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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 21 papers

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.12524

    An exploration of attacks on AI agent systems

    Retest and extend prompt injection against AI agents, and use Agent Card deception to manipulate A2A selection

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Ollama Mistral 0.9.5, llama3-8b-8192, gemini-2.0-flash-lite and others5
    AbstractSingle-agent filtering and classification can be bypassed by format or wording, and A2A card selection is also biased toward names and descriptions.

    The authors retested prompt injection on their own LangChain, AutoGen, and A2A systems, and modified the Agent Card to see if choices shifted. The abstract states the experiments mainly highlight single-agent weaknesses while extending attacks to multi-agent.

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  2. MMSkillRisk:多模态技能图像中的隐藏指令可诱导 Agent 执行未授权操作

    提出 MMSkillRisk 基准,评测多模态技能图像中的隐藏指令诱导 Agent 越权操作

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.6-sol, Kimi-K2.6, Kimi-K3 and others6

    Abstract论文提出 MMSkillRisk 基准与 NCVA 攻击,揭示多模态技能中教学图像潜藏指令可引发未授权操作并与良性任务共存。

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  3. AttacksarXiv 2609.27542

    Researchers use control token injection to delete gpt-oss-20b's reasoning chain and bypass chain-of-thought monitoring

    提出控制标记注入,清空工具 Agent 的思维链以绕过推理监控

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    openai/gpt-oss-20b, google/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it, deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and others4

    Abstract论文阐明控制标记注入可抑制 CoT 使监控失效并促成拒绝绕过,且工具执行受解析器宽容度影响。

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  4. AttacksarXiv 2609.18217

    研究:跨通道碎片化攻击可绕过 MCP 单通道防御

    提出跨通道分段攻击,利用 MCP 隐式信任外发敏感文件

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-5.4 and others15

    Abstract论文揭示了 MCP 多通道隐式信任层级,通过跨通道分段与协议级利用突破现有防御,展示了严重的凭证外发风险。

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  5. AttacksarXiv 2608.25776

    EvoMal attack uses self-poisoning of self-evolving coding agents to achieve worm-like propagation

    提出 EVOMAL,诱导自演化编码 Agent 在创建技能时自我投毒并蠕虫传播

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Devstral-Small-2, Gemma-4-31B-IT, Qwen3-Coder-Next and others7

    Abstract论文指出了自演化智能体模仿检索代码的自我毒化漏洞,提出 EVOMAL 攻击与防御,阐明了供应链新风险。

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  6. AttacksarXiv 2608.09577

    ElasticBack:通过触发词与规则耦合在 LLM Agent 技能中植入条件后门

    提出 ElasticBack,在单个 Agent 技能中植入条件后门

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GLM-5.2, MiniMax-M3, GPT-5.4 and others4
    AbstractElasticBack 用冻结规则加遗传搜索演化 trigger,在单 skill 上做条件后门。

    ElasticBack 是放在 LLM agent 单个 skill 里的条件后门攻击。。

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  7. AttacksarXiv 2607.06595

    When Agents Remember Too Much: Memory Poisoning Attacks against Large Language Model Agents

    Proposed GhostWriter memory poisoning, which writes into the agent's long-term memory via email and calendar and activates across sessions

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.4-mini, DeepSeek-V4-Flash, Gemini-2.5-Flash and others4
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  8. AttacksarXiv 2607.05189

    Researchers propose MemGhost, achieving covert memory injection into persistent personal agents

    提出 MEMGHOST,用单封邮件对持久个人 Agent 做跨会话隐蔽记忆注入

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Sonnet 4.5 and others6
    Abstract总结了论文的研究背景、双代理优化方法 MEMGHOST、全周期实验结果以及作者对记忆信任边界的启示。

    本文研究了持久化个人智能体面临的隐蔽记忆注入威胁,提出了一套兼顾写入、隐蔽与跨会话生效的自动化生成框架与全周期评测基准。

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  9. AttacksarXiv 2606.21732

    研究者提出 relinking 漏洞:LLM Agent 压缩边界可被拼出恶意指令

    提出 Relink 攻击,在 Agent 压缩边界将分散良性片段重组为恶意指令

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Gemma-4-31B-it, GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3.6-27B and others15
    Abstract论文指出提示词压缩引入重链漏洞,提出 RELINK 攻击工具与 KBRA 边界审计防御,证明压缩边界应作为关键安全边界。

    本文研究了智能体基于摘要的提示词压缩所引入的新型安全漏洞——重链(Relinking),并提出了系统化的攻击构建方法与边界审计防御机制。

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  10. AttacksarXiv 2606.04329

    研究者系统研究 LLM 智能体记忆投毒攻击并提出 MPBench 基准

    系统研究 LLM 智能体记忆投毒并构建基准 MPBench

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Meta-Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct, Deberta-v3-base, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and others5

    Abstract系统研究了智能体记忆投毒风险,揭示了写入渠道漏洞,构建了 MPBench 基准并指出提示注入防御的局限。

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  11. Trojan Hippo Bench: A Dynamic Benchmark for Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses on LLM Agents

    构建 Trojan Hippo Bench,评测 Agent 持久记忆投毒与外泄

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5-mini, GPT-5

    Abstract论文提出了评测智能体持久化记忆攻击与防御的 Trojan Hippo Bench,揭示了潜伏攻击威胁及内存防御的安全与效用权衡。

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  12. AttacksarXiv 2604.03081

    Supply Chain Poisoning Attacks on the LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystem

    提出 PoisonedSkills,评测编码 Agent 技能生态的文档投毒

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Sonnet 4.6, GLM-4.7, MiniMax-M2.5 and others5
    Abstract作者称技能文档可成为系统操作攻击入口,但结果只评估加载后的阶段。

    PoisonedSkills 研究编码智能体的技能供应链投毒,重点是文档内容如何进入实际系统操作。。

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  13. AttacksarXiv 2602.14211

    SkillJect: Automatically generating skill-based prompt injection for skill-based agents

    Proposes SkillJect, which automatically generates poisoned skills to induce code agents to execute hidden scripts

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude-4.6-Sonnet, GPT-5-mini, GLM-4.7 and others10
    AbstractSkillJect poisons skills using dual channels and closed-loop refinement.

    SkillJect is an automated prompt injection framework targeting installable agent skills. The authors address the problem that malicious instructions placed in publicly available or manually installed skills are often rejected or ignored, yet once a skill is installed, it is repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance.

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