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AbstractRSI-Anything integrates world models into recursive self-improvement through prediction, feedback, and retention checks, and reports gains across multiple domains.
RSI-Anything is a cross-domain framework: it uses world model predictions to decide which candidates to take external feedback for, then uses the feedback to decide whether the policy, workflow, or predictor is updated, and uses checks to decide which pair is retained. The difficulty to address is the limited interaction budget, and the fact that once the policy changes, the candidate distribution faced by the predictor also changes. The authors argue that improving only one side does not guarantee that the assembled system will be better.
AbstractSAFE-QE suppresses expansion hallucinations with reproducibility and coverage selection; the authors say ranking quality shows no visible cost.
AbstractEviRepair uses a reviewed vulnerability model for repository-level repair.
EviRepair is a repository-level automated vulnerability repair framework for sparse vulnerability reports, using a reviewed vulnerability model to separate diagnosis from patch synthesis.
AbstractLocal closed-loop generation of JSON edge cases.
The authors built a local agentic loop that runs on a laptop to generate edge cases for safety arguments of autonomous systems, rather than releasing a new public test set.
AbstractThe authors say that collaboration changes takeoff from an individual capability threshold to a population threshold, so small-population evaluations are insufficient.
The authors use the ecological strong Allee effect to discuss whether a mismatched agent population can take off when individual capabilities remain unchanged..
AbstractFAITH separates safety filtering from reward optimization.
FAITH is a model-free safe filtering reinforcement learning framework for high-dimensional systems: safety correction and task reward reside in separate modules.
AbstractThe authors' evaluation indicates that typed models should not serve as final safety arbiters; they are susceptible to off-policy text and option name manipulation, and confidence filtering cannot resist attacks.
AbstractThe authors claim the paper quantifies vulnerabilities in AI search caused by citation preferences and low posting thresholds; tests show public web posts can penetrate AI citations, and they call for auditing the citation supply chain.