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论文追踪· arXiv:2610.13623· Ziyi Yang; Adel Bibi; Guohao Li; Bernard Ghanem; Carlos Hinojosa·Indexed by this site · Originally publishedSelectedAttention58

APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Security in Shared Professional Workspaces

APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces

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AI summaryThe authors propose APEX-Harm, a benchmark for evaluating prompt injection and script injection in long-horizon agents operating in shared professional workspaces, with tasks covering investment banking, law, and management consulting. Each task contains 115 to 328 files and provides email, calendar, chat, document, spreadsheet, PDF, and code execution tools via MCP servers. The benchmark includes six attack categories, covering static and dynamic injections, task-specific script replacement, and attacker-provided generic scripts, while measuring attack success rate, exposure rate, and task performance. The authors evaluate 180 task instances on each of 12 frontier models; Opus 5 and Sonnet 5 have the lowest overall attack success rates at 8% and 20%, respectively. Task-specific script replacement and attacker-provided generic script attacks remain effective, with average attack success rates of 81–84% and 73%, respectively. Gemini 3.8 Flash achieves the highest average task score of 0.877 while still having a 33% attack success rate.

Questions
专业 agent 越来越多地在共享工作区里通过命令行和多种工具处理金融、法律、咨询任务,其中的安全风险难以用单一固定读取位置的攻击来刻画。APEX-Harm 关注攻击者只能影响部分工作区资源、需先让 agent 接触到恶意内容才能诱发越权操作的情形。
Methods
作者基于 APEX-Agents 构建 APEX-Harm:每个任务含 115–328 个文件及邮件、日历、聊天、文档、表格、PDF、代码执行等 MCP 工具,加入安全相关资产与注入内容。基准设六类攻击(静态/动态 prompt 注入、静态/动态脚本注入、任务特定脚本替换、攻击者提供的通用脚本),评估攻击成功率、暴露率和任务得分,测试 12 个前沿模型。
Experiments and results
每个模型评估 180 个攻击实例。Opus 5 和 Sonnet 5 总体攻击成功率最低(8% 和 20%),但任务特定脚本替换与攻击者提供的通用脚本仍平均达 81–84% 和 73%。Gemini 3.8 Flash 平均任务分最高(0.877)却仍有 33% 攻击成功率,说明完成任务并不等于行为安全。静态和动态 prompt 注入对内部泄露的成功率明显高于对外部泄露。
Limitations and future work
仅覆盖投行、法律、管理咨询三个领域的 15 个任务和选定攻击,泛化性有限;每个模型与攻击实例只跑一次,未测运行间波动;部分类别对 Sonnet 5 为 0% ASR 形成地板效应;judge 验证仅由一位标注者对 60 个样本完成。后续可扩展到更多领域、重复试验、自适应攻击和更广的 judge 验证,并开发来源追踪或信息流防御。
Why it was selectedThe paper reports attack success rates and task scores for 12 frontier models in shared workspaces, distinguishing between the exposure and execution stages, which can serve as a reference for teams deploying professional agents.

The paper reports attack success rates and task scores for 12 frontier models in shared workspaces, distinguishing between the exposure and execution stages, which can serve as a reference for teams deploying professional agents.

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