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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 52 papers

Filter6

Attack type

Prompt injection31 Poisoning and backdoors12 Detection evasion4 Malicious use4

Attack technique

Automated search4 Encoding and obfuscation6 Role-play and persuasion7 Dormant triggers4

Defense type

Detection and filtering8 Instruction–data separation4 Monitoring and auditing3

Impact

Unauthorized actions12 Data and privacy leaks7 Output manipulation26 Oversight failure3

System component

MCP and skills3 Memory3 RAG7 Guardrails and judges10 Monitors4 Permissions and sandboxing3

Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 215papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

System type：LLM applications System type：coding agent Attack surface / entry point：Web pages and interfaces Attack surface / entry point：Documents and messages Attack surface / entry point：Code repositories and dependencies Attack surface / entry point：Inference services and hardware Clear all

Another 215papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

AttacksarXiv 2610.11932Oct 8
A Fudan team measures the citation fragility of AI search: ordinary posts can enter citations and answer text
Measures citation fragility in AI search, demonstrating that ordinary public posts can enter citations and answers.
arXiv
2610.11932
Published
Oct 8
Layer
Application layer
Setting
LLM applications
Evaluated models
Grok, Doubao, ChatGPT and others10
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentRAG
AbstractThe authors claim the paper quantifies vulnerabilities in AI search caused by citation preferences and low posting thresholds; tests show public web posts can penetrate AI citations, and they call for auditing the citation supply chain.
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.11634Oct 8
LTBD：用可学习信任边界分隔符防御提示注入
提出 LTBD，用可学习分隔符隔离可信指令与不可信数据
arXiv
2610.11634
Published
Oct 8
Layer
Application layer
Setting
LLM applications
Evaluated models
Llama3-8B-Instruct, Llama3.1-8B-Instruct, Falcon3-7B-Instruct and others4
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
AbstractLTBD 只训练四个分隔符嵌入。
LTBD 是一种不改基座权重的提示注入防御：只学习用来标出可信指令与不可信数据边界的四个 token 嵌入。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09981Oct 7
研究：LLM 路由决策日志可推断用户医疗、自伤等敏感话题
提出利用路由元数据推断敏感话题的侧信道攻击
arXiv
2610.09981
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Infrastructure layer
Setting
LLM applications
Evaluated models
RouteLLM (BERT router), notdiamond-0001, Vela (vLLM Semantic Router)
- AttacksExtraction and theft
- TechniqueSide channels
Abstract论文揭示并测量了 LLM 路由决策在无文本日志中的敏感话题泄露，验证了按类别公平性防御的有效性与边界。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09264Oct 7
研究者提出 PackHallu：经规则文件提示注入对编码 Agent 发起包幻觉攻击
提出 PackHallu，经规则文件提示注入诱导编码 Agent 换用攻击者指定包
arXiv
2610.09264
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-Coder-7B, Qwen3-Coder-30B, Devstral-Small-2-24B and others19
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueAutomated search
AbstractPackHallu 诱导规则文件换包。
PackHallu 研究一种针对编程智能体规则文件的提示注入：让智能体在本应使用合法依赖时，改导入攻击者指定并控制的包。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.09159Oct 7
SpecGuard 用 Lean 证书在编码 Agent 执行前证明任务冲突
提出 SPECGUARD，用 Lean 证书在编码 Agent 执行前证明任务冲突
arXiv
2610.09159
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 5, Claude Fable 5 and others4
- RiskReward hacking
Abstract提出预执行冲突检测与证明框架，在多个基准和真实仓库中成功证明任务与测试不可同时满足。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2610.07639Oct 6
HarnessSecurity-Bench horizontally evaluates the security mechanisms of six coding agent frameworks.
评测编码智能体 harness 安全机制在对抗任务中的防护效果
arXiv
2610.07639
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.07510Oct 6
PersistBD: attackers can strengthen backdoors before release so that they maintain high attack success rates even after developer SFT and RL.
提出 PERSISTBD，发布前强化供应链后门使其经良性 SFT 与 RL 后仍外发凭据
arXiv
2610.07510
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Qwen2.5-Coder-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
Abstract总结了论文关于后门在 SFT/RL 中存活的发现、两因子机制、PERSISTBD 方法与核心数字。
本文研究第三方 LLM 智能体在开发者进行良性监督微调（SFT）和强化学习（RL）后训练时的后门持久性风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.05163Oct 4
Researchers construct segmented prompt injection on Claude Code and Codex and release a boundary action audit benchmark
提出 PAA 方法，在边界动作前审计长流程智能体的分阶段提示注入
arXiv
2610.05163
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Claude Code (v2.1.172, Claude Sonnet 5), Codex CLI (v0.144.0, GPT-5.5)
- DefensesMonitoring and auditing
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMonitors
Abstract论文针对长流程注入提出边界动作审计与 PAA，在保持低误阻的同时实现高拦截率。
本研究针对长流程智能体在执行任务时面临的分阶段间接提示注入威胁，提出了在动作生效前进行拦截的边界动作审计框架与路径对齐归因方法。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.05139Oct 4
研究揭示代码注释中的上下文注入攻击面
提出推理时上下文注入，用代码注释诱导补全生成含弱点的代码
arXiv
2610.05139
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
StarCoderBase, DeepSeek-Coder-base, Qwen2.5-base and others10
- AttacksPrompt injection
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.05089Oct 4
研究者披露 LiteLLM 网关跨租户干扰攻击 Cooldown Landmines
提出利用共享冷却的跨租户干扰攻击，并设计租户隔离机制
arXiv
2610.05089
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Infrastructure layer
Setting
LLM applications
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksDenial of service
Abstract揭示网关共享冷却漏洞，提出来源检查与租户隔离防御。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.02869Oct 2
AgentTrap：面向自主渗透测试 Agent 的有状态反馈欺骗蜜罐
提出 AgentTrap 有状态蜜罐，欺骗并反击自主渗透测试 Agent
arXiv
2610.02869
Published
Oct 2
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
AIDA, Claude Code, PentestGPT and others8
- AttacksMalicious use
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.01768Oct 1
LLMLeak：借 LLM 合法网页抓取实施隐蔽数据外泄
提出 LLMLeak，借合法网页抓取把 URL 中的秘密隐蔽外传
arXiv
2610.01768
Published
Oct 1
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Meta-Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Meta-Llama-4-Scout-17B-16E-Instruct, Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and others18
- AttacksMalicious use
Abstract作者称第三方外传可发生于正常网页获取，防护需考虑工具请求而不只考虑提示注入。
LLMLeak 是利用网页获取请求携带预先编码秘密的隐蔽通道攻击。它关注恶意软件已能读取数据、却因网络限制或监控无法直接外传的情形。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.36817Sep 29
pikit：面向间接提示注入研究与评测的可组合工具包
构建可组合工具包 pikit，评测编码智能体的间接提示注入
arXiv
2609.36817
Published
Sep 29
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
- AttacksPrompt injection
Abstractpikit 提供组合式间接注入评测。
pikit 是面向间接提示注入研究的组合式工具包，主要贡献是组织攻击、投递通道、防御和判定流程，而非提出新的攻击优化算法。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.35659Sep 29
Tracekit：面向自主编码 Agent 的防篡改意图-推理-动作审计系统
提出 Tracekit，审计编码 Agent 的意图、推理与动作并检测账本篡改
arXiv
2609.35659
Published
Sep 29
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Claude Code (claude -p, version 2.1), 独立评审（同一 CLI，无工具）
- DefensesMonitoring and auditing
- AttacksPrompt injection
- RiskDangerous agent actions
- ComponentMonitors
AbstractTracekit 把意图、自述和动作写入可锚定的哈希链。
Tracekit 是无第三方依赖的编码智能体审计层：把人类请求、模型自述和已执行动作并排写入可外部锚定的哈希链，执行前用正则门，事后用规则和独立模型互查。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.33910Sep 28
论文提出残留授权重放攻击：长期运行 Agent 的授权可跨任务复用
提出残余权限重放攻击，跨任务复用长期 Agent 的历史授权绕过确认
arXiv
2609.33910
Published
Sep 28
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
GPT-4.1, Gemini-3.1-Flash-Lite, Qwen3-14B and others6
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueDefense-targeted
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.32616Sep 26
Cave-Bench：虚假指控下 LLM 智能体最高 60.06% 的运行会破坏正确工作
提出 CAVE-BENCH，评测智能体在虚假指责下破坏已完成的正确工作
arXiv
2609.32616
Published
Sep 26
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Claude-Sonnet-5, Claude-Opus-5, GPT-5.6-Sol and others14
- AttacksPrompt injection
- RiskDangerous agent actions
Abstract论文提出了评估智能体在虚假指责下破坏已有正确成果的 CAVE-BENCH，发现强模型易推翻已知证据，提出了门控缓解方案。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.28915Sep 24
研究提出 ACE 语料库，评估内核级证据对 Agent 安全检测的有效性
构建 ACE 语料，评测内核级证据对 Agent 攻击检测的有效性
arXiv
2609.28915
Published
Sep 24
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
AdaBoost, XGBoost, TabPFN and others10
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMCP and skills
AbstractACE 用配对的内核与应用层证据表明，syscall 痕迹可判别智能体攻击，两层组合通常更好。
ACE 是一份把智能体会话的内核 syscall 痕迹与应用层清单、转录配对起来的检测语料和基准。。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.21088Sep 18
Provenance-Aware Transformers：用来源感知架构分离可信边界以防御间接提示注入
提出 Provenance-Aware Transformers，隔离不可信来源防御间接提示注入
arXiv
2609.21088
Published
Sep 18
Layer
Application layer
Setting
LLM applications
Evaluated models
SmolLM2-360M-Instruct, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and others4
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.19722Sep 17
ALIBI：向二进制注入虚假安全叙事可让 LLM 恶意软件分析器误判
提出 ALIBI，向恶意二进制注入不执行掩护叙事使分析器误判为良性
arXiv
2609.19722
Published
Sep 17
Layer
Application layer
Setting
LLM applications
Attacker
Black-box
Evaluated models
Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5.5 Pro, Claude Opus 4.7
- AttacksDetection evasion
- TechniqueRole-play and persuasion
AbstractALIBI 用二进制内的掩护叙事重释可疑静态证据，Gemini 上翻转多，另两模型主要为降级。
ALIBI 是针对 LLM 恶意软件分诊的语义掩护叙事攻击：不覆盖系统指令，而把仍可见的可疑静态证据重释成良性安全产品的预期行为。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.13889Sep 12
PMPA：针对 OpenClaw 与 Claude Code 的持久记忆投毒攻击
提出 PMPA，经外部源向 Agent 持久记忆投毒并跨会话泄露隐私
arXiv
2609.13889
Published
Sep 12
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
DeepSeek-V4-Flash, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Qwen3-Max
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Abstract论文提出了持久记忆投毒攻击 PMPA，报告了 harness 智能体在处理外部数据时易受跨会话记忆投毒与隐私泄露的风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis

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