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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 11 papers

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.05894

    研究者提出闭环偏见注入攻击

    提出闭环激活引导,在扩散语言模型去噪过程中注入定向偏见

    Published
    Attacker
    Gray-box
    Evaluated models
    LLaDA-8B-Instruct, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, LLaDA-MoE-7B-A1B-Instruct

    Abstract通过去噪中间概率反馈动态调节残差流转向,证明扩散语言模型在推理服务栈中存在闭环偏见注入脆弱性。

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  2. DefensesarXiv 2610.02349

    MIRROR:面向多智能体通信的法定人数完整性防御

    提出 MIRROR,用多路径摘要多数表决保障多智能体通信完整性

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Gemma-4-31B-it, Gemini 2.5 Pro
    AbstractMIRROR 靠多数路径。

    MIRROR 是 LLM 多智能体通信层上的多路径法定人数完整性原语,只处理不透明字节,不解释消息内容。要处理的是 Agent-in-the-Middle:中介合法终结 TLS 后可改在途消息,而语义校验有推理开销和误拦,签名又要求私钥管理。做法是生成结束后复制同一规范化载荷。

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  3. DefensesarXiv 2610.00348

    NEEDLE:通过权重正交化移除 LLM 后门

    提出 NEEDLE,用权重正交化在已知触发器时去除大模型后门

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Gemma-3-4B-IT, Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Gemma-3-12B-IT

    AbstractNEEDLE 用闭式权重编辑去掉已知触发器的后门,并保住拒绝子空间。

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  4. AttacksarXiv 2609.17817

    论文:用投毒基准污染自改进编码 Agent,令其后续版本写出漏洞代码

    提出基准投毒攻击,使自修改编码 Agent 跨代写出含漏洞代码

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Sonnet 4.5, Qwen3.5-397B, gpt-oss-120b and others5

    Abstract论文报告了恶意基准能污染自修改代码智能体的进化过程并持续输出漏洞,警示系统设计需纳入安全约束。

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  5. DefensesarXiv 2609.00786

    MROP:针对 Deep JSCC 后门攻击的掩码区域优化净化方法

    提出 MROP,在发射端推理时纯化输入以抵御训练投毒后门

    Published
    Evaluated models
    DeepJSCC, SwinJSCC
    AbstractMROP 不重训练,在发射端纯化补丁后门。

    MROP 是 deep JSCC 无线图像传输上的推理时输入纯化,对象是矩形补丁后门。

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  6. DefensesarXiv 2603.03206

    Understanding and mitigating dataset contamination in large language model steering

    Mitigating steering dataset contamination with Lee-Valiant robust means

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct, Mistral-7b-Instruct-v0.3, OLMo-2-1124-7B-Instruct
    AbstractData poisoning can alter steering; coordinated injection is strongest.

    The authors study how much behavioral control remains at inference time when contrastive steering's training data is contaminated, and whether the robust mean can catch it.

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  7. AttacksarXiv 2602.17837

    TFL: Targeted Bit-Flip Attack against Large Language Models

    Proposes TFL targeted bit flipping so that selected prompts output false answers while unrelated queries remain correct

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, LLaMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT
    AbstractTFL searches weight bits on three LLMs to make specified prompts produce target keywords while constraining degradation on unrelated tasks.

    TFL is a framework for targeted bit flips on LLM main memory weights: the attacker wants a selected prompt to output a specified false answer keyword while limiting degradation on unrelated queries.

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  8. DefensesarXiv 2602.03085

    Triggers in the Haystack: Extracting and Reconstructing LLM Backdoor Triggers

    提出推理扫描器,在仅有模型文件时检测后门并重构触发词

    Published
    Evaluated models
    gemma-3-270m-it, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B, Phi-4-mini-instruct and others8
    Abstract用记忆泄漏和内部信号重构触发词。

    这是一个只做推理的 sleeper agent 扫描器:在不知触发词和目标行为时,检测因果语言模型里的条件后门并重构触发词。。问题在于,后门只在触发词出现时偏离基线,而开放仓库和网页投毒使检测方通常没有触发词、目标或激活语料。

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  9. DefensesarXiv 2601.21189

    Adaptive robust cost-aware Proof of Quality for decentralized LLM inference networks

    为去中心化 LLM 推理网络提出稳健成本感知 PoQ,抵御恶意评估者操纵分数

    Published
    Evaluated models
    llama 3 2 3b, gemma 2 2b it, tinyllama 1 1b and others10
    Abstract成本感知 PoQ 加入稳健共识。

    这篇扩展工作把成本感知 Proof of Quality 的共识层改成能承受恶意评估分数的形式,奖励仍同时看输出质量与延迟成本。

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  10. AttacksarXiv 2601.04261

    针对大语言模型后门指纹的抑制攻击

    提出 TFA 与 SVA,抑制 ensemble 后门指纹验证

    Published
    Evaluated models
    LLaMA2-7B, LLaMA3.1-8B-It, Qwen2.5-7B and others11
    Abstract两种 ensemble 攻击 TFA/SVA 抑制后门指纹。

    TFA 与 SVA 是针对后门式 LLM 指纹的 ensemble 抑制攻击,不改模型参数。所有者用 SFT 写入秘密对,只通过 API 验证版权。攻击者未授权取得模型,不知道触发和指纹,却要把每个模型的验证变成失败,同时让 ensemble 至少不差于性能最高的单模型。

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