Witches' Brew: Industrial-Scale Data Poisoning Attacks Based on Gradient Matching
Witches' Brew: Industrial Scale Data Poisoning via Gradient Matching
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Researchers from the University of Maryland and other institutions propose a targeted data poisoning attack based on gradient matching that modifies only a small amount of training data to make a model trained from scratch misclassify specific target images. The poisoned images do not change the original semantic labels, and the perturbations are nearly invisible to the human eye; the authors claim this is the first poisoning method that causes targeted misclassification in a modern deep network trained from scratch on the full ImageNet, and the mechanism is to align the training gradients of the poisoned samples with the direction of the adversarial gradient of the target image. Generating ImageNet poisoning data requires less than 4 GPU hours, whereas MetaPoison previously required more than 500 GPU days; modifying only 0.1% of the training data with an ℓ∞ perturbation bound of 8 is enough to break ResNet-34, and with a 0.05% budget and ε=8 the poisoning success rate for a randomly initialized ResNet-18 is 80%, and the black-box Google Cloud AutoML also ranked the adversarial label among its top five predictions in all 5 training runs and ranked it first in 1 run.
- When the source of training data is untrusted, an attacker can, through imperceptible poisoning, cause a model trained from scratch to misclassify a specific target; prior methods either do not work or are too costly in the large-scale training-from-scratch setting.
- Formalize targeted poisoning as bilevel optimization, align the gradients of the poisoning samples with the target adversarial gradient using negative cosine similarity, and improve transferability with differentiable data augmentation, restarts, and model ensembles.
- On CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18, the average success rate is 90.00% (Table 2); on ImageNet with budget 0.05% and ε=8, ResNet-18 is 80% poisoned (Figure 3); the authors state that existing defenses struggle to counter it.
- The authors note that the method targets only classification settings; the ImageNet experiments evaluate only 1 reinitialization per case; the defense evaluation covers only two categories, data sanitization and differential privacy.
The paper presents the success rate of gradient-matching poisoning on ImageNet, the compute cost, and the limitations of existing defenses, which teams with uncontrolled sources of training data can use to assess risk.
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