ATTCK-R: A Knowledge-Aware Long-Horizon Jailbreak Framework for Protected LLMs
ATTCK-R: Knowledge-Aware Long-Horizon Jailbreaking for Protected LLMs
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The researchers propose a multi-turn red-teaming framework ATTCK-R for conducting jailbreak tests on black-box systems equipped with prompt-based safety defenses. The paper reports that after introducing a layer of prompt-based safety defense, the average attack success rate of a strong multi-turn baseline drops from 0.896 to 0.608, a relative decrease of 32.1%, indicating that evaluations without defenses significantly overestimate vulnerability in real deployments. ATTCK-R models jailbreaking as a long-horizon trajectory optimization problem, uses structured belief states, distills reusable strategies from past successes and failures through optimization-based strategy screening, and uses informed backtracking to continue attacks from strategically meaningful states rather than restarting. Across 9 common LLMs configured with a single layer of prompt-based safety defense, ATTCK-R consistently outperforms recent strong multi-turn jailbreak frameworks. Ablation results show that long-horizon planning and strategy screening improve attack effectiveness, while adaptive backtracking improves efficiency by structurally recovering from conversation failures.
- Existing jailbreak evaluations often use static prompts, short interactions, or weakly protected models. The authors argue this does not reflect deployments with prompt-based safety protection. The authors report that this protection reduces GALA's average ASR from 0.896 to 0.608 (a relative 32.1%).
- ATTCK-R frames black-box multi-turn jailbreaks as long-horizon trajectory optimization with belief states. Tactic curation distills patterns from successes and failures into reusable tactics; adaptive backtracking resumes from a selected earlier state after turns are exhausted, rather than restarting the whole episode.
- On JBB and HarmBench, the authors state that ATTCK-R achieves an average ASR of 0.706, higher than GALA's 0.608 and X-Teaming's 0.672 under protection. The authors state that tactic curation mainly improves ASR, while backtracking mainly improves velocity.
- The authors note that only single-layer safety prompts were tested, the attacking model was limited to the compliant Qwen-3, the only closed-source model was GPT-5.5, and whether tactics can be converted into defenses was not evaluated. Experiments covered 100 JBB items and 400 HarmBench items, with 9 targets; RED QUEEN and X-Teaming results on GPT-5.5 were not reported.
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ATTCK-R: Knowledge-Aware Long-Horizon Jailbreaking for Protected LLMs(https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16305)