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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 13 papers
Filter4

Attack type

Jailbreaks10

Attack technique

Gradient and representation optimization61Automated search104Multi-turn escalation30Encoding and obfuscation57Role-play and persuasion28Conversation structure manipulation13Reasoning-chain manipulation13Cross-modal payloads54Side channels3Defense-targeted43Dormant triggers56Selection manipulation11

Impact

Harmful content9

System type

Models and APIs11LLM applications3AI Agent2Multi-agent systems0

Attacker access

Black-box8

Attack surface / entry point

User input12

Layer

Prompt layer9

System component

Reasoning chains4
Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 254papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
Attack technique：Conversation structure manipulationSystem type：Models and APIsSystem type：AI AgentSystem type：Multi-agent systemsClear all

Another 254papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.12644

    Cancerous backdoor attack: progressive activation via invisible tokens and a stage controller.

    Proposes the Cancerous backdoor, which progressively corrupts reasoning using invisible stage tokens.

    arXiv
    2610.12644
    Published
    Layer
    Training and data layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3
    AbstractHidden tokens plus a stage controller make the backdoor progressively corrupt reasoning upon triggering, and the authors believe that looking only at the answer will miss it.

    Cancerous Backdoor Attack changes LLM backdoors from one-time activation to multi-stage reasoning corruption that accumulates progressively with triggers.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  2. AttacksarXiv 2609.36956

    研究者提出 Controlled Decoding Attacks，通过纯文本接口越狱黑盒 LLM

    提出 BLINDBIAS，通过纯文本续写与前缀控制越狱黑盒模型

    arXiv
    2609.36956
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GLM-5, Gemini-3.5-Flash, Qwen3-32B and others4
    Abstract作者认为，隐藏数值概率并不足以消除支持重复采样和前缀续写的解码攻击面。

    BLINDBIAS 是一种针对 sample-only 续写接口的 black-box 解码时越狱框架，研究没有目标数值概率时，采样能否支持逐步控制。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  4. AttacksarXiv 2609.27542

    Researchers use control token injection to delete gpt-oss-20b's reasoning chain and bypass chain-of-thought monitoring

    提出控制标记注入，清空工具 Agent 的思维链以绕过推理监控

    arXiv
    2609.27542
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    openai/gpt-oss-20b, google/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it, deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and others4

    Abstract论文阐明控制标记注入可抑制 CoT 使监控失效并促成拒绝绕过，且工具执行受解析器宽容度影响。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  6. AttacksarXiv 2608.09867

    Researchers steal proprietary LLM inference chains via cross-model compatibility of encrypted inference blocks

    利用加密思维块的跨模型重放，诱导弱模型逐字转写专有推理链

    arXiv
    2608.09867
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5 and others13

    Abstract论文揭示了客户端加密思维块跨模型互换漏洞，提出了低成本提取方法并给出防御方案。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  8. Analysis and theoryarXiv 2606.04168

    论文提出随机插入攻击，利用自回归一致性绕过 LLM 安全对齐

    解释自回归一致性如何导致浅层安全对齐，并提出随机插入攻击

    arXiv
    2606.04168
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Abstract作者用自回归一致性串起浅层对齐、插入攻击和最坏延续对齐。

    作者把浅层安全对齐和一类续写攻击都归到自回归一致性上。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  9. InterpretabilityarXiv 2603.08234

    续写与拒答之争：大语言模型中续写触发越狱的机制分析

    分析续写触发越狱的注意力头机制并提出 HCS

    arXiv
    2603.08234
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    LLaMA-2-7B-Chat, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct
    Abstract作者称越狱来自两类头竞争，HCS 加蒸馏可把该竞争用于推理时干预。

    作者用注意力头机制分析 continuation-triggered jailbreak：同一有害指令下，把 continuation 后缀从指令后面挪到提示词边界外，模型更容易顺着后缀继续生成。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  11. AttacksarXiv 2510.10271

    MetaBreak：通过特殊 token 操纵越狱在线 LLM 服务

    提出 MetaBreak，用特殊 token 操纵越狱在线 LLM 服务并绕过审核

    arXiv
    2510.10271
    Published
    Layer
    Prompt layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-72B-Instruct, Gemma-2-27B-Instruct and others10

    Abstract利用特殊 token 注入对抗平台模板包裹与审核，多场景验证了越狱有效性与互补性。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  12. AttacksarXiv 2509.25624

    STAC：看似无害的工具调用链如何攻破 LLM Agent

    提出 STAC 框架，把恶意目标拆成多轮看似无害的工具调用链

    arXiv
    2509.25624
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4.1-2025-04-14, GPT-4.1-mini-2025-04-14, Qwen3-32B and others8

    Abstract作者提出并验证了智能体在序列化工具攻击下的普遍脆弱性，指出针对累积动作序列防御的必要性。

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