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The authors retested prompt injection on their own LangChain, AutoGen, and A2A systems, and modified the Agent Card to see if choices shifted. The abstract states the experiments mainly highlight single-agent weaknesses while extending attacks to multi-agent.

本文研究了智能体基于摘要的提示词压缩所引入的新型安全漏洞——重链（Relinking），并提出了系统化的攻击构建方法与边界审计防御机制。

这篇论文研究了人类视觉感知与大模型分词处理机制之间的差异所导致的内容审核漏洞。

PoisonedSkills 研究编码智能体的技能供应链投毒，重点是文档内容如何进入实际系统操作。。

The authors state that LAAF is an automated red-teaming framework built specifically for LPCI in agentic LLMs. The issue to address is that encoded, delayed, and conditionally triggered payloads can persist in memory or RAG and re-enter across sessions, whereas Garak and PyRIT do not use the previous round's breakthrough results to seed the next stage across the six stages.

Blindfold is a no-box attack against embodied LLM planning modules, rewriting malicious intent into seemingly benign action sequences.

Thought Virus puts subliminal prompting into multi-agent communication, to see whether a single-point deviation spreads across the network without naming the target concept.

SkillJect is an automated prompt injection framework targeting installable agent skills. The authors address the problem that malicious instructions placed in publicly available or manually installed skills are often rejected or ignored, yet once a skill is installed, it is repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance.

这篇工作把自动代码评分中的失败称为 Compliance Paradox：评分模型可以离开提交逻辑，转而执行嵌在可编译代码里的隐藏指令。