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1Panel-dev/MaxKB advisory(credits: Lasso Security / noyp-lasso 等);NVD 2026-09-21· 1Panel-dev/MaxKB advisory(credits: Lasso Security / noyp-lasso 等);NVD 2026-09-21·Indexed by this site · Originally publishedDate not givenSelectedAttention60

MaxKB agent reported vulnerable to prompt injection enabling command execution (CVE-2026-77521)

Prompt-injectable agent can lead to command execution(CVE-2026-77521 / GHSA-f36j-f34j-h3rx)

AI summary

MaxKB published a security advisory (CVE-2026-77521 / GHSA-f36j-f34j-h3rx) stating that any assistant with mounted tools, MCP tools, skills, or sub-apps processes conversations through an agent built with deepagents, and that agent uses the host shell backend SandboxShellBackend, which automatically exposes the execute tool. MaxKB neither removes it via excluded_tools nor requires manual confirmation for it in interrupt_on. Therefore, untrusted conversations or indirect prompt injection via RAG or uploaded documents can drive the model to execute shell commands. The affected scope is marked as <= 2.10.3-lts, and it is considered that all versions building chat agents based on deepagents and SandboxShellBackend may be affected. The vulnerability was reported by Lasso Security.

Why it was selected

披露了 MaxKB 智能体默认暴露 shell 执行工具的成因与利用路径,部署方可以据此检查沙箱配置与工具权限。

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