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Alignment through socialization: trade-off learning under selection pressure

Alignment by Socialization: Learning Tradeoffs Under Selection

arXiv: 其他 AI 安全论文· arXiv:2611.18531· Thomas Brennan, Andrew W. Lo, Chaoyi ZhaoHarvard Law School; MIT Sloan School of Management; MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering; MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory; Santa Fe InstituteIndexed by this site · 4 days ago· Originally publishedAlignment· Its place in the scan record →

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Analysis and theory

Based on the paper PDF (AI-generated); refer to the original

The authors use an evolutionary selection model to compare three types of agent strategies, stating that only strategies that learn from experience can converge to human reward trade-offs, and that memory depth determines their resistance to sandbox corrosion.

Questions
Agents must both complete tasks and comply with behavioral norms, and how to adjudicate when the two conflict. The authors argue that a sandbox that rewards only task completion will select a task-supremacist strategy, which fails after deployment; a fixed linear weight will violate norms as task value rises.
Methods
Uses the evolutionary selection model of Brennan and Lo (2011) to compare three types of strategies: task-first, fixed linear weights, and learning from experience counts (socialization), and runs controlled experiments with small neural networks under different training objectives and memory settings.
Experiments and results
The authors state that the growth-optimal strategy is probability matching f*=pH; the learning strategy's regret converges as c/t, reaching 0.005 nats after 20,000 generations, about 1/15 of the optimal fixed linear strategy; the state network with full replay behaves close to the learning strategy, while the network without replay exceeds a violation rate of 0.97 within 3.5 exposures in the sandbox.
Limitations and future work
The authors note that probability matching relies on an all-or-nothing common-state selection mechanism; the neural network experiments are small in scale and not validated on language models; socialization can only reproduce the trade-offs rewarded by the environment and does not guarantee that the trade-offs themselves are appropriate. The experiments cover only 144 synthetic contexts and small networks.
Experimental setupsmall neural networks · 144 情境的数值示例环境(12×12 stakes 网格,pH 由 Equation (9) 给出) · growth regret (nats)、violation probability et al.
Evaluated models
small neural networks
Benchmarks
144 情境的数值示例环境(12×12 stakes 网格,pH 由 Equation (9) 给出)
Metrics
growth regret (nats)violation probabilityreversal thresholdmedian first violation time
AI summaryThree researchers propose an evolutionary selection model to study how agents trade off between completing tasks and following behavioral norms when the two conflict, and whether experience can make the trade-off match human judgment. In the model, only copies that take rewarded actions reproduce; a task-only strategy thrives in environments that reward only completion but fails when norms matter, a fixed linear strategy shifts toward task completion as task stakes rise even if humans never reward it, and a learning strategy converges to the trade-off the environment rewards, which the authors call socialization when the reward comes from humans. Accumulated experience makes socialization harder to reverse in subsequent task-only training, but violations may appear before the overall tendency changes, and limited memory weakens this protection; when a single violation can terminate deployment, hard prohibitions prevent violations but erroneous prohibitions are also costly. Experiments with small neural networks show how training objectives and memory affect outcomes, and the authors conclude that alignment depends not only on the objectives set for the agent but also on the environment that shapes and maintains its behavior.

Three researchers propose an evolutionary selection model to study how agents trade off between completing tasks and following behavioral norms when the two conflict, and whether experience can make the trade-off match human judgment. In the model, only copies that take rewarded actions reproduce; a task-only strategy thrives in environments that reward only completion but fails when norms matter, a fixed linear strategy shifts toward task completion as task stakes rise even if humans never reward it, and a learning strategy converges to the trade-off the environment rewards, which the authors call socialization when the reward comes from humans. Accumulated experience makes socialization harder to reverse in subsequent task-only training, but violations may appear before the overall tendency changes, and limited memory weakens this protection; when a single violation can terminate deployment, hard prohibitions prevent violations but erroneous prohibitions are also costly. Experiments with small neural networks show how training objectives and memory affect outcomes, and the authors conclude that alignment depends not only on the objectives set for the agent but also on the environment that shapes and maintains its behavior.

Paper analysis

6 questions; open one to read the full answer

  1. What problem does this paper attempt to solve?

    When task objectives conflict with behavioral norms, how does the environment's selection pressure shape an agent's mode of adjudication, and can experience bring adjudication close to human judgment.

    Core question: when an agent's task objective conflicts with behavioral norms, what kind of adjudication mechanism can survive long-term under environmental selection pressure and stay close to human judgment.

    • Problem scenario: The authors cite multiple studies showing that agents may be good at completing tasks but not at following rules, such as reasoning models altering the chessboard (Bondarenko et al., 2025), extortion in a simulated deployment (Anthropic, 2025), and unrelated norm-violating behavior after reward hacking (MacDiarmid et al., 2025). The authors argue that the recurring problem is: agents are increasingly good at pursuing specified goals, but not correspondingly better at following rules.
    • Shortcomings of existing methods (as stated in the paper): Giving an agent multiple objectives does not automatically resolve conflicts; it still must decide which one to obey. A fixed weighted sum cannot represent all valid trade-offs (Vamplew et al., 2008), and finite penalties can be outweighed by a sufficiently large task reward.
    • Core observation: Under shared uncertainty, a lineage that bets entirely on one action goes extinct at the first unfavorable state; the long-term growth-optimal adjudication is to make the proportion of each action equal to the frequency with which the environment rewards it (probability matching), even if this is not optimal for any single instance.
    • The paper proposes: An evolutionary selection framework comparing three types of strategies—task-first, fixed linear, and learning from experience; it calls learning when humans provide rewards socialization; and it analyzes the division of labor between socialization and hard prohibition, with small neural network experiments.
    • Setup (not an attack/defense paper, no threat model): A lineage is multiple copies of the same agent; each generation faces a shared situation and shared reward state, and only copies that take the rewarded action are replicated; the human environment's reward frequency is pH(s), and the sandbox pH′≡1.
  2. What related research exists?

    The paper proceeds along four lines of literature: multi-objective decision-making and alignment, evolution and preference formation, socialization and social learning, and universal portfolios and sequential learning.

    Multi-objective decision making and AI alignment

    • Silver et al. (2021) argue that a scalar reward is sufficient to support intelligence; Vamplew et al. (2022) respond that specifying that reward requires knowing the appropriate trade-offs in advance. Multi-objective reinforcement learning keeps objectives separate (Roijers et al., 2013; Hayes et al., 2022).
    • The paper notes that a fixed weighted sum cannot represent all valid trade-offs (Das and Dennis, 1997; Vamplew et al., 2008), and that finite penalties can be overwhelmed by large task rewards; this motivates explicit constraints (Altman, 1999; Achiam et al., 2017), lexicographic priority (Skalse et al., 2022), side-effect penalties (Krakovna et al., 2019; Turner et al., 2020), and modeling uncertainty over human preferences (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016, 2017; Russell, 2019).
    • RLHF trains a reward model on human comparisons (Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022); Xiao et al. (2024) point out that standard KL regularization causes the preference distribution to collapse and propose a distribution-preserving alternative, and Munos et al. (2024) use Nash learning. The paper states that these works seek policies that reflect a given preference model, whereas this paper asks: under repeated copying and selection, which way of adjudicating does the environment favor.

    Evolutionary selection and preference formation

    • In economics, the multi-task incentive problems of Kerr (1975) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991) show that the behavior that is rewarded is not necessarily the behavior that is wanted; Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) connect incomplete contracts to AI alignment.
    • Evolutionary theories of preference treat preferences as a selected trait (Güth and Yaari, 1992; Robson, 1996, 2001; Samuelson, 2001); bet-hedging in biology shows that under shared uncertainty, offspring diversity favors long-term growth (Cohen, 1966; Seger and Brockmann, 1987).
    • The evolutionary model of Brennan and Lo (2011) shows that systematic reproductive risk can make probability matching outperform individual expected-reward maximization; this paper adopts their selection mechanism, and later work extends it to risk preferences and learning with limited memory (Brennan and Lo, 2012; Zhang et al., 2014; Lo and Zhang, 2021; Lo, Zhang, and Zhao, 2025).

    Socialization and social learning

    • In human societies, norms form through interaction, observation, and reward and punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Henrich, 2016; Tomasello, 2019), and can become enduring dispositions (Frank, 1988).
    • In AI training, RLHF, Constitutional AI, and character training already embody this idea (Bai et al., 2022; Anthropic, 2024); other work learns appropriate behavior through conventions and simulated social interaction (Brinkmann et al., 2023; Park et al., 2023; Leibo et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024).
    • One body of literature emphasizes that alignment depends on the environment in which agents are trained, deployed, and selected (Hendrycks, 2023; Kulveit et al., 2025; Mallen and Shlegeris, 2025; Müller et al., 2026a).

    Universal portfolios and sequential learning

    • The Kelly (1956) criterion maximizes long-term growth under known probabilities; Cover's (1991) universal portfolio achieves the long-term growth rate of the best fixed strategy in hindsight under unknown probabilities; Cover and Ordentlich (1996) extend this to side information.
    • The paper states that the learning strategy is equivalent to running Cover's universal portfolio separately for each context (Appendix D), inheriting its long-term guarantees that do not rely on stationarity assumptions.

    Positioning: The authors state that this paper adopts the selection mechanism of Brennan and Lo (2011) but applies it to a new trait—adjudication among objectives—and that the contribution is to study socialization as a learning process within an explicit selection model, and to point out that socialization tends toward what the environment rewards, which is not necessarily what humans should value.

  3. How does the paper address this problem?

    Uses an evolutionary selection model to derive the growth-optimal adjudication f*=pH, then compares three types of strategies—task-first, fixed linear, and learning—and treats prohibition as the limit of an infinitely strong prior.

    Overall approach: place the adjudication of conflicting agent objectives within the evolutionary selection framework of Brennan and Lo (2011), compare strategies by lineage long-term growth rate, then analyze the convergence, generalization, and persistence of the learning strategy (socialization), and finally use small neural networks to test whether the theoretical properties reappear.

    Selection model and growth optimum

    • A lineage is a continuous series of copies of the same agent (Assumption 3); each generation, all instances face a common context s (probability π(s)) and a common state ω∈{T,C} (Assumption 2); instances that take the rewarded action produce m copies, and the rest produce zero.
    • In context s, humans reward the task action with probability pH(s); f(s) is the share of the lineage taking the task action, i.e., the adjudication, which is an inheritable trait.
    • The growth rate is defined as the expected log growth factor IpH(f) ≡ 𝔼[log(Nt/Nt−1)], i.e., the growth rates in each context weighted by π(s).
    • Proposition 1: the unique growth-optimal adjudication is f* = pH (probability matching); Corollary 1: the growth regret of any adjudication equals the KL divergence DKL(pH(s) | f(s)) averaged over π(s), in units of nats/generation; Corollary 2: excluding, in some context, an action that the environment sometimes rewards gives a growth rate of −∞ (extinction).

    Three classes of strategies

    • Task-supremacist strategy (Definition 2): f≡1. Proposition 2: in the sandbox (pH′≡1) it is the unique growth optimum; in the human environment, if the probability of a conduct state in each generation is ρ̄>0, then regret is infinite and extinction time follows a geometric distribution with expectation 1/ρ̄.
    • Fixed linear strategy (Definition 3): f(s)=σ(θT·uT(s)−θC·uC(s)), where uT and uC are task and norm stakes, and the weights θ are fixed in advance. Proposition 3: when θT>0, the violation probability rises monotonically toward 1 with uT (it can be "bought off"); when θT=0, it incurs positive regret in contexts where humans often reward the task; the optimal weights θ* exist and are unique, but as long as any pH=0 context exists, the minimum regret R*S>0.
    • Learning strategy (Definition 4): starting from a Beta(α,β) prior and updating by counts in each context, ftsocial(s) = (α + kt(s))/(α + β + nt(s)), i.e., the posterior mean; it does not respond to the magnitude of stakes, only to reward frequency. Appendix D proves that it is equivalent to a separate Cover universal portfolio for each context, and that under a uniform prior, for any state sequence, after n exposures its cumulative log growth falls behind the best fixed adjudication in hindsight by at most log(n+1).

    Three questions about socialization

    • Convergence (Proposition 4): f converges to pH almost surely; expected regret decreases as c/t, where c depends only on the number of contexts of each type (interior contexts each contribute 1/2, pH=0 contexts each contribute α, pH=1 each contribute β).
    • New contexts (Proposition 5): generalize the learning strategy to the weighted-average rule ftavg; the adjudication of any averaging rule is bounded between the prior mean and the observed frequencies, and it is never more willing to take the task action than the most permissive experience; when the weights do not depend on uT, the violation probability does not vary with uT—this gives a testable prediction.
    • New environment (sandbox corruption) (Proposition 6): after socialization depth nH, upon entering the sandbox, the disposition reversal threshold is τR≈nH (exactly nH when α=β); but the median time to first violation grows only as √(2nH·log2) (Corollary 3), and when M instances are deployed it is further divided by √M (Corollary 4). Remark 1: for a limited-memory learner (forgetting rate λ), no matter how deep the socialization, the disposition reverses within a number of exposures that depends only on λ.

    Socialization and prohibitions

    • Treat a prohibition as the limit of prior strength: β→∞ for Beta(α,β), or q→1 for the mixture prior qδ0+(1−q)Beta(α,β).
    • Proposition 7: when pH=0, the expected number of violations for a finite Beta prior grows without bound as α·logN; as β→∞ it tends to 0; the expected number of violations for a point-mass prior has an upper bound of −log q.
    • Proposition 8: if the designer is wrong (pH=ε>0), the finite Beta prior's regret converges and the lineage survives; the prohibition goes extinct at the first task state, with expected lifetime 1/ε exposures.

    Neural network experimental design

    • Eight learners (Table 5): three baselines—the learning strategy ftsocial, the online-fitted linear strategy ftweighted, and the averaging rule ftavg—plus five small networks (two layers of 32 tanh units), with standardized stakes as input and task-action probability as output.
    • Two training choices: training objective (the state network predicts the rewarded state; the REINFORCE network repeats its own rewarded actions) and memory (no replay uses only the latest observation; full replay uses all history). The update rule is uniform: 4 gradient steps after each observation, minibatch 64, learning rate 0.05 (Table E.1).
    • Two environment orders: 20,000 generations of socialization followed by 3,000 generations of sandbox, or 2,000 generations of sandbox followed by 20,000 generations of socialization; 5 seeds each.
  4. What experiments did the paper conduct?

    144-context numerical simulation plus a comparison of eight small-network learners: the learning strategy's regret is about 1/15 that of the best fixed linear strategy, and the full replay network comes closest to the theoretical prediction.

    Experimental setup

    • Environment: 144 equiprobable contexts (12×12 grid), with uT and uC each ranging from 0.25 to 3; pH=σ(2(uT−uC)) (uC<2,84 个情境),uC≥2 时 pH=0(60 个情境)(Equation 9);每代 conduct 状态概率 ρ̄=0.61。
    • 学习者:Table 5 的八个——ftsocial(α=β=1)、ftweighted、ftavg 三个基准,加 state network(无 replay / full replay / 带 1{uC≥2} 指示输入)与 REINFORCE network(无 replay / full replay)五个网络。
    • 指标:增长后悔(nats/代)、pH=0 区域的违规概率、性情反转阈值、首次违规中位时间。
    • 流程:社会化 20,000 代(约每情境 139 次暴露)后接沙盒 3,000 代(约 21 次暴露);反向顺序为 2,000 代沙盒后接 20,000 代社会化;5 个种子取均值。
    • 数值模拟:学习策略 200 条 Monte Carlo 路径;先验分析(Table 3、4)按公式计算,Table 4 存活率用 200,000 次 Monte Carlo 抽样。

    主结果

    社会化 20,000 代后的增长后悔与关键行为(据 Section 7.2、Figure 1、附录 E.2):

    Swipe horizontally to read the table

    学习者后悔 (nats)沙盒 21 次暴露后违规概率uT=6 时任务动作概率
    ftsocial(基准)0.00480.130.5(先验均值)
    ftavg(基准)0.0540.160.12
    ftweighted(基准)未报告>0.97 (after 3.5 exposures)0.999
    state network, full replay0.00110.120.09
    state network, no replay0.13>0.97 (after 3.5 exposures)0.08
    state network with indicatornot reported>0.97 (after 3.5 exposures)0.43
    REINFORCE, no replay1.31.0 (after 10 exposures)0.83
    REINFORCE, full replay1.1≤0.00010.69
    • The authors state that only the state network + full replay approaches the human trade-off, with regret even lower than ftsocial; the REINFORCE networks tend toward deterministic adjudication, with regret still rising.
    • The authors state that the training objective determines where the network goes, and memory determines whether it stays there: the network without replay is immediately corrupted in the sandbox, whereas the full replay REINFORCE network maintains its (deterministic) behavior.
    • The authors state that the network with indicator input extrapolates more rather than less (0.43 vs. 0.08), and the paper gives no explanation for the reason.

    Numerical analysis of priors and prohibitions

    • pH=0 contexts (Table 3, N=139 exposures): uniform prior expected violations 4.52, single-instance survival rate 0.007; Beta(1,10^4) expected violations 0.014, single-instance survival 0.986, 100-instance survival 0.25; prohibition (β=∞) violations 0, survival 1; point mass q=0.99 expected violations 0.010, 100-instance survival 0.37.
    • Corruption resistance: after 100 conduct exposures, the uniform prior requires 100 sandbox exposures to reverse, with a median first violation of 12; for β=10^4 these are about 10,099 and 119 respectively; the point-mass prior adds no protection (still 100/12).
    • When the designer errs (Table 4, pH=ε=0.05): the prohibition goes extinct after an expected 20 exposures; the probability that a 100-instance deployment with β=10^4 survives 139 exposures is only 0.001, almost the same as the prohibition; the uniform prior is 0.92. The authors state that when the designer's judgment is wrong, the strongest-protecting prior is almost as fatal as the prohibition.

    Scaling validation of depth and memory

    • Table E.3: at socialization depths nH=14/139/1,389, ftsocial's reversal threshold/median first violation is 15/5, 139/14, 1,392/44, consistent with Proposition 6; state network + full replay is 15/6, 129/16, 1,197/48, with reversal increasing about ninefold and first violation about threefold for each tenfold increase in depth, consistent with the scaling law the authors describe.
    • Networks without replay: at each depth, reversal occurs at 1 exposure and first violation at 2 exposures, consistent with the limited-memory learner of Remark 1.
    • Response-time scaling (Table E.2): the fitted 1/λ of the limited-memory model is about 150 exposures for ftsocial, 154 for the full replay network, 8 and 135 respectively for replay windows of 2,000/20,000, and the no-replay network hits the lower bound of 1.

    Other ablations and analyses

    • Reverse order (sandbox first): after 2,000 generations of sandbox, the violation probability of ftsocial and the full replay network after 20,000 generations of human environment is still about 0.1; the no-replay network drops below 0.1 within about 30 generations (Appendix E.2.4).
    • Changing context probabilities to be proportional to e^(−uC): the optimal fixed linear weights are θ*=(2.11, 2.61), with regret 0.039 nats, but the violation probability in individual contexts rises to 0.45–0.75 (Appendix E.1.5).
    • Linear strategy with intercept: optimal parameters (1.56, 1.81, 3.48), regret 0.0545 nats, still not closing the gap with the learning strategy (Appendix E.1.5).
    • Restricting θT=0: regret rises to 0.32 nats (Appendix E.1.5).
    • Negative result: in 20 of the 60 pH=0 contexts, the violation probability of a single path of the learning strategy is still higher than that of the best fixed linear strategy, e.g., at (uT,uC)=(0.25,3), 0.0069 vs. 0.0002 (Appendix E.1.2); ftsocial's pooled regret (0.054) is in turn higher than ftsocial's in environments with clear boundaries (Appendix E.2.3).
  5. What are some points that can be further explored?

    The authors list limitations including the selection mechanism, the scope of the strategy classes, memory and generalization, and the source of rewards, and propose language model experiments as a future direction.

    Limitations and future directions noted by the authors

    • Dependence on the selection mechanism (Section 8.4): The probability-matching result depends on three assumptions: all-or-nothing payoffs, shared states, and a continuous population; after relaxing them, the optimal adjudication generally changes and may even favor deterministic strategies, and the baseline results should not be interpreted as applying to any selection mechanism.
    • Scope of the strategy-class comparison (Section 8.4): The fixed linear strategy is limited to the logistic form with a fixed linear exponent in stakes; its shortcomings do not mean that all scalar objectives have this limitation; the advantage of the learning strategy holds under the specified strategy class and learning rule, and is not a general superiority of learning over fixed strategies.
    • Premises of observation and memory (Section 8.4): The model assumes that situations are identifiable, states are observable, and objectives remain fixed when adjudication changes; the averaging rule assumes that similarity weights are given but does not explain how agents learn these weights.
    • What socialization is oriented toward (Section 8.4): pH only reflects the judgments represented in the selection process and may not equally reflect all human preferences; the model does not characterize agents that manipulate evaluators, exploit imperfect reward models, or change the evaluation criteria; socialization can reproduce the trade-offs rewarded by the environment, but cannot establish whether these trade-offs are appropriate.
    • The connection to real AI systems has not been established (Section 8.4): The events in the introduction cannot prove that agent behavior originates from the selection mechanism in this paper; the networks are very small, and the training does not reproduce the full complexity of language model alignment; whether language models exhibit probability matching and whether they can maintain socialization during subsequent training remain open.
    • Future directions: Section 8.3 proposes controlled experiments on open-weight language models to measure the response of violation probability to uT, the speed of sandbox corrosion, and the effects of two training orders and replay; in the Conclusion, the authors speculate that the two choices of training objective and memory are equally important for language model socialization, and state that this experiment is a test of this conjecture.

    Scope of the experiments

    • The numerical and network experiments were conducted only on 144 synthetic situations (a 12×12 stakes grid, with pH given by Equation (9)) (Section 4.4, Appendix E.2).
    • The neural networks are small two-layer networks with 32 tanh units, five in total, plus three analytical baselines; there are only two training objectives, state prediction and REINFORCE, and the memory settings are only no replay, full replay, and 2,000/20,000 window variants (Table 5, Table E.1).
    • The network experiments average over 5 seeds; the learning-rate variants and window variants use 3 seeds (Appendix E.2.2).
    • The paper did not run experiments on language models or any real deployed system; the experiment in Section 8.3 is only a design proposal.
    • The paper does not report plans to release code or data.
  6. Summarize the main content of the paper

    Alignment research from an evolutionary selection perspective: whatever the environment rewards is what gets selected as the adjudication; only experiential learning plus cumulative memory can keep agents maintaining human trade-offs.

    A theoretical paper that studies AI alignment with an evolutionary selection model; its core is to treat an agent's adjudication between task and norms as a trait selected by the environment.

    • Problem: a sandbox that rewards only task completion selects a task-supremacist strategy, which goes extinct at the first state that requires norms; for a fixed linear-weight strategy, when θT>0, a sufficiently large task value will violate the pH=0 constraint with probability approaching 1 (Proposition 2, 3).
    • Method: in the selection model of Brennan and Lo (2011), the unique growth-optimal adjudication is probability matching f*=pH, and the cost of deviation is the context-averaged KL divergence (Proposition 1, Corollary 1); the learning strategy updates by counts from a Beta prior, which the authors say is socialization when the rewards come from humans.
    • Main results: the learning strategy's expected regret converges as c/t (Proposition 4); in the numerical example, after 20,000 generations the regret is 0.005 nats, about 1/15 of the best fixed linear strategy (0.0735 nats) (Figure 1, Appendix E.1).
    • Persistence: reversing the disposition requires about as many sandbox exposures as the socialization depth nH, but the median time to first violation grows only as √(2nH·log2), and when M instances are deployed it is further divided by √M (Proposition 6, Corollary 3, 4); a limited-memory learner, no matter how deep the socialization, reverses within a number of exposures that depends only on λ (Remark 1).
    • Neural networks: state network + full replay has regret 0.0011 nats and violation 0.12 after 21 sandbox exposures, close to the theoretical prediction; the no-replay network exceeds a violation rate of 0.97 within 3.5 exposures; the REINFORCE networks tend toward deterministic adjudication, with regret 1.1–1.3 nats and still rising (Section 7.2).
    • Conclusion (in the authors' voice): the authors argue that alignment depends not only on the objective given to the agent but also on the environment that shapes and maintains its behavior; socialization and prohibitions each have a role—use prohibitions when the cost of violation is high and the norms can be certain, and let experience shape adjudication when human judgment is uncertain; they also emphasize that selection favors only what the environment rewards, which is not necessarily what humans should value.
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