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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 2 papers
Filter5

Attack technique

Gradient and representation optimization4Automated search13Encoding and obfuscation2Cross-modal payloads5Dormant triggers10

System type

LLM applications5AI Agent2coding agent0

Attack surface / entry point

User input6Web pages and interfaces1Documents and messages1Tool responses4Tool and skill descriptions5Memory writes3Distribution channels5
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Attack technique：Encoding and obfuscationSystem type：AI AgentSystem type：coding agentAttack surface / entry point：Web pages and interfacesAttack surface / entry point：Documents and messagesClear all

Another 216papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.12524

    An exploration of attacks on AI agent systems

    Retest and extend prompt injection against AI agents, and use Agent Card deception to manipulate A2A selection

    arXiv
    2610.12524
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Ollama Mistral 0.9.5, llama3-8b-8192, gemini-2.0-flash-lite and others5
    AbstractSingle-agent filtering and classification can be bypassed by format or wording, and A2A card selection is also biased toward names and descriptions.

    The authors retested prompt injection on their own LangChain, AutoGen, and A2A systems, and modified the Agent Card to see if choices shifted. The abstract states the experiments mainly highlight single-agent weaknesses while extending attacks to multi-agent.

    Paper analysisRead analysis
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