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Attack surface / entry point：Memory writes Attack surface / entry point：Images, audio and video System component：Memory System component：Fine-tuning and open weights Clear all

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DefensesarXiv 2610.13733Oct 9
KVeil: First-Place Solution for the ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Unlearnable Video Challenge
Propose KVeil, which adds perturbations to face videos to prevent unauthorized customization from reproducing identity
arXiv
2610.13733
Published
Oct 9
Layer
Prompt layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Attacker
White-box, Black-box
Evaluated models
Wan2.2-TI2V-5B, HunyuanVideo-1.5, Kling 3.0 and others4
- AttacksMalicious use
- ComponentImage generation
AbstractKVeil adapts LETHE's reference-reading disruption to the challenge's two stages, ranking first on the leaderboard in both Final columns.
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.13267Oct 9
Forgetting is not always bad: a neuroscience-inspired memory repair mechanism for poisoned LLM agents
Proposes DREAM, which selectively weakens agent-poisoned memories while preserving benign memories.
arXiv
2610.13267
Published
Oct 9
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5.4-mini, Claude-Haiku-4.5
- DefensesDetection and filtering
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.09819Oct 7
FAB 攻击：给 HuBERT/WavLM 植入后门，背景警笛声即可让下游语音任务失灵
提出 FAB 攻击，向声学基础模型植入可由环境声触发的后门
arXiv
2610.09819
Published
Oct 7
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
HuBERT-base, WavLM-base
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentAudio
Abstract论文提出了针对声学基模的 FAB 后门攻击，在弱威胁模型下实现了任务无关、物理可触发的后门植入。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.07657Oct 6
DEFER1 多智能体防御研究报告受控测试中的攻击成功率下降
实现 DEFER，以确定性检查优先拦截多智能体流水线的内容攻击
arXiv
2610.07657
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507, gpt-oss-120b, Llama-4-Scout-17B-16E-Instruct and others5
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentGuardrails and judges
AbstractDEFER 把确定性检查放在 judge 之前。
DEFER 用来测量多智能体授权流水线里，确定性规则在何处结束、LLM judge 从何处开始。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.07645Oct 6
SkillPoison：用成功经验投毒自进化 Agent 的技能形成
提出 SkillPoison，用局部有效的成功经验诱导自进化 Agent 形成过度泛化技能
arXiv
2610.07645
Published
Oct 6
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
deepseek-v4-flash, Qwen V3.8 Flash, GPT-5.5
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
AbstractSkillPoison 通过局部有效且验证成功的经验诱导技能过度泛化，在多个评测基准上实现了持久的下游攻击影响。
SkillPoison 提出了一种针对自进化智能体经验到技能形成过程的攻击范式，通过组织已验证的成功经验诱导技能过度泛化。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.04589Oct 3
StegoMemory red team testing: agent persistent memory can be used as a cross-session covert channel
提出 StegoMemory，评测智能体持久记忆作为跨会话隐写信道
arXiv
2610.04589
Published
Oct 3
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Llama 3.1 405B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o and others13
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueEncoding and obfuscation
- ComponentMemory
Abstract研究揭示智能体持久记忆可作为隐蔽信道跨会话传输机密，写入持久化是主要防御瓶颈，呼吁建立记忆完整性防御。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.04504Oct 3
论文提出 VAL 框架：相同 ASR 的 LLM Agent 防御可能对应不同安全保证
提出 VAL 框架，并用确认门与参数沙箱约束智能体高风险工具调用
arXiv
2610.04504
Published
Oct 3
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
DeepSeek-chat, Meta Llama 3.1 8B, Kimi
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2610.04195Oct 3
MemLeak research: multi-tenant agents sharing vector memory stores have cross-user memory leakage
提出 MemLeak，评估多租户 Agent 共享向量记忆的跨用户泄露
arXiv
2610.04195
Published
Oct 3
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Gemini 2.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, all-MiniLM-L6-v2 and others5
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2610.00450Oct 1
ZoneClaw 用记忆分区防御 OpenClaw 式计算机使用 Agent 的持久记忆攻击
提出 ZoneClaw，用记忆分区防御计算机使用 Agent 的持久记忆攻击
arXiv
2610.00450
Published
Oct 1
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Browser and computer use
Evaluated models
Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.5, GLM-5.2 and others4
- DefensesInstruction–data separation
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.35576Sep 29
研究提出跨 LLM 助手的记忆跳跃攻击
提出跨独立 Agent 的记忆跳跃攻击，经共享工件在助手间自传播
arXiv
2609.35576
Published
Sep 29
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
GPT-5.6 Luna, Kimi-K2.6, GPT-OSS-120B and others6
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Abstract论文证实持久工件与内存可形成跨智能体传播链，揭示了将共享工件纳入安全防线的重要意义。
该论文系统研究并量化了通过共享持久工件在具有独立私有内存的 LLM 智能体之间发生自传播的“工件介导传播”攻击风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.34790Sep 28
CoSec：面向社区场景的 LLM Agent 安全基准
用 CoSec 评测社区 Agent 是否越界披露受保护信息
arXiv
2609.34790
Published
Sep 28
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
OpenClaw with Gemini 3.1 Pro, OpenClaw with Qwen 3.8 Max, OpenClaw with MiniMax M2.5 and others13
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.22818Sep 19
研究测量 LLM Agent 记忆投毒防御的良性场景开销
测量记忆投毒防御在良性对话上的效用与 token 开销
arXiv
2609.22818
Published
Sep 19
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentMemory
Abstract写时代价落在噪声内。
在没有攻击的对话上，给记忆投毒防御计价，而不是再测一轮攻击是否被挡住。
Paper analysisRead analysis
Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.19705Sep 17
SoK 论文提出 FARSIGHT 框架，评测 15 个学术金融 LLM 交易 Agent 的鲁棒性与安全失败
用 FARSIGHT 方案级评测金融 LLM 交易 Agent 的稳健性与安全失败
arXiv
2609.19705
Published
Sep 17
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
ChatGPT Deep Research
- AttacksPrompt injection
- RiskDangerous agent actions
- ComponentMemory
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.17648Sep 15
多智能体 LLM 流水线中的信任传播与结构隔离
用任务绑定令牌和策略预言机拦住多智能体流水线的未授权执行
arXiv
2609.17648
Published
Sep 15
Layer
Application layer
Setting
Multi-agent systems
Evaluated models
gemma4:31b-cloud
- DefensesPermissions and approval
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- ComponentPermissions and sandboxing
Abstract结构性授权拦住了记忆投毒的未授权执行，持密钥时承重的是策略预言机。
作者在一条会改写沙箱邮件库的四智能体流水线上，检查低权限失陷会不会变成未授权的真实动作。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.13889Sep 12
PMPA：针对 OpenClaw 与 Claude Code 的持久记忆投毒攻击
提出 PMPA，经外部源向 Agent 持久记忆投毒并跨会话泄露隐私
arXiv
2609.13889
Published
Sep 12
Layer
Application layer
Setting
coding agent
Evaluated models
DeepSeek-V4-Flash, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Qwen3-Max
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentMemory
Abstract论文提出了持久记忆投毒攻击 PMPA，报告了 harness 智能体在处理外部数据时易受跨会话记忆投毒与隐私泄露的风险。
Paper analysisRead analysis
OtherarXiv 2609.12413Sep 11
SoK 综述：智能体 AI 时代的越狱攻击、防御与实践考量
系统梳理智能体执行链路中的越狱攻击与防御并比较推理时防御
arXiv
2609.12413
Published
Sep 11
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Qwen3.5-4B, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct
- AttacksJailbreaks
- ComponentMemory
AbstractSoK 将越狱重放到智能体流水线，并用两种模型检验回复层防御的边际与代价。
Mia 等人把越狱安全从单轮回复扩展到智能体的规划、记忆、工具和智能体间通信，并问既有结论在更强原生对齐下是否还成立。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.07051Sep 7
TrojanWorld：通过想象引导对世界模型智能体植入后门
提出 TrojanWorld，用物理触发器对世界模型智能体植入想象引导后门
arXiv
2609.07051
Published
Sep 7
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Embodied systems and robotics
Evaluated models
TD-MPC2, DreamerV3, R2-Dreamer
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentFine-tuning and open weights
AbstractTrojanWorld 揭示了世界模型智能体的供应链后门风险，通过在世界模型中操纵想象可实现对闭环动作的持续控制。
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.07048Sep 7
FreqDoor：面向视觉语言模型的频域后门攻击
提出 FreqDoor，在频域混合振幅并对生成式 VLM 做训练时视觉后门
arXiv
2609.07048
Published
Sep 7
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
BLIP-2 (opt-2.7b), InstructBLIP (flan-t5-xl), LLaVA (interleave-qwen)
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentVision
AbstractFreqDoor 用频域振幅混合给三款 VLM 植入仅视觉的训练时后门。
FreqDoor 是针对生成式 VLM 的仅视觉、训练时后门：在频域混合触发源振幅、保留干净图像相位，使触发在空间上分散。
Paper analysisRead analysis
DefensesarXiv 2609.04875Sep 4
Forgetting without restart: execution-state forgetting for stateful LLM agents
Proposes execution-state forgetting, using provenance-guided selective replay to purify stateful agents
arXiv
2609.04875
Published
Sep 4
Layer
Application layer
Setting
AI Agent
Evaluated models
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3
- AttacksPrompt injection
- ComponentMemory
AbstractSelective replay concatenates the clean prefix with the sanitized suffix, and main-table metrics match full reset.
This work defines forgetting in long-horizon agents as runtime counterfactual equivalence, rather than deleting a plaintext memory.
Paper analysisRead analysis
AttacksarXiv 2609.04260Sep 2
GhostWord：针对自动语音识别的细粒度后门攻击
提出 GhostWord 词级触发后门，对自动语音识别做数据投毒
arXiv
2609.04260
Published
Sep 2
Layer
Training and data layer
Setting
Models and APIs
Evaluated models
Whisper-Small, Whisper-Medium, MMS and others4
- AttacksPoisoning and backdoors
- TechniqueDormant triggers
- ComponentAudio
Paper analysisRead analysis

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