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Oct 13 · Tuesday

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  1. DefensesarXiv 2610.03089

    COBRA: A Dual-LLM Architecture for Defending Computer-Using Agents Against Branch-Jumping Attacks

    提出 COBRA 双 LLM 架构,防御计算机使用 Agent 的分支转向攻击

    Published
    Evaluated models
    gpt-5, UI-TARS-1.5-7B, claude-sonnet-5 and others6

    Abstract提出分支转向防御架构 COBRA,通过事前能力约束与边界代理消除分支转向攻击并兼顾效用。

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  2. AttacksarXiv 2609.22711

    UBA-ORL:针对离线强化学习的遗忘激活后门攻击

    提出 UBA-ORL,以 BD/CM 样本在遗忘后激活离线 RL 后门

    Published
    Evaluated models
    TD3+BC, BCQ, IQL
    AbstractUBA-ORL 用竞争的 BD/CM 样本,使离线 RL 后门在删除伪装轨迹后激活。

    UBA-ORL 研究离线强化学习中由合规轨迹删除激活的后门:合法贡献者同时上传共享触发的后门轨迹和伪装轨迹,训练后触发响应被压低,删除伪装批次后再升高。受害系统是使用静态数据集和轨迹级遗忘接口的离线 RL 服务。对手不能看到训练算法、参数、梯度或具体遗忘算法,但能提交可区分批次,并在部署时向观测注入预定触发。

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  3. AttacksarXiv 2606.09499

    研究者提出针对世界模型的机器人学习管线投毒攻击

    提出 VPH 与 VTH,只改视频帧劫持世界模型并投毒下游策略

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Cosmos-Predict 2.5, Cosmos-Predict 2.5 AC, Dino WM and others4
    Abstract只改视频帧经世界模型投毒。

    只改看似安全的视频帧,经世界模型之后才改变下游机器人策略。 问题在于世界模型进入数据生成后,数据集检查看到的仍是安全演示,合成轨迹却可以变危险。

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  4. AttacksarXiv 2604.03890

    From prompts to physical actions: structured backdoor attacks against LLM-mediated robot control systems

    Propose a structured JSON backdoor that triggers malicious actions in robot control via a poisoned LoRA

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-IT, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B and others4

    Abstract推理层后门传不到执行。

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  5. DefensesarXiv 2603.14707

    Visual Confusion Agents: Exploiting and Defending Against Perception Failures in Computer-Use Agents

    Proposes out-of-process dual-channel comparison classification to intercept erroneous clicks by computer-use agents

    Published
    Evaluated models
    multi-modal-embed-small
    AbstractPerception errors can be exploited by swapping screen pixels.

    The authors frame CUA's perception failure as a security vulnerability, visual confused deputy: the agent authorizes click(x,y) based on a misread screen, and the actual landing point differs from the element it believes it is clicking.

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