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Defense type：Permissions and approval Impact：Unauthorized actions Impact：Availability and reliability System type：coding agent System type：Multi-agent systems Clear all

Another 233papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

DefensesarXiv 2610.07657Oct 6
DEFER1 多智能体防御研究报告受控测试中的攻击成功率下降
实现 DEFER，以确定性检查优先拦截多智能体流水线的内容攻击
arXiv
2610.07657
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507, gpt-oss-120b, Llama-4-Scout-17B-16E-Instruct and others5
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentGuardrails and judges
AbstractDEFER 把确定性检查放在 judge 之前。
DEFER 用来测量多智能体授权流水线里，确定性规则在何处结束、LLM judge 从何处开始。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.05246Oct 4
研究测量策略网关跨平台命令裁决的能力边界
提出策略门裁决已实现动作，并测量跨平台命令拦截边界
arXiv
2610.05246
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
claude-opus-5, deepseek-v4.1-flash, gpt-6-astra
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- RiskDangerous agent actions
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.05241Oct 4
StateWise：在 Agent 执行动作前诊断并修复持久操作状态
提出 StateWise，在编码智能体行动前诊断并修复失效持久状态
arXiv
2610.05241
Published
Oct 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5.6-sol, DeepSeek v4 Pro, Qwen 3.7 Max and others4
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- RiskDangerous agent actions
- ComponentMemory
AbstractStateWise 在动作前修复失效的持久前提。
StateWise 是在执行带副作用的动作之前，诊断并修复编码智能体持久操作状态的框架。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.38983Sep 30
The paper proposes an Approval Laundering taxonomy and empirically shows that Claude Code's approval and execution binding fails
形式化编程 Agent 的审批洗白并提出 HMAC 权能令牌防御
arXiv
2609.38983
Published
Sep 30
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Claude Code (v2.1.197, opus[1m] / claude-sonnet-5-ccmax), Codex CLI (@openai/codex v0.154.0)
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- RiskDangerous agent actions
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Abstract系统揭示编程智能体审批洗白风险，提出七字段权能防御机制，证实其能消除身份时序偏离但难防副作用偏离。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.22949Sep 19
多智能体系统提示注入威胁模型与防御架构：14 类攻击向量与四类防御
提出多智能体系统提示注入的威胁模型与四层架构防御
arXiv
2609.22949
Published
Sep 19
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
GPT-4o (2024-08-06), Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3 70B-Instruct
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.17648Sep 15
多智能体 LLM 流水线中的信任传播与结构隔离
用任务绑定令牌和策略预言机拦住多智能体流水线的未授权执行
arXiv
2609.17648
Published
Sep 15
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
gemma4:31b-cloud
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Abstract结构性授权拦住了记忆投毒的未授权执行，持密钥时承重的是策略预言机。
作者在一条会改写沙箱邮件库的四智能体流水线上，检查低权限失陷会不会变成未授权的真实动作。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.15803Sep 15
研究者提出 k-robust 联盟对齐，用多智能体评审委托授权
提出 k-robust 联盟对齐，刻画误对齐评审下的安全委托授权
arXiv
2609.15803
Published
Sep 15
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- RiskMisalignment and value divergence
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Abstract联盟覆盖使无个体对齐的评审面板仍可相对基线安全授权，数值分数改善完备性。
委托授权的安全不要求每位评审者对齐，而要求面板在效用空间覆盖委托人。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2608.21101Aug 21
ClawSentry：面向自主 LLM Agent 的渐进式多层安全监控网关
提出 ClawSentry 多层监控网关，在技能准入和运行时拦截恶意技能与隐藏指令
arXiv
2608.21101
Published
Aug 21
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
Codex/GPT-5.4, Codex/GPT-5.5, Claude Code/GLM-5.1 and others6
- DefensesMonitoring and auditing
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentMCP and skills
AbstractClawSentry 用包准入、三级运行时门控和反绕过，压低 skill 攻击并保住干净任务。
ClawSentry 是挂在智能体运行时之外的安全监督网关，用来同时盖住 skill 执行的多个生命周期边界，并把已被拒绝的效果记到会话里。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2607.21642Jul 22
CARE: Pre-execution command validation for LLM agents that execute shell commands
Proposes a static-first validator, CARE, that decides before dispatch whether an agent's shell command may be executed
arXiv
2607.21642
Published
Jul 22
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis

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