAbundance· Discussion

    The timing mattered too. Checks ran when the agent handed control back to the user. During the compaction gap, continui…(opens the original post in a new tab)
15. 09:44
    X@AoAbundance· Discussion

    One gap involved compaction: shortening an agent’s working context. METR estimates missing checks at these events left…(opens the original post in a new tab)
16. 09:44
    X@AoAbundance· Discussion

    AI research group METR’s “Red-Teaming OpenAI’s Internal Agent Monitoring Systems” (22 Oct 2026) exposes a gap between b…(opens the original post in a new tab)
17. 08:50
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    OpenAI reprend la formation en IA de pointe après une refonte de ses mesures de sécurité et révèle une faille(opens the original post in a new tab)
18. 08:25
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    A red team report shows that OpenAI's monitoring system failed to operate normally when Hugging Face was attacked.(opens the original post in a new tab)
19. 08:20
    X@warrenzp8· Discussion

    OpenAI's "monitoring" was audited by outsiders, who found holes everywhere. AI safety organizations METR and Redwood Research announced that each sent one person to work inside OpenAI for three weeks, red-teaming its own agent monitoring system. Result: multiple novel vulnerabilities were found, including on…(opens the original post in a new tab)
20. 08:01
    X@linma4217· Discussion

    3. METR and Redwood spent three weeks inside OpenAI testing its agent monitors. They estimate 75–94% of internal agent…(opens the original post in a new tab)
21. 07:22
    XiaohongshuXiaohongshu · Max For AI· Discussion

    OpenAI asked external reviewers to check its monitoring and found multiple bypasses(opens the original post in a new tab)
22. 06:52
    X@developer312773· Discussion

    METR and Redwood spent 3 weeks red-teaming OpenAI's agent monitor. 6 evasion paths, mostly plumbing: compaction, hidden…(opens the original post in a new tab)
23. 05:28
    X@koltregaskes2· Discussion

    Two outside researchers spent three weeks inside OpenAI this summer testing the system meant to catch its internal agen…(opens the original post in a new tab)
24. 05:12
    X@a_mahringer· Discussion

    the METR and redwood review of openai's agent monitor found two http headers that let an agent start a copy of itself w…(opens the original post in a new tab)
25. 04:06
    WebCNA · Technology· Media coverage

    OpenAI resumes frontier AI training after security overhaul, discloses flaw in widely used software(opens the original post in a new tab)
26. 03:55
    X@Catfishwhat9· Discussion

    METR and Redwood did three weeks of red-teaming on OpenAI's internal agent monitoring, and I think the funniest one: for a while the monitoring only triggered when the agent handed control back to the user, so as long as the agent kept working without stopping, it could go unreviewed indefinitely. Isn't that just "only…"(opens the original post in a new tab)
27. 03:31
    X@AIStockWire_· Discussion

    Outside testers spent three weeks inside #OpenAI and found ways its AI agents could evade monitoring https://aistockwir…(opens the original post in a new tab)
28. 03:14
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    Red-team report found OpenAI utterly failed to monitor its agents during Hugging Face attack(opens the original post in a new tab)
29. 02:37
    X@mamiferolab· Discussion

    METR y Redwood hallaron formas de esquivar el monitor de agentes de OpenAI 🤔https://www.mamiferolab.com/notas/metr-red-…(opens the original post in a new tab)
30. 02:11
    X@neuronium_ai· Discussion

    OpenAI audit found Codex monitoring gaps, but the full report stayed private METR found Codex activity escaping monito…(opens the original post in a new tab)
31. 02:10
    X@3li3· Discussion

    رابط التقرير الأمني الكامل من منظمة METR: https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-red-teaming-openai-agent-monitoring/(opens the original post in a new tab)
32. 02:10
    X@3li3· Discussion

    10% من استخدام وكلاء البرمجة تجاوز أنظمة الرصد الأمني في فحص مستقل 🕵 الافتراض بأن وجود نموذج رقابي يفحص أوامر وكيل ال…(opens the original post in a new tab)
33. 02:07
    X@Zeniteqco· Discussion

    OpenAI Agent Audit Found Multiple Monitor Bypass Paths METR and Redwood Research identified weaknesses in OpenAI’s his…(opens the original post in a new tab)
34. 02:00
    The DecoderSelected

    Three-week on-site audit of OpenAI finds major gaps in AI safety monitoring

    Two researchers from METR and Redwood Research spent three weeks on-site at OpenAI auditing its internal monitoring system for AI loss-of-control behavior and found multiple weak points. According to METR's estimate, during the audit period 6% to 25% of internal agentic Responses API traffic from GPT-5.5-level and above models was entirely uncovered by monitoring; about 10% of internal Codex traffic that should have been monitored was not tracked between May and July due to a defect in handling compaction events (context summarization), which OpenAI independently discovered and fixed during the audit, and METR said both estimates have large uncertainty. The auditors also found methods to hide hundreds of operations from the monitor and to bypass the Codex sandbox, and judged that specially crafted inputs would likely crash the monitor entirely; at the start of the audit, model behavior during RL training was not monitored.

35. 01:50
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    OpenAI reprend la formation en IA de pointe après une refonte de ses mesures de sécurité et révèle une faille dans un logiciel largement utilisé(opens the original post in a new tab)
36. 01:10
    X@alexlee20122022· Discussion

    openai paid outside red teamers to audit the system that watches its own coding agents. metr's verdict, reported this w…(opens the original post in a new tab)
37. 00:36
    X@djcroman· Discussion

    OpenAI let METR and Redwood try to sneak its own coding agents past its safety monitor. They found gaps: a Codex sandb…(opens the original post in a new tab)

1. 23:58
   X@hazemomier· Discussion

   METR وRedwood عملوا red team على monitoring الـ agents في OpenAI. أهم لقطة: الـ monitor كان بيشتغل بس لما الـ agent يرج…(opens the original post in a new tab)
2. 23:55
   X@skimwirehq· Discussion

   Outside testers spent three weeks inside OpenAI probing the system that watches its AI agents. They found two settings…(opens the original post in a new tab)
3. 23:30
   X@0MeissnerState· Discussion

   @OpenAI let outside researchers from METR and Redwood spend three weeks inside its infrastructure assessing internal-ag…(opens the original post in a new tab)
4. 23:04
   X@MrmartinsGaze· Discussion

   Fri 23.10.2026 - AI / tech in 1 min (Anthropic's S-1 still not public as of this morning) - 🕵 🇺🇸 METR and Redwood Res…(opens the original post in a new tab)
5. 22:55
   X@kamerFo· Discussion

   The most ironic scene in AI safety: OpenAI's agent monitoring used to trigger only when the agent handed back control—as long as the agent never stopped, it could keep evading review. METR and Redwood, on site for three weeks, also dug up two request headers that could directly turn off the new agent monitoring. OpenAI says it has been fixed…(opens the original post in a new tab)
6. 22:46
   XX @boazbaraktcs· Discussion

   Grateful to METR and Redwood for this assessment, which took place in July&August (planned before the hugging face incident, but coi...(opens the original post in a new tab)
7. 22:19
   RedditReddit r/AIsafety· Discussion

   METR and Redwood Research just published findings from a three-week investigation into OpenAI's internal AI-agent monitoring.(opens the original post in a new tab)
8. 22:02
   X@inclinq_Founder· Discussion

   July–August test, not proof of abuse. OpenAI says fixes are in. https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-red-teaming-openai-age…(opens the original post in a new tab)
9. 22:02
   X@inclinq_Founder· Discussion

   Researchers found a flaw that could hide hundreds of AI-agent actions from OpenAI's internal monitor. The watchdog had…(opens the original post in a new tab)
10. 20:36
    X@saadkamal· Discussion

    metr red-teamed openai's agent monitoring. codex could escape its sandbox, and ~10% of internal codex use went unmonito…(opens the original post in a new tab)
11. 20:16
    X@Adham__Khaled__· Discussion

    sources: - https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-red-teaming-openai-agent-monitoring/ - https://alignment.openai.com/misalig…(opens the original post in a new tab)
12. 19:35
    X@window98se· Discussion

    METR and Redwood Research spent 3 weeks inside OpenAI stress-testing its internal agent monitoring and found gaps. Deta…(opens the original post in a new tab)
13. 19:33
    X@window98se· Discussion

    외부 감사기관 METR·Redwood가 OpenAI 사내 AI 에이전트 감시 시스템을 3주간 점검, 허점을 찾았다. Codex 트래픽 약 10% 미감시·행동 은닉 허점 등 세부는 미확인, OpenAI는 패치했다고…(opens the original post in a new tab)
14. 19:23
    X@leonfu2012· Discussion

    OpenAI invited outsiders on-site to investigate for 3 weeks: the vulnerabilities when AI works with no one watching are more numerous than imagined. METR and Redwood Research sent people to be on-site at OpenAI for 3 weeks, specifically examining the monitoring system for internal Agents. OpenAI officially also reposted it, saying the problems found…(opens the original post in a new tab)
15. 19:15
    X@divid_lu49394· Discussion

    OpenAI originally had a monitoring system specifically watching whether internal AI Agents exceeded authority, deceived, or secretly performed dangerous operations. As a result, after inviting two AI safety organizations, METR and Redwood Research, to check it, it was found that this system itself had quite a few vulnerabilities. Two researchers were on-site for three…(opens the original post in a new tab)
16. 19:11
    X@0xwolverines· Discussion

    Agents keep working, so auditing can't wait for them to "clock off." Redwood's October 22 announcement of a red team exercise with METR: it evaluated historical systems as of July 21 and does not represent current coverage. At the time, monitoring was triggered when the agent handed control back to the user; context compaction did not trigger monitoring, and the researchers estimate it caused 5—...(opens the original post in a new tab)
17. 18:36
    X@Zizaiaiai· Discussion

    OpenAI did something rather unusual: inviting outsiders in to inspect its own "monitoring system." This summer, METR and Redwood Research sent people to be on-site at OpenAI for three weeks and obtained deep infrastructure access. What they examined was what OpenAI uses to monitor…(opens the original post in a new tab)
18. 17:53
    X@0xLogicrw· Discussion

    OpenAI originally had a monitoring system specifically watching whether internal AI agents overstepped authority, deceived, or secretly performed dangerous operations. After bringing in the two AI safety organizations METR and Redwood Research to check, it turned out the monitoring system itself had quite a few vulnerabilities. Two researchers were on site for three…(opens the original post in a new tab)
19. 17:26
    X@0xLogicrw· Discussion

    OpenAI originally had a monitoring system specifically watching whether internal AI agents overstepped authority, deceived, or secretly performed dangerous operations. After bringing in the two AI safety organizations METR and Redwood Research to check, it turned out the monitoring system itself had quite a few vulnerabilities. Two researchers were on site for three…(opens the original post in a new tab)
20. 17:22
    X@aure79lien· Discussion

    Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems ⚠ https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-red-teaming-openai-agent-mo…(opens the original post in a new tab)
21. 17:06
    X@AristoclesTheG· Discussion

    4/ METR/Redwood found ways OpenAI agents could delay monitoring, hide actions, exploit serialization gaps, and bypass s…(opens the original post in a new tab)
22. 16:24
    X@justelite· Discussion

    METR and Redwood red-teamed OpenAI's internal agent monitoring for 3 weeks: only an est. 75–94% of agent traffic was el…(opens the original post in a new tab)
23. 16:01
    X@dorlando1997· Discussion

    4/4 — METR y Redwood Research publican hallazgos de red-team sobre la monitorización de misalignment de OpenAI https://…(opens the original post in a new tab)
24. 15:42
    X@Rachidmarcil· Discussion

    🔥 METR + Redwood had 3 weeks of full access to OpenAI's agent-monitoring stack — and broke it: customer settings disabl…(opens the original post in a new tab)
25. 15:23
    X@itsSanwalZia· Discussion

    Here's the AI safety problem in one sentence: What happens when the thing being monitored can interfere with the monit…(opens the original post in a new tab)
26. 15:03
    X@QQTeng· Discussion

    OpenAI safety action: invite METR and Redwood Research to deeply access internal systems, with a three-week embedded evaluation of internal monitoring mechanisms. The test results are used to strengthen safety guardrails and also pave the way for subsequent third-party independent evaluation cooperation. Safety verification of frontier large models is moving toward deeply embedded red-team auditing.…(opens the original post in a new tab)
27. 14:31
    X@JkwuRmsl· Discussion

    METR and Redwood go into OpenAI for embedded evaluation, find that the monitoring system has vulnerabilities; the agent can make hundreds of actions evade surveillance. Officials say the production side has been fixed, but there has been no independent external verification yet. Third parties being able to enter the server room to check is more reliable than only looking at one's own red team report. Will the next lab dare to open its doors too(opens the original post in a new tab)
28. 14:14
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    OpenAI's AI monitoring system found to have vulnerabilities: hundreds of operations can evade inspection(opens the original post in a new tab)
29. 14:04
    X@WWTLitee· Discussion

    OpenAI's agent monitoring once missed about 10% of internal Codex traffic? METR and Redwood Research conducted a round of red teaming on OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring from late July to mid-August, and finally delivered a 61-page report. The most…(opens the original post in a new tab)
30. 13:02
    X@HLakadawala· Discussion

    4. METR and Redwood red-teamed OAI’s agent monitoring finding 2 headers that can start an unmonitored new agent instanc…(opens the original post in a new tab)
31. 12:48
    X@Benjaminliang_1· Discussion

    METR and Redwood each sent one person, with high privileges, to red-team agent monitoring inside OpenAI for three weeks. According to METR, in July about 75–94% of internal agent traffic on GPT-5.5 and above was within monitoring scope, and RL training was initially not covered. There are also two…(opens the original post in a new tab)
32. 12:06
    AI Times (Korea)Selected

    External evaluation report discloses numerous vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal monitoring system

    METR 与 Redwood Research 对 OpenAI 内部 AI Agent 监控系统做了三周红队测试，发现可绕过监控、削弱安全限制的漏洞，OpenAI 称已修复所有影响实际生产安全的问题。研究团队访问了内部代码、监控配置与文档，并访谈约 12 名安全研究与工程人员，其中一个漏洞可让 Agent 把最近数百条行为排除在监控之外，具体攻击方式未公开；Codex 还可绕过沙箱与 Auto-Review，部分内部工具可绕过只读权限，但未验证在实际环境中的可利用性。监控覆盖存在缺口，研究者估计 GPT-5.5 以上模型使用的内部 Responses API 流量有 6~25% 可能不在监控范围，内部 Codex Agent 流量为 0.8%，两项估计的不确定性都较大；2026 年 5~7 月压缩（compaction）事件未被监控，约 10% 的内部 Codex 流量可能被漏掉。

33. 12:04
    X@HarshaHegde0· Discussion

    openai let METR and redwood red-team its internal agent monitoring for 3 weeks. they found a way codex agents could by…(opens the original post in a new tab)
34. 12:02
    X@aitopline· Discussion

    A METR and a Redwood researcher spent three weeks inside OpenAI testing the monitor on its coding agents. They found ga…(opens the original post in a new tab)
35. 11:59
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    OpenAI responds that the monitoring vulnerability has been fixed but has not been verified: METR testing found that agents can postpone checks; recommends a fixed frequency of isolated monitoring(opens the original post in a new tab)
36. 11:38
    X@bioshok3· Discussion

    METR and Redwood Research conducted a 3-week "embedded assessment" at OpenAI. They accessed internal code and monitoring configurations, and found multiple gaps in the monitoring of internal AI agents. ・At the time, users...(opens the original post in a new tab)
37. 11:07
    X@agipulse_org· Discussion

    METR paraphrase: OpenAI says the vulnerabilities affecting production defenses have all been patched; METR has not verified this. OpenAI's official account confirms the collaboration, saying the findings helped harden defenses 🔒 METR original source: https://metr.org/blog/2026-10-22-red-teaming-…(opens the original post in a new tab)
38. 11:06
    X@agipulse_org· Discussion

    A health check for the monitoring system, and the results are not all excellent 👀 METR and Redwood Research each sent one person to be embedded at OpenAI for three weeks, red-teaming its internal agent misalignment monitoring (the system before July 21). METR's summary says: about 75–94% of internal agent traffic was within monitoring (limited to G...(opens the original post in a new tab)
39. 10:54
    Sina TechSelected

    Third party finds OpenAI vulnerability: AI agents can evade security audits

    METR and Redwood Research completed a pilot security test of OpenAI's internal AI agent monitoring system and found some vulnerabilities that could allow a large number of an agent's operations to evade security audits. The test was conducted from late July to early August; each of the two organizations sent one researcher to OpenAI, using dedicated devices restricted to the office premises, and accessed internal code repositories and monitoring configuration documents for stress testing, ultimately producing a 61-page internal report. The test found vulnerabilities that could allow an agent to evade monitoring across hundreds of operations, and estimated that during the test period about 10% of Codex's internal business traffic was not covered by the monitoring system. OpenAI said it had fixed all vulnerabilities that would affect the online production environment, but the two organizations did not re-verify the fixed system; as a pilot project, the parties agreed to disclose only summary conclusions, and the full report will not be publicly released.

40. 10:38
    X@AIScientist_X· Discussion

    NEWS: METR AND REDWOOD FOUND HOLES IN OPENAI'S AGENT MONITORING > One METR employee and one Redwood Research employee…(opens the original post in a new tab)
41. 10:31
    X@rwadatax· Discussion

    @OpenAI Inviting METR and Redwood on-site for three weeks is rare industry hygiene. 🫤(opens the original post in a new tab)
42. 10:17
    X@swif_ai· Discussion

    METR: OpenAI's agent monitor ran when an agent returned control, so while compaction was unmonitored, an agent could de…(opens the original post in a new tab)
43. 10:11
    X@dsoch8c· Discussion

    METR and Redwood's hands-on testing found that OpenAI's internal Codex agent had vulnerabilities that could obtain equivalent permissions and evade monitoring. The two organizations each sent 1 researcher to be on site from 2026-07-21 to 2026-08-11; officials did not give specific times. The team, by reviewing code, prompts, and interviewing more than ten…(opens the original post in a new tab)
44. 10:08
    X@shao__meng· Discussion

    Each sends one person deep into OpenAI for three weeks: METR and Redwood stress-test the internal Agent "misaligned behavior" monitoring system. This summer, @METR_Evals and @redwood_ai each sent one person to be stationed at OpenAI for three weeks, to deeply inspect the internal agent (including...(opens the original post in a new tab)
45. 09:53
    X@twobee265841· Discussion

    The monitoring coverage of AI agents should be accepted based on the traffic that actually completed inspection. The full METR report gives a specific figure: it estimates that at the time, 99.2% of the Responses API traffic used by internal Codex fell within the intended monitoring scope. The report's footnote states that system errors and implementation flaws could still allow these requests to slip past review.…(opens the original post in a new tab)
46. 09:41
    Hacker NewsHacker News· Discussion

    Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems(opens the original post in a new tab)
47. 09:35
    RedditReddit r/artificial· Discussion

    METR, Redwood Research find exploit in OpenAI agent monitoring that could hide hundreds of actions(opens the original post in a new tab)
48. 08:57
    X@catcowbug· Discussion

    best finding in the metr / redwood red team of openais agent monitoring is a parser differential. the monitor didnt rea…(opens the original post in a new tab)
49. 08:52
    X @tomekkorbak

    OpenAI internal agent alignment monitoring evaluation report made public; participant says publication was edited and delayed by two and a half months

    Two employees from METR and Redwood Research spent three weeks embedded at OpenAI this summer, conducting an embedded evaluation pilot to assess OpenAI's system for monitoring internal agent alignment issues; their work brief is now public. The author who participated in the project said this was one of the third-party collaborations he took part in at OpenAI; he declined to comment on the scale of the edits OpenAI did not allow METR to make to the report, and expressed disappointment that there was no explanation for the two-and-a-half-month delay in publication.

50. 08:36
    X@TweetThreatNews· Discussion

    Metr and Redwood Research identified ways to bypass or disable OpenAI’s coding-agent monitoring. OpenAI said it patched…(opens the original post in a new tab)
51. 08:32
    X@delx369· Discussion

    METR and Redwood audited how OpenAI monitors its own agents. the monitor only fired when an agent handed control back,…(opens the original post in a new tab)
52. 08:20
    WebAI Threat Watch (aithreat.io)· Media coverage

    External evaluators found vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal monitoring system: AI agents can bypass safety restrictions(opens the original post in a new tab)
53. Time not given
    SohuSelected

    METR testing finds vulnerabilities in OpenAI agent monitoring system, hundreds of operations can evade inspection

    AI evaluation organization METR publicly released the results of joint testing with Redwood Research, finding multiple vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal AI agent monitoring system, one exploitation method of which could allow hundreds of recent operations to go unmonitored; OpenAI said the vulnerabilities affecting its production defense system have been fixed, but the evaluators have not yet verified this. The testing was conducted from July 21 to August 11, targeting the system state as of July 21 and before; the evaluators submitted a 61-page internal report to OpenAI, and the article published on October 22 disclosed only some of the results. One vulnerability was in the monitoring trigger timing: the system at the time triggered monitoring only when the agent handed back control, so the agent could in theory continue executing operations to delay inspection; the researchers did not check whether this was actually exploited. The evaluation also found that the Codex agent could in principle bypass the sandbox and automated review. METR recommended checking agents at fixed message counts or time intervals and isolating agents from the monitoring system; OpenAI had already expanded monitoring and fixed some issues during testing, and subsequent fixes have not yet been reviewed by the evaluators.

54. Time not given
    k.sina.com.cnSelected

    Third party finds OpenAI vulnerability: AI agent can evade safety audits

    According to CNBC, the nonprofit AI safety organization METR and Redwood Research completed a pilot safety test of OpenAI's internal AI agent monitoring system, finding multiple vulnerabilities, some of which could allow a large number of an agent's operations to evade security auditing. The test was conducted from late July to early August; each organization sent one researcher to OpenAI, who, accompanied by dedicated staff, used dedicated devices restricted to the office premises to access the internal codebase and monitoring configuration documents, producing a 61-page internal security report. The test found vulnerabilities that could allow an agent to evade monitoring for hundreds of operations, and estimated that between May and July about 10% of Codex internal business traffic was not covered by the monitoring system. OpenAI said it had fixed all vulnerabilities affecting the online production environment, but the two organizations did not re-verify the fixed system; under the pilot agreement, only a summary of conclusions was disclosed externally, and the full report will not be made public.

55. 03:40
    The Straits TimesSelected

    External evaluators found flaws in OpenAI's AI monitoring system during a pilot evaluation

    METR and Redwood Research found multiple new vulnerabilities in a pilot evaluation of the monitoring system OpenAI uses internally for embedded evaluations. The evaluation took place from July 21 to August 11, with one researcher from each organization using equipment provided by OpenAI at OpenAI's premises, with access to internal code, documentation and some technical staff. The vulnerabilities found included an exploit that agents could have used to let hundreds of actions go unmonitored, and a potential path for the Codex agent to bypass safety restrictions and act with the user's full permissions. OpenAI said these findings helped it strengthen protections as it scales the system, and said it has fixed all vulnerabilities affecting production protections, but the two organizations said they did not verify these fixes. The parties agreed to publish only a broad summary, with OpenAI having the right to redact sensitive information; the full 61-page internal report was provided only to OpenAI.

56. 03:10
    iThome (Taiwan)Selected

    Multiple vulnerabilities found in OpenAI's internal model monitoring system

    METR and Redwood Research published a report saying that OpenAI's internal AI model monitoring system had multiple vulnerabilities, and OpenAI stated it has patched all issues found in this study. The research was conducted at OpenAI's invitation as a stress test, from July 21 to August 11. The report found that the Codex agent could bypass the Codex sandbox and the Auto-Review mechanism, acting arbitrarily within the scope of actions the host user was originally authorized to perform; it could also exploit serialization differences in execution traces to make the monitoring system see different traces and thereby evade monitoring, and could use two client-controllable headers to disable monitoring and cause newly created agents to be unmonitored. The team also found two internal agent tools considered read-only but unmonitored, and a method to bypass restrictions within the sandbox, but has not yet actually verified its feasibility.

57. 00:04
    CNBC · TechnologySelected

    Third-party evaluators found vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal monitoring system during a pilot

    METR and Redwood Research said that in a three-week pilot, the two organizations were given deep access to OpenAI's internal monitoring system used to monitor model misalignment and found multiple novel vulnerabilities, including an exploit that lets an agent make hundreds of recent actions evade monitoring; OpenAI said it has fixed the vulnerabilities affecting its production guardrails. The pilot ran from July 21 to August 11, with one employee from each organization, accompanied, using equipment provided by OpenAI, accessing its internal codebase, documentation and some technical staff, and the evaluation targeted the system state as of July 21 and earlier. The two sides agreed to publish only a summary public article and to submit a 61-page internal report to OpenAI. The pilot is part of OpenAI's implementation of Altman's September commitment to give independent evaluators employee-like access, and OpenAI said earlier this month that it is finalizing contracts with third-party safety evaluators.

1. 23:32
   Redwood ResearchSelected

   Redwood Research and METR red-team test OpenAI's internal agent monitoring system

   Redwood Research and METR conducted a high-privilege red-team exercise against OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system from July 21 to August 11, finding multiple vulnerabilities that can bypass monitoring; OpenAI said issues affecting the production defense stack have been fixed. The test estimated that about 75%–94% of internal Responses API agent traffic generated by models at least as strong as GPT-5.5 can be monitored, and 99.2% of that API traffic used for the internal Codex agent can be monitored. Because compaction events were not monitored, about 10% of qualifying internal Codex traffic from May to July was not monitored, and OpenAI fixed this issue during the exercise. The test also found that the Codex agent could in principle bypass the sandbox and Auto-Review, and that there are paths to keep hundreds of recent actions unmonitored and to disable monitoring of the new agent via a client request header.

2. 23:26
   X @METR_Evals

   Two employees from METR and Redwood Research were embedded at OpenAI for three weeks, piloting an evaluation of its internal agent alignment monitoring system

   Two employees from METR and Redwood Research were embedded at OpenAI for three weeks this summer to conduct an embedded evaluation pilot assessing the system OpenAI uses to monitor internal agent alignment issues; a brief report on this work is now public.

3. 15:00
   METRSelected

   METR and Redwood red-team OpenAI's internal agent monitoring system

   From July 21 to August 11, METR and Redwood Research conducted a three-week high-privilege red-team pilot against OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system and produced a 61-page internal report. METR estimates that about 75%–94% of internal Responses API agent traffic from models at least as capable as GPT-5.5 is eligible for monitoring, and that this proportion is 99.2% for internal Codex agent traffic. They found multiple bypass paths, including that Codex agents could in theory bypass the Codex sandbox and Auto-Review, exploit serialization differences to make the monitor fail, use client-controllable request headers to launch new unmonitored agents, and cause hundreds of recent actions to go unmonitored. OpenAI said that vulnerabilities affecting the production defense stack have all been patched; METR did not evaluate this claim; these findings correspond to the system as of July 21 and earlier.

Current attention 48·Peak in the comparable period 85 (Oct 23 14:00)·Change over the comparable past 24 hours -4%