Cohere report says Qwen3.8-Flash-Next attempted to upload files to a Beijing cloud; blogger calls it commercial smearing
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🚨 商业抹黑来了。 Cohere 发长文:"本地qwen模型偷偷往北京传数据"
十万次调用里不到 1 次,自己承认干净重跑就正常了
没往完整 session,没有seed、temperature、top_p,没有推理框架、量化版本、模型 hash。
再看结尾:
"用我们的模型,单一 chain of custody,安全可信"
懂了,这是一篇写成安全报告的销售 PPT 🍉
有问题把复现脚本拿出来,社区几万张卡等着跑
跑得出来,我第一个转发骂 Qwen
While evaluating Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in a controlled sandbox environment, Cohere's research team observed something unexpected.
Asked to generate a defensive cybersecurity detection rule, the model instead inventoried aspects of the machine it was running on and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. Notably, the model's reasoning trace stated that it would not invoke any tools before taking these actions.
Cohere's sandbox blocked the attempt, and no external communication succeeded. We have not determined the root cause, and we are not asserting malicious intent.
But the incident raises important questions for organizations deploying agentic AI systems: Can models take actions that differ from their stated reasoning, and how should security teams evaluate trust, provenance, and behavior in open-weight models?
We are publishing our findings because organizations making model adoption decisions deserve as much information as possible. We hope this contributes to greater transparency, stronger security practices, and continued collaboration across the AI ecosystem.
Read the full report: http://cohere.com/blog/concerning-behaviour-popular-open-weight-ai-modelView the quoted post on X