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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 9 papers

Filter3

Attack type

Prompt injection9

Defense type

Instruction–data separation3

Impact

Harmful content6 Unauthorized actions67 Data and privacy leaks9 Output manipulation13

System type

AI Agent9

Attack surface / entry point

User input15 Web pages and interfaces6 Documents and messages8 Tool responses9 Tool and skill descriptions11 Code repositories and dependencies3 Memory writes9 Inter-agent messages6 Distribution channels7

Layer

Application layer9

System component

Permissions and sandboxing3

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Impact：Data and privacy leaks System type：AI Agent Attack surface / entry point：Tool responses Clear all

Another 265papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

DefensesarXiv 2609.33371Sep 27
论文提出保险库中介执行边界，评估 LLM Agent 的 API 凭据处理风险
提出并评测保险库中介执行边界，隔离 Agent 的 API 凭据
arXiv
2609.33371
Published
Sep 27
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Corvic Security Vault
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Abstract作者称，凭据分离可减少披露路径，但权限、操作授权和配置验证仍需独立控制。
这是一项智能体 API 凭据威胁分析及 Vault 执行边界的功能评测。作者关心的不是模型能否承诺保密，而是认证材料是否会进入模型、日志、记忆和执行代码。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.27542Sep 23
研究者用控制 token 注入删除 gpt-oss-20b 推理链并绕过思维链监控
提出控制标记注入，清空工具 Agent 的思维链以绕过推理监控
arXiv
2609.27542
Published
Sep 23
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
openai/gpt-oss-20b, google/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it, deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and others4
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueConversation structure manipulation
- ComponentReasoning chains
Abstract论文阐明控制标记注入可抑制 CoT 使监控失效并促成拒绝绕过，且工具执行受解析器宽容度影响。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.18217Sep 16
研究：跨通道碎片化攻击可绕过 MCP 单通道防御
提出跨通道分段攻击，利用 MCP 隐式信任外发敏感文件
arXiv
2609.18217
Published
Sep 16
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-5.4 and others15
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueEncoding and obfuscation
- ComponentMCP and skills
Abstract论文揭示了 MCP 多通道隐式信任层级，通过跨通道分段与协议级利用突破现有防御，展示了严重的凭证外发风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.07529Sep 7
CoER：用对抗协同演化与精炼防御自适应间接提示注入
提出 CoER，用对抗共进化与精炼训练工具智能体抵御自适应间接提示注入
arXiv
2609.07529
Published
Sep 7
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Qwen3.5-9B
- DefensesModel hardening
- AttacksPrompt injection
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.04875Sep 4
无需重启的遗忘：有状态 LLM Agent 的执行状态遗忘
提出执行状态遗忘，用溯源选择性重放净化有状态 Agent
arXiv
2609.04875
Published
Sep 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMemory
Abstract选择性重放拼接干净前缀与净化后缀，主表指标与全量重置相同。
这篇工作把长时智能体的遗忘定义成运行时反事实等价，而不是删除一条明文记忆。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2608.24017Aug 25
WebMCP-Phalanx：为浏览器内 LLM Agent 工具调用建立信任边界
提出 WebMCP-Phalanx，用能力凭证与双智能体隔离浏览器工具调用
arXiv
2608.24017
Published
Aug 25
Layer
Application layer
Setting
web agent
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMCP and skills
AbstractPhalanx 用浏览器凭证绑定工具所有权，Q/P 分离拦住描述注入，工具名与返回值仍有残留。
WebMCP-Phalanx针对浏览器里的 WebMCP 智能体：在 SOP 下补工具所有权，并把语义检查从有工具权的执行中分开。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2608.22868Aug 24
AgentFlow：面向 LLM 智能体系统的流中心策略语言与运行时防护框架
提出 AgentFlow 流策略语言与运行时框架，约束智能体跨步数据流
arXiv
2608.22868
Published
Aug 24
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2607.26115Jul 29
OpenAI 发布 GPT-Red：通过自博弈训练自动化红队智能体
训练自博弈红队智能体 GPT-Red，规模化生成提示注入与越狱攻击
arXiv
2607.26115
Published
Jul 29
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Attacker
Black-box
Evaluated models
GPT-5.6, GPT-5.5, GPT-5.4 and others8
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueAutomated search
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2605.01970May 4
Trojan Hippo Bench: A Dynamic Benchmark for Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses on LLM Agents
构建 Trojan Hippo Bench，评测 Agent 持久记忆投毒与外泄
arXiv
2605.01970
Published
May 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5-mini, GPT-5
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Abstract论文提出了评测智能体持久化记忆攻击与防御的 Trojan Hippo Bench，揭示了潜伏攻击威胁及内存防御的安全与效用权衡。
Paper analysisRead analysis

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