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Oct 13 · Tuesday

All papers

Found 23 papers

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.12524

    An exploration of attacks on AI agent systems

    Retest and extend prompt injection against AI agents, and use Agent Card deception to manipulate A2A selection

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Ollama Mistral 0.9.5, llama3-8b-8192, gemini-2.0-flash-lite and others5
    AbstractSingle-agent filtering and classification can be bypassed by format or wording, and A2A card selection is also biased toward names and descriptions.

    The authors retested prompt injection on their own LangChain, AutoGen, and A2A systems, and modified the Agent Card to see if choices shifted. The abstract states the experiments mainly highlight single-agent weaknesses while extending attacks to multi-agent.

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  2. AttacksarXiv 2610.09240

    WebMirage hijacks visual web agents' browser operations with adversarial images

    提出 WebMirage,用局部对抗图像劫持视觉网页 Agent 的浏览器操作

    Published
    Setting
    web agent
    Evaluated models
    LLaVA-v1.5-13B, LLaVA-v1.6-34B, MiniCPM-o-8B and others6
    Abstract论文提出了针对网络智能体的端到端视觉红队框架 WebMirage,揭示了从视觉定位到浏览器执行的安全脆弱性。

    WebMirage 是一个面向视觉定位网络智能体的流水线感知端到端红队攻击框架。

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  3. AttacksarXiv 2610.04589

    StegoMemory red team testing: agent persistent memory can be used as a cross-session covert channel

    提出 StegoMemory,评测智能体持久记忆作为跨会话隐写信道

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Llama 3.1 405B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o and others13

    Abstract研究揭示智能体持久记忆可作为隐蔽信道跨会话传输机密,写入持久化是主要防御瓶颈,呼吁建立记忆完整性防御。

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  4. MMSkillRisk:多模态技能图像中的隐藏指令可诱导 Agent 执行未授权操作

    提出 MMSkillRisk 基准,评测多模态技能图像中的隐藏指令诱导 Agent 越权操作

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.6-sol, Kimi-K2.6, Kimi-K3 and others6

    Abstract论文提出 MMSkillRisk 基准与 NCVA 攻击,揭示多模态技能中教学图像潜藏指令可引发未授权操作并与良性任务共存。

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  5. AttacksarXiv 2609.18217

    研究:跨通道碎片化攻击可绕过 MCP 单通道防御

    提出跨通道分段攻击,利用 MCP 隐式信任外发敏感文件

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-5.4 and others15

    Abstract论文揭示了 MCP 多通道隐式信任层级,通过跨通道分段与协议级利用突破现有防御,展示了严重的凭证外发风险。

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  6. MMPIBench:多模态提示注入对六种 Agent 框架的跨框架评测

    用 MMPIBench 评测多模态提示注入对 Agent 框架的影响

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude Opus 4.8, GPT-5.4, Gemini 3.1 Pro and others6

    Abstract论文提出 MMPIBench 评测多模态提示注入对智能体的影响,发现模型主导行为、尝试远超完成,音频通道缺乏防护。

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  7. AttacksarXiv 2609.04533

    Repeat-After-Me:针对黑盒 VLM 的自适应视觉提示注入攻击

    提出 Repeat-After-Me 自适应视觉提示注入,诱导 VLM 智能体执行指定任务

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5, Gemini-3.1-Pro and others6

    Abstract论文提出了针对黑盒 VLM 的前缀诱导自适应视觉提示注入,在多款模型上诱发了工具调用与隐私泄露。

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  8. AttacksarXiv 2608.06862

    SynChain:诱导计算机使用 Agent 自建攻击链并跨任务持久化

    提出 SYNCHAIN,诱导计算机使用 Agent 自建跨任务持久攻击链

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3.5-9B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-3-8B

    Abstract论文揭示了 CUA 自合成工件带来的内部供应链威胁,验证了潜伏载荷的跨任务传播能力与防御局限。

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  9. AttacksarXiv 2606.21732

    研究者提出 relinking 漏洞:LLM Agent 压缩边界可被拼出恶意指令

    提出 Relink 攻击,在 Agent 压缩边界将分散良性片段重组为恶意指令

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Gemma-4-31B-it, GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3.6-27B and others15
    Abstract论文指出提示词压缩引入重链漏洞,提出 RELINK 攻击工具与 KBRA 边界审计防御,证明压缩边界应作为关键安全边界。

    本文研究了智能体基于摘要的提示词压缩所引入的新型安全漏洞——重链(Relinking),并提出了系统化的攻击构建方法与边界审计防御机制。

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  10. AttacksarXiv 2604.03081

    Supply Chain Poisoning Attacks on the LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystem

    提出 PoisonedSkills,评测编码 Agent 技能生态的文档投毒

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Sonnet 4.6, GLM-4.7, MiniMax-M2.5 and others5
    Abstract作者称技能文档可成为系统操作攻击入口,但结果只评估加载后的阶段。

    PoisonedSkills 研究编码智能体的技能供应链投毒,重点是文档内容如何进入实际系统操作。。

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  11. AttacksarXiv 2603.17239

    LAAF: A Systematic Red-Teaming Method and Automated Attack Framework for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLM Systems

    Proposes LAAF, which automatically attacks LPCI vulnerabilities in agent systems in stages

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    gemini-2.0-flash-001, claude-3-haiku-20240307, meta-llama/llama-3.1-70b-instruct and others5
    AbstractLAAF does LPCI red teaming with taxonomy plus stage seeding.

    The authors state that LAAF is an automated red-teaming framework built specifically for LPCI in agentic LLMs. The issue to address is that encoded, delayed, and conditionally triggered payloads can persist in memory or RAG and re-enter across sessions, whereas Garak and PyRIT do not use the previous round's breakthrough results to seed the next stage across the six stages.

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  12. AttacksarXiv 2603.16960

    Adversarial attacks against modern vision-language models

    Conduct adversarial attacks on product images for open-source visual shopping agents and induce wrong purchases

    Published
    Setting
    web agent
    Evaluated models
    LLaVA-v1.5-7B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B
    AbstractThe authors state that LLaVA is easily induced by three attacks to buy the wrong item, while Qwen's correct purchase rate remains close to its clean condition.

    The authors compare the robustness of two open-source VLM shopping agents against image adversarial perturbations in a self-built e-commerce environment.

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  13. AttacksarXiv 2603.01414

    Jailbreaking embodied LLMs via action-level manipulation

    Propose Blindfold, jailbreaking embodied LLMs with action-level manipulation

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B, DeepSeek-R1-14B, Gemma-3-27B and others8
    AbstractBlindfold jailbreaks embodied LLMs with action-level proxy planning, and the authors claim it can bypass semantic checks and is effective in both simulation and real-world settings.

    Blindfold is a no-box attack against embodied LLM planning modules, rewriting malicious intent into seemingly benign action sequences.

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  14. AttacksarXiv 2603.00131

    Thought Virus: viral misalignment induced by subliminal prompts in multi-agent systems

    Propose Thought Virus, which propagates preferences along multi-agent messages via subliminal prompts.

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct
    AbstractThought Virus spreads a single-point bias downstream.

    Thought Virus puts subliminal prompting into multi-agent communication, to see whether a single-point deviation spreads across the network without naming the target concept.

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  15. AttacksarXiv 2602.14211

    SkillJect: Automatically generating skill-based prompt injection for skill-based agents

    Proposes SkillJect, which automatically generates poisoned skills to induce code agents to execute hidden scripts

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude-4.6-Sonnet, GPT-5-mini, GLM-4.7 and others10
    AbstractSkillJect poisons skills using dual channels and closed-loop refinement.

    SkillJect is an automated prompt injection framework targeting installable agent skills. The authors address the problem that malicious instructions placed in publicly available or manually installed skills are often rejected or ignored, yet once a skill is installed, it is repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance.

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  16. AttacksarXiv 2509.22040

    研究:通过编码规则文件对Cursor与GitHub Copilot实施提示注入

    通过规则文件提示注入劫持编码编辑器并执行未授权终端命令

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude 4 Sonnet and others4

    Abstract论文提出了针对代码编辑器的提示注入评估框架 AIShellJack,实验显示攻击能诱导 AI 执行未授权终端命令。

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  17. AttacksarXiv 2507.10457

    论文提出 LPCI:针对 Agent 逻辑层与持久记忆的提示控制注入攻击

    提出 LPCI,把延迟条件载荷写入记忆与检索库以跨会话触发

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    ChatGPT, Claude, LLaMA3 and others8
    Abstract作者定义 LPCI。

    作者把LPCI定义为针对智能体逻辑执行、记忆留存和工具集成的跨阶段漏洞类,而不是单次输入上的提示改写。

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