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Oct 12 · Monday

Agent safety · Papers

Found 3 papers
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Attack type

Prompt injection7Poisoning and backdoors3

Impact

Unauthorized actions3

System type

AI Agent3

Attack surface / entry point

Memory writes3

Layer

Application layer3
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Attack type：Poisoning and backdoorsTopic: Agent safetyClear all
  1. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2609.32616

    Cave-Bench：虚假指控下 LLM 智能体最高 60.06% 的运行会破坏正确工作

    提出 CAVE-BENCH，评测智能体在虚假指责下破坏已完成的正确工作

    arXiv
    2609.32616
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    coding agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Sonnet-5, Claude-Opus-5, GPT-5.6-Sol and others14

    Abstract论文提出了评估智能体在虚假指责下破坏已有正确成果的 CAVE-BENCH，发现强模型易推翻已知证据，提出了门控缓解方案。

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  3. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2608.09476

    ActBench: A Self-Evolving Benchmark for Behavioral Safety of Collaborative Agents

    构建自演化基准 ActBench，评测协作智能体的行为安全

    arXiv
    2608.09476
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    Claude-Opus-4.8, Claude-Sonnet-4.6, GPT-5.5 and others15

    AbstractActBench 通过自演化搜索与双证据重构评测轨迹行为安全，揭示基础模型决策差异主导了协同智能体的操作风险。

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