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Oct 12 · Monday

Agent safety · Papers

Found 7 papers
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  1. A2A-TIBA:针对 A2A 协议 LLM 智能体的间接提示注入攻击与三层同构攻防模型

    提出 A2A-TIBA,经 A2A 对等任务间接注入并植入常驻回调

    Published
    Evaluated models
    MiniMax-M3, deepseek-v4-pro, glm-5.3 and others8
    AbstractA2A-TIBA 一次植入后绕过智能体,GDA 用四类结果定位防线,ELA-ITL 把信封标注列为第三层。

    A2A-TIBA 把间接提示注入和绕过放进 A2A:gray-box 攻击者已能投递任务,诱导目标部署常驻回调程序后,下令和外传不再经过智能体。

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  2. Cave-Bench:虚假指控下 LLM 智能体最高 60.06% 的运行会破坏正确工作

    提出 CAVE-BENCH,评测智能体在虚假指责下破坏已完成的正确工作

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Sonnet-5, Claude-Opus-5, GPT-5.6-Sol and others14

    Abstract论文提出了评估智能体在虚假指责下破坏已有正确成果的 CAVE-BENCH,发现强模型易推翻已知证据,提出了门控缓解方案。

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  3. ActBench: A Self-Evolving Benchmark for Behavioral Safety of Collaborative Agents

    构建自演化基准 ActBench,评测协作智能体的行为安全

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Opus-4.8, Claude-Sonnet-4.6, GPT-5.5 and others15

    AbstractActBench 通过自演化搜索与双证据重构评测轨迹行为安全,揭示基础模型决策差异主导了协同智能体的操作风险。

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  4. OpenSec:测量对抗证据下事件响应 Agent 的校准

    提出 OpenSec,评测事件响应 Agent 在对抗证据下的遏制校准

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 3 and others5
    AbstractOpenSec 以执行评分测 IR 智能体在对抗证据下是否过度遏制,作者称缺口在克制。

    OpenSec 用 dual-control 事件环境测量 IR 智能体在对抗证据下的校准:分数看实际遏制,不看报告文本。

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