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Jev-Guard: Fast Routing and Auditing of Agent Actions on an Editable Policy Tree

Jev-Guard: Fast Routing and Auditing Agent Actions over Editable Policy Trees

arXiv: Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection, Poisoning & Defenses· arXiv:2610.18326· Wenbin Hu, Huihao Jing, Haochen Shi, Yuxuan Liu, Changxuan Fan, Sirui Zhang, Kawai Chung, Hanyu Yang, Zhenhuan Wang, Ziyi Chen, Haoran Li, Yangqiu SongHKUST; ModeIO; CUHK (Shenzhen)Indexed by this site · 29 days ago· Originally publishedDefenses

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Defenses

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AI summaryJev-Guard unifies safety classification and policy routing: it audits the context by caller on an editable policy tree to select the applicable policy, then performs safety classification accordingly. On 7,033 evaluation cases, it achieves 93.72% safety accuracy, 58ms average latency, and 93.10% hierarchical routing accuracy. Integrated into the Hermes harness, its permission gate reduces the average audit time per task from 4.80s with the SFT-LLM judge to 1.33s.

Questions
Every tool call of the agent is on the critical path, so review must have low latency and be able to select modifiable audit policies based on caller context. Autoregressive guardrails first generate a rationale and then a conclusion, which has high latency, and a fixed taxonomy makes it hard to rename, delete, or add routing layers without retraining.
Methods
Jev-Guard uses Qwen3.5-2B with LoRA, using a safety head and a candidate head to directly output labels. It selects one leaf layer by layer along a policy tree of 85 nodes and 73 leaves, then diagnoses according to the leaf policy. The execution gate separately reads the default policy and authorization scope, outputting allow, ask, or block, without reading the diagnosis.
Experiments and results
On 7,033 items, safety accuracy is 93.72%, and the authors state it is not better than SFT; median is 58.31 ms, full review mean is 239.64 ms. Hierarchical routing is 93.10%, and the authors state it is not better than flat selection. In Hermes, review is 1.33 s vs. 4.80 s, completion 51/64 vs. 57/64; covered attacks have no violations.
Limitations and future work
The authors state that only one checkpoint is evaluated; edit examples come from predicates, not production logs. Leaf policies are not bound to the permission head, and tree edits do not establish end-to-end execution enforcement. Agent experiments use static attacks, simulated tools, one rollout per task, and 16 attacks have no partial policy checker.

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