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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 2 papers
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Defense type

Instruction–data separation2Permissions and approval1

Attack surface / entry point

User input20Web pages and interfaces22Documents and messages15Tool responses34Tool and skill descriptions14Code repositories and dependencies4Retrieval corpus5Memory writes10Inter-agent messages5Distribution channels7Inference services and hardware2

Layer

Application layer0Infrastructure layer2
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Defense type：Instruction–data separationDefense type：Permissions and approvalAttack surface / entry point：Inference services and hardwareLayer：Application layerLayer：Infrastructure layerClear all

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  2. DefensesarXiv 2608.25431

    GIFT: Enforcing User Data Isolation in LLM Serving via GPU Information Flow Tracking

    Propose GIFT, isolating user data in shared LLM serving using encryption and GPU information flow tracking

    arXiv
    2608.25431
    Published
    Layer
    Infrastructure layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-14B, Qwen2.5-32B, Qwen2.5-72B and others6
    AbstractGIFT uses cryptographic isolation plus GPU information flow rules to enforce user data isolation on vLLM and DistServe, and reports throughput overhead.

    GIFT is the authors' user data isolation system for shared LLM serving, with GIFT-CC enabling confidential computing. In the conclusion, the authors state it is the first IFT design for this scenario.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
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