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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 145 papers
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Attack type

Jailbreaks47Prompt injection38Poisoning and backdoors13Extraction and theft8Detection evasion24Malicious use7

Attack technique

Gradient and representation optimization32Automated search15Multi-turn escalation6Encoding and obfuscation15Cross-modal payloads55Defense-targeted5Dormant triggers9

Defense type

Model hardening5Inference-time intervention7Detection and filtering17Instruction–data separation6Permissions and approval5Watermarking and provenance4

Impact

Harmful content48Unauthorized actions17Data and privacy leaks15Output manipulation55Availability and reliability5

System type

Models and APIs91LLM applications7AI Agent47coding agent4web agent4Browser and computer use3Multi-agent systems24Embodied systems and robotics8

Attacker access

Black-box37Gray-box3White-box13No-box (offline transfer)3

Attack surface / entry point

User input381Web pages and interfaces68Documents and messages85Tool responses104Tool and skill descriptions60Code repositories and dependencies31Retrieval corpus35Memory writes37Inter-agent messages27Images, audio and video118Training data70Weights and gradients66Distribution channels59Inference services and hardware22

Layer

Prompt layer67Model layer19Application layer47Training and data layer11

System component

MCP and skills7Memory5Guardrails and judges22Reasoning chains6Permissions and sandboxing9Fine-tuning and open weights7Vision74Audio19Video8Image generation14Multimodal109
Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 313papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
Attack surface / entry point：Inter-agent messagesAttack surface / entry point：Images, audio and videoClear all

Another 313papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. DefensesarXiv 2610.13733

    KVeil: First-Place Solution for the ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Unlearnable Video Challenge

    Propose KVeil, which adds perturbations to face videos to prevent unauthorized customization from reproducing identity

    arXiv
    2610.13733
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    White-box, Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Wan2.2-TI2V-5B, HunyuanVideo-1.5, Kling 3.0 and others4

    AbstractKVeil adapts LETHE's reference-reading disruption to the challenge's two stages, ranking first on the leaderboard in both Final columns.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  2. DefensesarXiv 2610.13333

    LETHE: Defending Against Unauthorized Image-to-Video Generation via Value Diversity Collapse

    Proposes LETHE, which perturbs reference images to block unauthorized image-to-video

    arXiv
    2610.13333
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Wan2.1-I2V-14B, CogVideoX-5B-I2V, LightX2V and others6
    AbstractLETHE suppresses the diversity of reference values and attracts attention, making protected images difficult to animate faithfully.

    LETHE is a protective perturbation added to personal images before publication, used to counter unauthorized image-to-video generation.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  3. AttacksarXiv 2610.09819

    FAB 攻击：给 HuBERT/WavLM 植入后门，背景警笛声即可让下游语音任务失灵

    提出 FAB 攻击，向声学基础模型植入可由环境声触发的后门

    arXiv
    2610.09819
    Published
    Layer
    Training and data layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    HuBERT-base, WavLM-base

    Abstract论文提出了针对声学基模的 FAB 后门攻击，在弱威胁模型下实现了任务无关、物理可触发的后门植入。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  5. DefensesarXiv 2610.09703

    研究揭示 Token-Pruning 对 VLM 安全性的影响并提出 SAP 缓解机制

    提出 Safety-Aware Pruning，缓解视觉 token 剪枝放大的多模态越狱

    arXiv
    2610.09703
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    LLaVA-1.5-7B
    Abstract剪枝去掉背景 token 后注意力塌向恶意前景。

    这篇工作评估视觉 token 剪枝如何改变 VLM 在多模态越狱下的行为，并给出推理时防御 SAP。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  6. AttacksarXiv 2610.09240

    WebMirage 用对抗图像劫持视觉网页 Agent 的浏览器操作

    提出 WebMirage，用局部对抗图像劫持视觉网页 Agent 的浏览器操作

    arXiv
    2610.09240
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    web agent
    Evaluated models
    LLaVA-v1.5-13B, LLaVA-v1.6-34B, MiniCPM-o-8B and others6
    Abstract论文提出了针对网络智能体的端到端视觉红队框架 WebMirage，揭示了从视觉定位到浏览器执行的安全脆弱性。

    WebMirage 是一个面向视觉定位网络智能体的流水线感知端到端红队攻击框架。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  7. AttacksarXiv 2610.09027

    P-VMI：对抗图像经 KV cache 持续影响多轮对话

    提出持久视觉记忆注入，使对抗图像经缓存在触发时操控输出

    arXiv
    2610.09027
    Published
    Layer
    Infrastructure layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct, Gemma-4-12B

    Abstract论文提出 P-VMI，证实对抗输入被掩蔽后仍可经 KV 缓存持久控制模型，强调了保留状态的安全风险。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  9. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2610.07939

    CCDF 数据集：Grok Imagine、Veo 3.1、Sora 2 伪造监控录像，十个深伪检测器基本认不出

    提出监控深伪基准 CCDF，在统一编码后评测检测器对伪造犯罪事故录像的识别

    arXiv
    2610.07939
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    C2P-CLIP, ForgeLens, D3-Im and others10

    Abstract提出消除格式捷径的监控深度伪造基准 CCDF，揭示现有检测器难以识别商用生成视频。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  10. AttacksarXiv 2610.07323

    ATLAS：用自适应信任域与主动学习搜索潜在对抗样本集

    提出 ATLAS 用水平集估计恢复黑盒分类器的对抗输入集合

    arXiv
    2610.07323
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    LeNet5, ResNet50 (CIFAR-10 standard), ResNet50 (ImageNet standard) and others5
    AbstractATLAS 用主动水平集估计构造黑盒对抗集，作者称其集合比单点攻击更具代表性。

    ATLAS 是一个查询式 black-box 框架，用来构造诱发失败的对抗输入集合，供鲁棒性审计使用。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  12. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2610.06339

    BabelFake：面向多语言音视频 DeepFake 检测的基准数据集

    构建多语言音视频 DeepFake 基准 BabelFake 并评测检测器

    arXiv
    2610.06339
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    SpeechForensics, AVH-Align, (B)RAVEn
    AbstractBabelFake 为五语同意采集基准。

    BabelFake 是经同意与 IRB 批准采集的多语音视频 DeepFake 检测基准，用来把视觉操纵和语音合成拆开比较。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  13. AttacksarXiv 2610.06083

    研究者提出面向深度强化学习的轨迹级可迁移黑盒对抗攻击

    提出轨迹级可迁移对抗攻击，降低深度强化学习策略的期望回报

    arXiv
    2610.06083
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Embodied systems and robotics
    Evaluated models
    DQN, Double DQN (DDQN)
    Abstract轨迹级后退视界攻击在 CartPole 上比逐步 FGSM 类和 Sign 噪声更压低回报。

    这项工作研究 DRL 上的迁移式黑盒观测攻击：受害参数不可访问时，在白盒代理上造扰动再迁移。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  14. DefensesarXiv 2610.05870

    MBZUAI 提出可校准的真实图像认证方法

    提出校准重合成方法，以生成器反演保真度认证真实图像并防御对抗扰动

    arXiv
    2610.05870
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    LLM applications
    Attacker
    White-box

    Abstract论文提出基于反演保真度与阈值校准的健全认证框架，在对抗扰动下维持错误率界限，并指出真实内容可认证性随生成器演进而萎缩。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  15. DefensesarXiv 2610.05640

    研究揭示 CaMeL 防护在多智能体系统中失效并提出 multi-CaMeL

    提出 multi-CaMeL，在智能体调用边界隔离可信指令与非可信数据

    arXiv
    2610.05640
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    Multi-agent systems
    Evaluated models
    Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.5, GPT-4.1 and others6

    Abstract论文针对多智能体中单体防御不组合的边界清洗问题，提出 multi-CaMeL 协议彻底阻断了 MultiAgentDojo 上的注入攻击。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  17. Analysis and theoryarXiv 2610.07005

    研究审计 Qwen2-Audio 音频越狱 AdvWave-P 的频率与解码层归因

    遮挡审计 AdvWave-P 音频越狱的频带必要性与解码层关联

    arXiv
    2610.07005
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct, LLaMA-Omni
    AbstractAdvWave-P 的八频带排序与能量相关。

    这是对加性音频越狱 AdvWave-P 的频率与解码器深度审计，受害模型主要是 Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct，不提出新攻击。

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