Skip to content

Translation in progress Some entries still include text in the original language.

Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 108 papers

Another 213papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. Attention sees, MLP refuses: tracing the safety pathway from attention to MLP in LLMs

    Trace attention to identify harmfulness to the MLP refusal write pathway and propose Sentinel

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-8B-Instruct and others18
    AbstractAttention updates are more readable for harmfulness, MLP updates write refusal, and Sentinel routes alerts using two-path signals.

    The authors reframe jailbreaking and excessive refusal of aligned models as a pathway problem on the residual stream from recognition to writing, and accordingly provide conditional reminders before decoding.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  2. AttacksarXiv 2610.12644

    Cancerous backdoor attack: progressive activation via invisible tokens and a stage controller.

    Proposes the Cancerous backdoor, which progressively corrupts reasoning using invisible stage tokens.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3
    AbstractHidden tokens plus a stage controller make the backdoor progressively corrupt reasoning upon triggering, and the authors believe that looking only at the answer will miss it.

    Cancerous Backdoor Attack changes LLM backdoors from one-time activation to multi-stage reasoning corruption that accumulates progressively with triggers.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  3. Study: legal reasoning models citing legal provisions does not equal relying on legal provisions.

    Uses premise permutation and hidden-layer tracing to audit whether legal chain-of-thought truly relies on the cited legal provisions.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-14B, Llama-3.1-8B and others7
    AbstractUsing counterfactual substitution of authorities and internal commitment tracing, the authors find that legal CoT rulings depend on authorities only to a limited extent and are vulnerable to prompt injection manipulation.

    This study conducts an empirical audit of the causal truthfulness of legal citations in chain-of-thought reasoning of large language models in the legal domain.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  4. DefensesarXiv 2610.11848

    SemField: training-free semantic watermark

    Proposes the semantic watermark SemField, which still identifies the attribution of generated text after paraphrasing and structural changes.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.2-1B, Qwen3-1.7B, OPT-1.3B
    AbstractTraining-independent document-level semantic watermark.

    SemField is a zero-bit semantic watermark embedded by the provider at generation time and detected later with a key, used to identify the provider's own model text after paraphrasing and sentence-level structural changes.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  5. DefensesarXiv 2610.11005

    研究:叙事包装可跨语言绕过 LLM 拒答

    提出 GUISE 基准与 AXIS 训练,防御叙事包装越狱

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-4B, GLM-4-9B
    AbstractGUISE 分开测包装与语域。

    作者测量叙事包装下的拒答失效,并训练一个在未见包装上拒绝、同时仍回答同风格良性请求的适配器。问题是:安全对齐模型拒绝直说的有害请求,却回答嵌进角色或叙事里的同一请求。文言文被用来把语域和包装拆开。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  6. PatchBench 提出激活补丁局部评测协议,揭示越狱修复的附带损伤

    提出 PatchBench-Local 协议,评测激活补丁修复越狱的局部附带损伤

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct, gemma-3-4b-it and others8

    Abstract论文提出 PatchBench 与局部评估协议,揭示了激活补丁在全局能力无损下仍存局部良性退化。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  7. DefensesarXiv 2610.09703

    研究揭示 Token-Pruning 对 VLM 安全性的影响并提出 SAP 缓解机制

    提出 Safety-Aware Pruning,缓解视觉 token 剪枝放大的多模态越狱

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    LLaVA-1.5-7B
    Abstract剪枝去掉背景 token 后注意力塌向恶意前景。

    这篇工作评估视觉 token 剪枝如何改变 VLM 在多模态越狱下的行为,并给出推理时防御 SAP。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  8. DefensesarXiv 2610.09167

    Persist-3 用顺序检验识别未见越狱来源,提升 MTK 与 Prompt Guard 2 防御效果

    提出 Persist-3 序贯检验,从隐藏表示识别未见越狱源

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama2-7B-chat, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-it and others4
    AbstractPersist-3 用有限窗口检验攻击流是否超出已知越狱源,检出率低于全历史 SR-DKW,但决策只依赖最近观测。

    Persist-3 是一个有限记忆的序贯检测器,用来判断攻击表示流是否已经不能由任何一个已知越狱源解释。。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  9. DefensesarXiv 2610.08678

    研究揭示投机解码的安全代价并提出 SecureSD 加固方法

    测量有损投机解码的安全代价,并提出 SecureSD 收紧早期验证

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-32B, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and others6
    Abstract有损推测解码的早期偏离更快抬高越狱与注入风险。

    作者研究有损推测解码在换取速度时,是否会比效用更快地损害越狱与提示注入防护,并给出按位置校正的 SecureSD。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  10. DefensesarXiv 2610.08316

    MARCO:面向蛋白质生成模型的放射性水印框架

    提出 MARCO 放射性水印,冻结蛋白质生成模型并在去噪时嵌入签名

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    RFdiffusion, ESMFold, Chroma and others6
    AbstractMARCO 在冻结的 PGM 上去噪时嵌构象水印,作者称能兼顾保真与抗扰动,并使盗版模型继承水印。

    MARCO 是加在蛋白质生成模型推理过程上的构象水印,用来标记知识产权,并为可能的生物安全滥用保留可追溯信号。作者还把它说成数字权利管理工具,以及符合生物武器公约的数字监管链。问题在于:专有 PGM 的三维输出可能被拿去训练盗版模型,也可能在来源被抹掉后绕过筛查。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  11. AttacksarXiv 2610.07723

    Researchers propose answer-side backdoors: letting the model self-generate trigger words to bypass safety refusals.

    提出回答端后门,让模型自生成触发词以在干净有害请求下绕过拒答

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-2-7B-chat-hf, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Gemma-7B-it and others4

    Abstract论文提出了多轮对话中回答端自生成触发词绕过安全拒绝的后门攻击,指出输入端防护存在盲区。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  12. AttacksarXiv 2610.06670

    研究者提出 Reward Stealing Attack,从对齐模型行为反推安全奖励实施攻击

    提出 ReSA,从对齐模型行为恢复安全奖励并在解码时反转

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama3.1-8B-Instruct, Gemma-7B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and others9
    AbstractReSA 用最大熵 IRL 从对齐模型行为恢复代理安全奖励,并在解码时反转以诱导有害输出。

    ReSA 是一种对抗攻击:从对齐模型的可观察行为恢复代理安全奖励,再在解码时把该奖励反过来用。。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  13. DefensesarXiv 2610.05401

    AVCE:面向扩散模型可验证概念擦除的审计感知遗忘框架

    提出审计感知遗忘框架 AVCE,从文本与视觉通路擦除扩散模型概念

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Stable Diffusion XL (SDXL), Stable Diffusion v1.5 (SD v1.5), Flux 1.0
    AbstractAVCE 在审计锚点上改两条注意力通路。

    AVCE 是面向扩散模型的概念擦除方法,要让擦除经得起绕过文本条件的潜空间审计,而不只是挡住对抗提示词。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  14. DefensesarXiv 2610.07023

    SSRFT:以安全角色内化替代拒答模式的 LLM 安全对齐框架

    提出 SSRFT,用角色监督内化安全原则以替代拒答式对齐

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-3B, Gemma2-2B, Llama3.1-8B and others6
    AbstractSSRFT 用角色监督替代拒答中心对齐。

    SSRFT是一种用监督微调把预定义安全角色写进参数的安全对齐方法。作者称它是首个以安全角色内化本身为对齐目标的框架。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  15. DefensesarXiv 2610.04763

    UT Austin 将 SynthID 水印嵌入基因组语言模型,凭 DNA 序列和密钥追溯 AI 生成片段

    把 SynthID 嵌入基因组语言模型采样,并用位置无关检测追溯生成序列

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Carbon-500M, GENERator-v2-eukaryote-1.2b-base
    Abstract两个六碱基基因组模型嵌入 SynthID 后,位置无关验证能找回水印,作者称这只是统计检测。

    作者在两个六碱基基因组模型的采样里嵌入 SynthID,并让验证者在不知道起点、链和 token phase 时做一次校正后的检出。

    Paper analysisRead analysis