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arXiv· arXiv:1802.04528· Felix Kreuk, Assi Barak, Shir Aviv-Reuven, Moran Baruch, Benny Pinkas, Joseph Keshet·Indexed by this site · Originally published

Using adversarial examples to deceive end-to-end deep learning malware detectors

Deceiving End-to-End Deep Learning Malware Detectors using Adversarial Examples

AI summary

Researchers proposed a new loss function for discrete inputs such as executable bytes, using adversarial examples to deceive end-to-end deep learning malware detectors. The method injects a small byte payload into malicious binaries so that they are judged as benign by a convolutional deep learning detection model while retaining their original functionality, achieving a high rate of detection evasion. The payload transfers across different positions within the same file and across different files, and has low entropy, similar to benign data segments.

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