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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 12 papers

Filter6

Attack type

Prompt injection12 Poisoning and backdoors3

Attack technique

Automated search3

Impact

Unauthorized actions65 Data and privacy leaks12 Output manipulation17 Availability and reliability3

System type

AI Agent12 coding agent2 web agent3

Attack surface / entry point

User input15 Web pages and interfaces6 Documents and messages8 Tool responses9 Tool and skill descriptions11 Code repositories and dependencies3 Memory writes9 Inter-agent messages6 Distribution channels7

Layer

Application layer12

System component

MCP and skills3

Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 227papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

Impact：Data and privacy leaks System type：AI Agent System type：coding agent System type：web agent Attack surface / entry point：Web pages and interfaces Attack surface / entry point：Documents and messages Clear all

Another 227papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

AttacksarXiv 2610.12524Oct 8
An exploration of attacks on AI agent systems
Retest and extend prompt injection against AI agents, and use Agent Card deception to manipulate A2A selection
arXiv
2610.12524
Published
Oct 8
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Ollama Mistral 0.9.5, llama3-8b-8192, gemini-2.0-flash-lite and others5
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueEncoding and obfuscation
- ComponentMCP and skills
AbstractSingle-agent filtering and classification can be bypassed by format or wording, and A2A card selection is also biased toward names and descriptions.
The authors retested prompt injection on their own LangChain, AutoGen, and A2A systems, and modified the Agent Card to see if choices shifted. The abstract states the experiments mainly highlight single-agent weaknesses while extending attacks to multi-agent.
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2610.08871Oct 6
CredLeak-Bench
提出 CredLeak-Bench，评测 Agent 面对钓鱼的凭据泄露与恢复
arXiv
2610.08871
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
web agent
Evaluated models
Claude Sonnet 5, Claude Opus 4.8, Gemini 3.6 Flash and others7
- AttacksPrompt injection
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.34790Sep 28
CoSec：面向社区场景的 LLM Agent 安全基准
用 CoSec 评测社区 Agent 是否越界披露受保护信息
arXiv
2609.34790
Published
Sep 28
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
OpenClaw with Gemini 3.1 Pro, OpenClaw with Qwen 3.8 Max, OpenClaw with MiniMax M2.5 and others13
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.27542Sep 23
Researchers use control token injection to delete gpt-oss-20b's reasoning chain and bypass chain-of-thought monitoring
提出控制标记注入，清空工具 Agent 的思维链以绕过推理监控
arXiv
2609.27542
Published
Sep 23
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
openai/gpt-oss-20b, google/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it, deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and others4
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueConversation structure manipulation
- ComponentReasoning chains
Abstract论文阐明控制标记注入可抑制 CoT 使监控失效并促成拒绝绕过，且工具执行受解析器宽容度影响。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.13889Sep 12
PMPA：针对 OpenClaw 与 Claude Code 的持久记忆投毒攻击
提出 PMPA，经外部源向 Agent 持久记忆投毒并跨会话泄露隐私
arXiv
2609.13889
Published
Sep 12
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
DeepSeek-V4-Flash, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Qwen3-Max
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Abstract论文提出了持久记忆投毒攻击 PMPA，报告了 harness 智能体在处理外部数据时易受跨会话记忆投毒与隐私泄露的风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2608.22868Aug 24
AgentFlow：面向 LLM 智能体系统的流中心策略语言与运行时防护框架
提出 AgentFlow 流策略语言与运行时框架，约束智能体跨步数据流
arXiv
2608.22868
Published
Aug 24
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2608.04741Aug 5
LoginTrap：针对 LLM Web Agent 的任务无关钓鱼式间接提示注入攻击
提出 LoginTrap，以网页弹窗诱导 Web Agent 提交敏感信息
arXiv
2608.04741
Published
Aug 5
Layer
Application layer
Setting
web agent
Evaluated models
GPT-4o, Gemini 3 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4 and others7
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueAutomated search
Abstract揭示网络智能体在黑盒网页下的登录诱导风险，利用模糊测试生成话术并跨骨干和架构验证了隐私泄露威胁。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2608.00677Aug 1
OpenART 提出环境演化红队框架
构建 OpenART 竞技场，以 EMHA 演化持久环境评测智能体安全
arXiv
2608.00677
Published
Aug 1
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5.5, Claude-Opus-4.8, GLM-5.2 and others5
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueAutomated search
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2607.26115Jul 29
OpenAI releases GPT-Red: training automated red-teaming agents through self-play
训练自博弈红队智能体 GPT-Red，规模化生成提示注入与越狱攻击
arXiv
2607.26115
Published
Jul 29
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Attacker
Black-box
Evaluated models
GPT-5.6, GPT-5.5, GPT-5.4 and others8
- AttacksPrompt injection
- TechniqueAutomated search
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2605.17380May 17
Uber proposes ADR enterprise-level agent detection system, deployed on 7,200 hosts for ten months
提出企业级检测系统 ADR，识别编程 Agent 的提示注入与恶意 MCP
arXiv
2605.17380
Published
May 17
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
- DefensesDetection and filtering
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMCP and skills
Abstract提出了端点因果遥测、两级在线分流与离线红队闭环的 ADR 系统，并在生产环境中验证了有效性。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2605.05509May 7
研究者提出面向 Agent 浏览器的 Web 威胁模型，梳理 20 类攻击并在 4 个模型上复现
提出面向智能体浏览器的 Web 威胁模型并复现混淆攻击
arXiv
2605.05509
Published
May 7
Layer
Application layer
Setting
web agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5, Claude-Sonnet-4.6, Kimi-k2p5 and others8
- AttacksPrompt injection
Abstract作者提出面向智能体浏览器的 Web 威胁模型与攻击分类，测试显示传统混淆攻击可复现且能绕过现有防御。
这篇论文研究了智能体浏览器在面临传统 Web 攻击者时的安全性问题，指出当前针对提示词注入的安全假设无法抵御基于正常 Web 交互模式的混淆攻击。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2604.01438Apr 2
ClawSafety: Safe LLM, Unsafe Agent
提出 ClawSafety，评测个人智能体读到对抗工件后是否执行有害动作
arXiv
2604.01438
Published
Apr 2
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro and others5
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMCP and skills
Paper analysisRead analysis

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