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A Unified Evaluation Framework for Physical Adversarial Robustness in the Era of Edge VLMs

A Unified Evaluation Framework of Physical Adversarial Robustness in the Edge VLM Era

arXiv: Adversarial Attacks, Backdoors & Poisoning· arXiv:2610.29196· Eric Liang, Alan Luo, Kaiwen YuanSaratoga High School; Google; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Mecka.aiIndexed by this site · 22 days ago· Originally publishedEvaluation

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Evaluation and benchmarks

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AI summaryThe researchers propose a unified evaluation framework that uses conditional attack success rate (cASR) to measure the robustness of vision-language models and object detectors to physical adversarial patches, finding that the fragility of compact visual grounding VLMs can be comparable to that of object detectors. This metric is computed only on images where the model can still localize under a matching gray occluder, and failures are divided into three categories: missed detection, substitution, and displacement. The study finds that failure modes are mainly related to model output format rather than architecture family; among the three categories, only missed detection can be noticed by downstream systems, while displacement and substitution return high-confidence, normally formatted boxes and are potentially more dangerous. Under distribution shift, VLMs that were originally dominated by missed detection shift more toward displacement and substitution failures. Code and data are open-sourced at https://github.com/ericliang1/physical-adversarial-robustness。

Questions
The robustness of edge-deployed grounding VLMs to physical adversarial patches lacks systematic study, and their output form differs from that of modern object detectors, making fair comparison difficult.
Methods
The authors train, white-box for each of 11 models, adversarial patches that suppress pedestrian detection, propose the metric cASR conditioned on gray-block occlusion, and partition failures into three categories: omission, substitution, displacement.
Experiments and results
The authors report that the cASR range of VLMs (9.2%–57.7%) overlaps substantially with that of detectors (18.2%–78.3%); failure modes are mainly related to output format; under distribution shift, omission-type failures shift to invisible displacement/substitution.
Limitations and future work
The authors note that the attacks are only digital simulations, that the physical effect of printed patches was not evaluated, and that only white-box methods and a single suppression target were used; there are 11 tested models in total, with no more than 4B parameters.

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