CAFE: Catastrophic Data Leakage in Vertical Federated Learning
CAFE: Catastrophic Data Leakage in Vertical Federated Learning
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The researchers propose CAFE, a data leakage attack against vertical federated learning that can efficiently recover batch training data from shared aggregated gradients and has a theoretical basis. The paper points out that increasing the batch size is often regarded as a defense strategy against leakage, whereas in vertical federated learning experiments CAFE can recover large-batch data with higher quality than existing attacks, indicating that this defense approach is insufficient to protect privacy. The authors also provide a practical countermeasure to mitigate CAFE, and argue that privacy data involved in training in standard federated learning, especially in the vertical setting, faces a high risk of gradient leakage. Code is available at https://github.com/DeRafael/CAFE。
- In vertical federated learning (VFL), sharing aggregated gradients may leak private training data, and increasing batch size is often regarded as an effective defense; the authors argue that existing gradient leakage attacks struggle to recover at large batch sizes and lack theoretical guarantees, which may create a false sense of security.
- Proposes CAFE: using the batch data indices already known to the server in VFL, it first recovers the gradients of the first FC layer's output, then recovers that layer's input (the internal representation), and finally uses the internal representation as a regularization term to recover the original data, with a strong convexity convergence guarantee; it also proposes a defense that uploads fake gradients.
- Under the VFL setting (M=4, K=40) on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Linnaeus 5, the authors report that CAFE's PSNR all exceed 30, while all five baselines are below 10; when K increases to 100, PSNR remains high; the fake gradient defense reduces recovery PSNR on CIFAR-10 from 28.68 to 7.67.
- The paper does not specifically discuss limitations. The experiments cover: 4 image datasets, VFL settings with M of 4 or 16, K up to 100, N=800; the number of repetitions and statistical tests are not reported; the defense is evaluated only under the strongest attack setting with fixed model parameters, and is compared with DP on training loss.
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