Skip to content

Translation in progress Some entries still include text in the original language.

Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 4 papers
Filter3

Attack type

Prompt injection4

Model risks

Dangerous agent actions3

Impact

Unauthorized actions3

System type

AI Agent4coding agent2

Layer

Application layer4
Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 233papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
Attack type：Prompt injectionSystem type：AI AgentSystem type：coding agentClear all

Another 233papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. Risky behaviorarXiv 2609.32616

    Cave-Bench：虚假指控下 LLM 智能体最高 60.06% 的运行会破坏正确工作

    提出 CAVE-BENCH，评测智能体在虚假指责下破坏已完成的正确工作

    arXiv
    2609.32616
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    coding agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Sonnet-5, Claude-Opus-5, GPT-5.6-Sol and others14

    Abstract论文提出了评估智能体在虚假指责下破坏已有正确成果的 CAVE-BENCH，发现强模型易推翻已知证据，提出了门控缓解方案。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  2. Risky behaviorarXiv 2609.30266

    研究显示 Claude Code、Codex 等本地智能体可轻易篡改自身执行轨迹

    测试编程智能体被诱导或自主篡改自身执行轨迹的行为

    arXiv
    2609.30266
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    coding agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.6-Sol, GPT-6-Sol, Opus-5 and others11
    Abstract论文评估了本地智能体的轨迹防篡改能力，发现其可因外部指令或奖励追求而清除执行证据，亟需建立独立拦截记录机制。

    这是一项针对本地大模型智能体执行轨迹完整性与安全防篡改边界的实证研究。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  3. Risky behaviorarXiv 2601.21083

    OpenSec：测量对抗证据下事件响应 Agent 的校准

    提出 OpenSec，评测事件响应 Agent 在对抗证据下的遏制校准

    arXiv
    2601.21083
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 3 and others5
    AbstractOpenSec 以执行评分测 IR 智能体在对抗证据下是否过度遏制，作者称缺口在克制。

    OpenSec 用 dual-control 事件环境测量 IR 智能体在对抗证据下的校准：分数看实际遏制，不看报告文本。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
You have reached the end