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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 14 papers

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  1. DefensesarXiv 2610.07657

    DEFER1 多智能体防御研究报告受控测试中的攻击成功率下降

    实现 DEFER,以确定性检查优先拦截多智能体流水线的内容攻击

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507, gpt-oss-120b, Llama-4-Scout-17B-16E-Instruct and others5
    AbstractDEFER 把确定性检查放在 judge 之前。

    DEFER 用来测量多智能体授权流水线里,确定性规则在何处结束、LLM judge 从何处开始。

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  2. DefensesarXiv 2610.05640

    Research reveals that the CaMeL defense fails in multi-agent systems and proposes multi-CaMeL

    提出 multi-CaMeL,在智能体调用边界隔离可信指令与非可信数据

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.5, GPT-4.1 and others6

    Abstract论文针对多智能体中单体防御不组合的边界清洗问题,提出 multi-CaMeL 协议彻底阻断了 MultiAgentDojo 上的注入攻击。

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  3. DefensesarXiv 2610.04412

    论文研究 LLM 数字孪生参与增强民主时的提示注入脆弱性

    提出检测、结构化与 GSPO 流程,降低共识生成的提示注入错位

    Published
    Evaluated models
    LLaMA-2 7B, LLaMA-3 8B, GPT 3.5 Turbo and others14
    Abstract三章依次做个体偏好预测、政党知识图谱审议,以及共识生成对提示注入的脆弱性与一条防御流程。

    这是一篇把 LLM 数字孪生放进增强民主的博士论文,分个体表示、政党聚合和共识生成的提示注入三章。

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  4. MADBench: multi-agent debate safety evaluation benchmark released

    提出 MADBench,评测多智能体辩论是吸收还是放大对抗影响

    Published
    Evaluated models
    gpt-4o, GPT-5, GPT-6 Astra
    AbstractMADBench 显示辩论能吸收部分准确率攻击,同时放大未授权读写。

    MADBench 是一个评测多智能体辩论安全性的基准,用来看攻击是被辩论吸收还是被放大。

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  5. AttacksarXiv 2609.38270

    VirusCascade:劫持 LLM 推荐智能体的协同反思机制

    提出 VirusCascade,联合操纵商品描述与交互轨迹以劫持推荐智能体协同反思

    Published
    Evaluated models
    AgentCF, AgentSEQ, AgentRAG and others4
    Abstract作者把反思写回视为推广攻击入口,并用联合操纵和诊断探针研究其持续与传播。

    VirusCascade 是针对推荐智能体协作反思的 black-box targeted promotion 攻击研究。 攻击者只改商品描述和少量账号的普通交互,试图让目标商品获得更多良性用户曝光。

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  6. ORBIT:基于 UK AISI Inspect 的多智能体安全评测框架

    提出 ORBIT 框架,评测多智能体防御对合谋等威胁的效果

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Qwen3-235B and others5

    AbstractORBIT 用六层配置比较多智能体防御,逐动作监控不迁移到合谋。

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  7. AttacksarXiv 2608.00718

    研究揭示多智能体 LLM 流水线的结构性漏洞

    提出多智能体流水线的边界攻击,使对抗内容作为可信输入跨层传播

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5-mini, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Kimi K2.5
    Abstract缺边界校验使对抗内容跨智能体传播,作者称这是架构属性而非模型能力。

    作者把多智能体 LLM 流水线的对抗问题定义为缺少边界校验,并用生产轨迹和受控实验检查脆弱性来自架构还是骨干模型。中间输出未经验证就传给下游。作者认为,一旦某级接受对抗内容,后续智能体会把它当作可信输入。

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  8. DefensesarXiv 2606.08234

    SciTrace:面向科学发现智能体的轨迹感知安全推理框架

    提出 SciTrace,为科学发现智能体加入跨阶段安全推理与工具轨迹核验

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct, DeepSeek-V3 and others4
    AbstractSciTrace 把安全推理织入科学智能体各阶段,在 SciSafetyBench 上提高安全指标并保持输出质量。

    SciTrace 是加在科学发现智能体流水线上的安全框架,不是再在各阶段出口放一个独立过滤器。

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  9. DefensesarXiv 2603.04474

    From Spark to Wildfire: Modeling and Mitigating Error Cascades in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration

    Proposing a lineage-graph governance layer to suppress error cascades in multi-agent collaboration

    Published
    AbstractA single seed can solidify into a false consensus along a fixed collaboration graph.

    The authors turn "small errors becoming collective false consensus" in LLM-MAS into a measurable propagation on a graph, and use a plug-in that only changes messages, not topology, to reduce the final infection.

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  10. AttacksarXiv 2603.00131

    Thought Virus: viral misalignment induced by subliminal prompts in multi-agent systems

    Propose Thought Virus, which propagates preferences along multi-agent messages via subliminal prompts.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct
    AbstractThought Virus spreads a single-point bias downstream.

    Thought Virus puts subliminal prompting into multi-agent communication, to see whether a single-point deviation spreads across the network without naming the target concept.

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  11. DefensesarXiv 2505.23559

    SafeScientist:让 LLM 智能体的科学发现具备风险意识

    提出 SafeScientist 四层监控,阻止科研智能体执行高风险或不伦理任务

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, GPT-3.5-turbo and others5
    Abstract四层监控加科研安全基准。

    SafeScientist 是带四层监控的科研智能体框架,并用 SciSafetyBench 评测科学场景中的任务安全。

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