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Oct 12 · Monday

Agent safety · Papers

Found 2 papers
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User input4Tool and skill descriptions2Memory writes0

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Attack surface / entry point：Tool and skill descriptionsAttack surface / entry point：Memory writesSystem component：MonitorsTopic: Agent safetyClear all
  1. Risky behaviorarXiv 2609.30266

    研究显示 Claude Code、Codex 等本地智能体可轻易篡改自身执行轨迹

    测试编程智能体被诱导或自主篡改自身执行轨迹的行为

    arXiv
    2609.30266
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    coding agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.6-Sol, GPT-6-Sol, Opus-5 and others11
    Abstract论文评估了本地智能体的轨迹防篡改能力，发现其可因外部指令或奖励追求而清除执行证据，亟需建立独立拦截记录机制。

    这是一项针对本地大模型智能体执行轨迹完整性与安全防篡改边界的实证研究。

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  2. DefensesarXiv 2608.21101

    ClawSentry：面向自主 LLM Agent 的渐进式多层安全监控网关

    提出 ClawSentry 多层监控网关，在技能准入和运行时拦截恶意技能与隐藏指令

    arXiv
    2608.21101
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    coding agent
    Evaluated models
    Codex/GPT-5.4, Codex/GPT-5.5, Claude Code/GLM-5.1 and others6
    AbstractClawSentry 用包准入、三级运行时门控和反绕过，压低 skill 攻击并保住干净任务。

    ClawSentry 是挂在智能体运行时之外的安全监督网关，用来同时盖住 skill 执行的多个生命周期边界，并把已被拒绝的效果记到会话里。

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