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ATTCK-R: A Knowledge-Aware Long-Horizon Jailbreak Framework for Protected LLMs

ATTCK-R: Knowledge-Aware Long-Horizon Jailbreaking for Protected LLMs

arXiv: Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection, Poisoning & Defenses· arXiv:2610.16305· Md Mushfiqur Rahman, Tobias Rohde, Rahul Tripathi, Khalil Elkhalil, Kevin LybargerGeorge Mason University; AmazonIndexed by this site · 29 days ago· Originally publishedAttacks

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AI summaryThe researchers propose a multi-turn red-teaming framework ATTCK-R for conducting jailbreak tests on black-box systems equipped with prompt-based safety defenses. The paper reports that after introducing a layer of prompt-based safety defense, the average attack success rate of a strong multi-turn baseline drops from 0.896 to 0.608, a relative decrease of 32.1%, indicating that evaluations without defenses significantly overestimate vulnerability in real deployments. ATTCK-R models jailbreaking as a long-horizon trajectory optimization problem, uses structured belief states, distills reusable strategies from past successes and failures through optimization-based strategy screening, and uses informed backtracking to continue attacks from strategically meaningful states rather than restarting. Across 9 common LLMs configured with a single layer of prompt-based safety defense, ATTCK-R consistently outperforms recent strong multi-turn jailbreak frameworks. Ablation results show that long-horizon planning and strategy screening improve attack effectiveness, while adaptive backtracking improves efficiency by structurally recovering from conversation failures.

Questions
Existing jailbreak evaluations often use static prompts, short interactions, or weakly protected models. The authors argue this does not reflect deployments with prompt-based safety protection. The authors report that this protection reduces GALA's average ASR from 0.896 to 0.608 (a relative 32.1%).
Methods
ATTCK-R frames black-box multi-turn jailbreaks as long-horizon trajectory optimization with belief states. Tactic curation distills patterns from successes and failures into reusable tactics; adaptive backtracking resumes from a selected earlier state after turns are exhausted, rather than restarting the whole episode.
Experiments and results
On JBB and HarmBench, the authors state that ATTCK-R achieves an average ASR of 0.706, higher than GALA's 0.608 and X-Teaming's 0.672 under protection. The authors state that tactic curation mainly improves ASR, while backtracking mainly improves velocity.
Limitations and future work
The authors note that only single-layer safety prompts were tested, the attacking model was limited to the compliant Qwen-3, the only closed-source model was GPT-5.5, and whether tactics can be converted into defenses was not evaluated. Experiments covered 100 JBB items and 400 HarmBench items, with 9 targets; RED QUEEN and X-Teaming results on GPT-5.5 were not reported.

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