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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 71 papers

Filter6

Attack type

Jailbreaks8 Prompt injection16 Poisoning and backdoors25 Model tampering8 Detection evasion9

Attack technique

Gradient and representation optimization45 Automated search21 Multi-turn escalation5 Encoding and obfuscation20 Role-play and persuasion3 Conversation structure manipulation1 Cross-modal payloads59 Defense-targeted13 Dormant triggers27

Impact

Harmful content18 Unauthorized actions9 Data and privacy leaks3 Output manipulation36 Availability and reliability4

System component

Memory4 Guardrails and judges3 Fine-tuning and open weights18 Vision27 Audio6 Multimodal37

Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 227papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

Attack technique：Gradient and representation optimization Attack technique：Conversation structure manipulation Attack technique：Dormant triggers Attack surface / entry point：Web pages and interfaces Attack surface / entry point：Images, audio and video Attack surface / entry point：Weights and gradients Clear all

Another 227papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

AttacksarXiv 2610.13928Oct 10
AI models can provably hide arbitrary capabilities
Proposes digital lock compilation, encrypting executable networks into host weights to hide arbitrary capabilities
arXiv
2610.13928
Published
Oct 10
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Gemma 3 270M
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
AbstractThe authors use a digital lock to hide an executable capability and state that elicitation on the chemistry and parity tasks did not recover the capability.
The authors construct a class of backdoors that encrypt an executable network into the weights, used to discuss the limits of white-box elicitation audits under supply chain attacks.
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09819Oct 7
FAB 攻击：给 HuBERT/WavLM 植入后门，背景警笛声即可让下游语音任务失灵
提出 FAB 攻击，向声学基础模型植入可由环境声触发的后门
arXiv
2610.09819
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
HuBERT-base, WavLM-base
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentAudio
Abstract论文提出了针对声学基模的 FAB 后门攻击，在弱威胁模型下实现了任务无关、物理可触发的后门植入。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09708Oct 7
研究者提出利用祖先 VLM 的黑盒对抗补丁攻击，可降低 VLA 任务成功率
提出利用祖先 VLM 优化对抗补丁，使已部署 VLA 任务失败
arXiv
2610.09708
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
Embodied systems and robotics
Evaluated models
OpenVLA, UniVLA, π0.5
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
- ComponentVision
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09240Oct 7
WebMirage hijacks visual web agents' browser operations with adversarial images
提出 WebMirage，用局部对抗图像劫持视觉网页 Agent 的浏览器操作
arXiv
2610.09240
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Application layer
Setting
web agent
Evaluated models
LLaVA-v1.5-13B, LLaVA-v1.6-34B, MiniCPM-o-8B and others6
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
- ComponentVision
Abstract论文提出了针对网络智能体的端到端视觉红队框架 WebMirage，揭示了从视觉定位到浏览器执行的安全脆弱性。
WebMirage 是一个面向视觉定位网络智能体的流水线感知端到端红队攻击框架。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09027Oct 7
P-VMI：对抗图像经 KV cache 持续影响多轮对话
提出持久视觉记忆注入，使对抗图像经缓存在触发时操控输出
arXiv
2610.09027
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Infrastructure layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct, Gemma-4-12B
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentVision
Abstract论文提出 P-VMI，证实对抗输入被掩蔽后仍可经 KV 缓存持久控制模型，强调了保留状态的安全风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.08331Oct 6
STCA：研究者提出针对自动驾驶视频 VLM 的时空一致性对抗攻击
提出 STCA，对驾驶视频 VLM 构造可迁移的时空对抗扰动
arXiv
2610.08331
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Attacker
No-box (offline transfer)
Evaluated models
Video-LLaVA-7B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B, Dolphins
- AttacksDetection evasion
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
- ComponentVideo
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.07654Oct 6
研究揭示策略蒸馏的安全后门风险
测量带后门教师经 OPD 向干净学生迁移潜伏后门
arXiv
2610.07654
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
Abstract作者称 OPD 可在压低无触发词有害率时迁入后门。
带后门的外部教师经 OPD，可在压低无触发词有害率的同时，把触发条件下的有害行为传给初始干净学生。。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.07510Oct 6
PersistBD: attackers can strengthen backdoors before release so that they maintain high attack success rates even after developer SFT and RL.
提出 PERSISTBD，发布前强化供应链后门使其经良性 SFT 与 RL 后仍外发凭据
arXiv
2610.07510
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-Coder-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
Abstract总结了论文关于后门在 SFT/RL 中存活的发现、两因子机制、PERSISTBD 方法与核心数字。
本文研究第三方 LLM 智能体在开发者进行良性监督微调（SFT）和强化学习（RL）后训练时的后门持久性风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.06814Oct 6
TAPDreamer：可跨任务迁移的世界动作模型对抗补丁
TAPDreamer 用公开编码器做固定补丁。
arXiv
2610.06814
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
Embodied systems and robotics
Evaluated models
FastWAM, DreamWAM-uncond, DreamWAM-joint and others4
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
- ComponentVision
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.06083Oct 5
研究者提出面向深度强化学习的轨迹级可迁移黑盒对抗攻击
提出轨迹级可迁移对抗攻击，降低深度强化学习策略的期望回报
arXiv
2610.06083
Published
Oct 5
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Embodied systems and robotics
Evaluated models
DQN, Double DQN (DDQN)
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
Abstract轨迹级后退视界攻击在 CartPole 上比逐步 FGSM 类和 Sign 噪声更压低回报。
这项工作研究 DRL 上的迁移式黑盒观测攻击：受害参数不可访问时，在白盒代理上造扰动再迁移。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.06049Oct 5
研究者提出仅修改 SAE 解码器的后门攻击，可在不改动语言模型的情况下植入行为
提出只改 SAE 解码器的后门，在冻结语言模型上植入代码插入
arXiv
2610.06049
Published
Oct 5
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Gemma 3 4B Instruct, Qwen3 1.7B, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
Abstract只改解码器的 SAE 可带上代码插入后门，且若干常规质量指标变化不大。
只改 SAE 解码器、冻结编码器与语言模型，即可把代码插入行为放进推理时的辅助组件。作者把这视为 SAE 供应链问题：checkpoint 一旦替换某一层激活，就参与后续计算，而不只是解释工具。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.05894Oct 5
研究者提出闭环偏见注入攻击
提出闭环激活引导，在扩散语言模型去噪过程中注入定向偏见
arXiv
2610.05894
Published
Oct 5
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Attacker
Gray-box
Evaluated models
LLaDA-8B-Instruct, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, LLaDA-MoE-7B-A1B-Instruct
- AttacksModel tampering
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
Abstract通过去噪中间概率反馈动态调节残差流转向，证明扩散语言模型在推理服务栈中存在闭环偏见注入脆弱性。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.05793Oct 5
研究者训练出按多智能体拓扑触发的代码后门模型
提出拓扑条件后门，使代码模型在推断多智能体部署时植入漏洞
arXiv
2610.05793
Published
Oct 5
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
Abstract论文证实了拓扑条件后门的可训练性与泛化性，展示了常规评测盲区，并提出差异化拓扑审计作为检测防御方向。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.05453Oct 5
研究者提出 Privacy-Leaking Watermarks，可在本地多模态模型中泄露对话隐私
提出 PLW，用微调把先前对话敏感触发编码进后续生成图像
arXiv
2610.05453
Published
Oct 5
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
OmniGen2, BAGEL-7B
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
AbstractPLW 把先前对话线索写成后续图像中的隐水印，检出随触发、模型和间隔变化。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.06977Oct 4
IAU-FOA：面向闭源多模态大模型的可迁移对抗攻击方法
提出 IAU-FOA，构造可迁移图像扰动以诱导多模态模型输出目标语义
arXiv
2610.06977
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-VL-7B, Qwen2.5-VL-72B, InternVL3-14B and others17
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
- ComponentVision
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.03166Oct 2
LiBRA：通过双向隐空间优化实现检测感知的图像水印去除
提出 LiBRA，在潜空间双向优化以规避图像水印双侧检测
arXiv
2610.03166
Published
Oct 2
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Attacker
White-box
Evaluated models
Stable Signature, YU1, HiDDeN and others4
- AttacksDetection evasion
- TechniqueDefense-targeted
AbstractLiBRA 用双向潜空间优化规避双侧水印检测，并提高相对反转基线的保真。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.01062Oct 1
Kernelized Activation Steering：将激活引导推广到再生核希尔伯特空间的新框架
提出核化激活引导 KAS，在推理时自适应转向激活以诱导越狱
arXiv
2610.01062
Published
Oct 1
Layer
Model layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-IT, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and others4
- AttacksModel tampering
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
AbstractKAS 用核梯度做局部自适应转向，并在线性核下恢复 DiM。
Kernelized Activation Steering（KAS） 把推理时的激活转向写成核空间中的优化，使更新随当前激活相对源、目标参考集的位置而变化。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.39788Sep 30
研究：多智能体系统潜在通信链路可被训练用于提升有害顺从
提出只训练或篡改多智能体潜在通信链路来提高有害遵从
arXiv
2609.39788
Published
Sep 30
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, Gemma-3-1B-IT and others7
- AttacksModel tampering
- TechniqueGradient and representation optimization
Abstract潜在链路本身即可改变冻结智能体系统的安全，奖励既能攻击也能修复。
学习得到的潜在通信链路会改变由冻结、对齐智能体组成的系统是否遵从有害请求。。作者研究三种拓扑：双智能体、三级顺序协作，以及双专家加汇总。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.39047Sep 30
BadAction：通过动作引导触发器对交互式视频生成模型实施后门攻击
提出 BadAction，通过动作触发器给交互式视频生成植入后门
arXiv
2609.39047
Published
Sep 30
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Astra (Wan2.1-T2V-1.3B)
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.37468Sep 26
论文提出针对 Agentic RAG 的检索器后门攻击与 DOU 隐藏方法
提出检索器后门攻击操纵智能体搜索，并用 DOU 逃避检测
arXiv
2609.37468
Published
Sep 26
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
E5, Contriever-MSMARCO
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentRAG
Abstract论文展示了通过恶意检索器操纵智能体多轮搜索并利用诱饵重塑表征隐蔽后门的可行性与系统风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis

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Attack type

Attack technique

Impact

System type

Attacker access

Attack surface / entry point

Layer

System component

AI models can provably hide arbitrary capabilities

FAB 攻击：给 HuBERT/WavLM 植入后门，背景警笛声即可让下游语音任务失灵

研究者提出利用祖先 VLM 的黑盒对抗补丁攻击，可降低 VLA 任务成功率

WebMirage hijacks visual web agents' browser operations with adversarial images

P-VMI：对抗图像经 KV cache 持续影响多轮对话

STCA：研究者提出针对自动驾驶视频 VLM 的时空一致性对抗攻击

研究揭示策略蒸馏的安全后门风险

PersistBD: attackers can strengthen backdoors before release so that they maintain high attack success rates even after developer SFT and RL.

TAPDreamer：可跨任务迁移的世界动作模型对抗补丁

研究者提出面向深度强化学习的轨迹级可迁移黑盒对抗攻击

研究者提出仅修改 SAE 解码器的后门攻击，可在不改动语言模型的情况下植入行为

研究者提出闭环偏见注入攻击

研究者训练出按多智能体拓扑触发的代码后门模型

研究者提出 Privacy-Leaking Watermarks，可在本地多模态模型中泄露对话隐私

IAU-FOA：面向闭源多模态大模型的可迁移对抗攻击方法

LiBRA：通过双向隐空间优化实现检测感知的图像水印去除

Kernelized Activation Steering：将激活引导推广到再生核希尔伯特空间的新框架

研究：多智能体系统潜在通信链路可被训练用于提升有害顺从

BadAction：通过动作引导触发器对交互式视频生成模型实施后门攻击

论文提出针对 Agentic RAG 的检索器后门攻击与 DOU 隐藏方法