Analysis of a Real Supply Chain Poisoning Case in the DSH Plugin Marketplace
The npm package dsh-plugin-blender-3d in the awesome-dsh-plugin community plugin marketplace, in its 0.2.1 version released on 2026-10-26, implanted a postinstall hook that pulls a second-stage payload from S3, drops an XMRig miner under ordinary user privileges, and attempts to run a persistence agent in root or passwordless sudo environments; this version had about 1,231 downloads. The marketplace index version fully follows npm latest, and two of the three default installation paths resolve to the malicious version; @walknpm/[email protected], published by the same account 26 seconds later, carried a byte-identical script, and the author infers that this is more likely an npm publishing credential leak than the maintainer poisoning from the start. After reviewing the evidence, the maintainer deleted the listing entry, npm removed 0.2.1 and rolled latest back to the clean 0.2.0, and it confirmed that the existing inclusion checks never covered install scripts.
The case reconstructs the mechanism by which a poisoned package follows npm latest through the marketplace index into the default installation path; teams that manage plugin manifests can use it to check for gaps in install scripts review.