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Oct 13 · Tuesday
All papers Found 13 papers Another 201 papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
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About this collection Collection in progress We are building a large AI safety paper collection to help researchers find work related to their interests. Papers are collected automatically andfiltered only for relevance to AI safety , without judging quality, novelty or reading value. The default “Annotated first” shows papers with tags or published paper analyses first. Each group is ordered by original publication date, newest first, with undated papers last. “Newest first” uses publication dates only. This order is not a quality ranking.
One-line summaries, tags and paper analyses are prepared by AI from the papers. Language models may have systematic biases and produce hallucinations.We plan to carry out human annotation and review to reduce errors in this content.
提出流匹配逆向框架，从多向量视觉文档索引重构页面
Published Oct 7
Evaluated models Tomoro-ColQwen3-8B , ColQwen3.5-4.5B , Tomoro-colqwen3-embed-4b and others13 评估应用决策层的输入注入与隐私推断风险
Published Oct 4
Evaluated models Jev , NanoJev Abstract Jev 的类型化决策可被输入与训练操纵，也会泄露信息，并同时支持检测与滥用。Jev 是 TypeSafe 的 System One 模型，把应用 state 和固定问题变成 Choice、Noul 或 Score 的类型化决策与概率。作者用官方 API 和可改训练的 NanoJev，考察它作为决策层时的操纵、泄露与双重用途。
提出 imMRAG 攻击，从多模态 RAG 私有图像库提取内容
Published Oct 1
Evaluated models Lumina-mGPT , Gemini 2.5 Flash Image Preview , CLIP ViT-B/16 and others5 提出 LLMLeak，借合法网页抓取把 URL 中的秘密隐蔽外传
Published Oct 1
Evaluated models Meta-Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct , Meta-Llama-4-Scout-17B-16E-Instruct , Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and others18 Abstract 作者称第三方外传可发生于正常网页获取，防护需考虑工具请求而不只考虑提示注入。LLMLeak 是利用网页获取请求携带预先编码秘密的隐蔽通道攻击。 它关注恶意软件已能读取数据、却因网络限制或监控无法直接外传的情形。
提出只训练或篡改多智能体潜在通信链路来提高有害遵从
Published Sep 30
Evaluated models Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct , Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct , Gemma-3-1B-IT and others7 Abstract 潜在链路本身即可改变冻结智能体系统的安全，奖励既能攻击也能修复。学习得到的潜在通信链路会改变由冻结、对齐智能体组成的系统是否遵从有害请求。 。作者研究三种拓扑：双智能体、三级顺序协作，以及双专家加汇总。
提出 CIG-MIA，用上下文信息增益推断 RAG 知识库成员身份
Published Sep 14
Evaluated models Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct , Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 , Llama-2-13b-chat-hf and others6 Abstract CIG-MIA 用注入前后的答案似然差推断 RAG 库成员，灰盒可分性高于所列基线。CIG-MIA 是针对 RAG 外部知识库的成员推断攻击，同时覆盖灰盒和纯文本黑盒。
提出 GraphProfiler，用个人知识图谱从帖子历史推断敏感属性并溯源
Published Sep 11 Abstract GraphProfiler 用源链接个人知识图谱做属性推断，准确率接近文本基线，并把证据定位到少量源帖。GraphProfiler 是一个可审计的 LLM 敏感属性画像器：用源链接个人知识图谱，把推断落到具体帖子。
提出 SkillClone，仅凭良性任务交互重构闭源 Agent 技能
Published Aug 5
Evaluated models DeepSeek-Flash , DeepSeek-Pro , GLM-5.1 and others5 Abstract 论文揭示了仅靠良性任务交互即可重构闭源智能体技能隐藏功能的风险，表明功能保密需要限制累积信息泄露。论文从功能保密视角系统研究了大语言模型智能体技能的行为重构威胁。
提出 SigLeak，从黑盒 Agent 执行轨迹推断专有技能
Published Jul 28
Evaluated models GPT-5.4-mini , GPT-5.5 , GLM-5.2 and others4 Abstract 提出了通过良性查询和对照轨迹推断黑盒专有技能的 SigLeak 框架，揭示了智能体执行可见性带来的行为侧信道泄露风险。
提出嵌入推断攻击 EIA，在黑盒 IR 中识别所用嵌入模型
Published Jul 1
Evaluated models e5-small , e5-small-v2 , e5-base and others19 Abstract EIA 用无序文档集的差异从候选中识别嵌入模型，并给出 reranker 与阈值下的计数。EIA 是在黑盒 IR 上识别所用嵌入模型的攻击。 。
提出 MEntA，用非模板查询推断文档是否属于 RAG 检索库
Published May 23
Evaluated models Phi4-14B , Llama3.1-8B , CommandR-7B and others5 Propose WebWeaver, which compromises only a single agent and recovers the multi-agent communication topology from conversation context.
Published Mar 12
Evaluated models Llama 3.1 8B , Qwen 2.5 7B , Mistral NeMo 12B and others6 Abstract WebWeaver infers topology from context.WebWeaver is an inference attack against the confidentiality of LLM-MAS communication topology: it controls only one arbitrary agent and recovers the full graph from dialogue context, rather than querying agent IDs.
Proposes the Aegis red-teaming framework for multi-turn attacks on high-risk voice agents.
Published Feb 7
Evaluated models GPT-4o , GPT-4o-mini , Gemini-1.5 Pro and others7 Abstract Aegis red-teams three types of voice agents: query-based access eliminates authentication and leakage successes, but behavioral attacks remain.Aegis uses multi-turn red-teaming evaluation on ALLM voice agents already integrated into business systems. The authors call this the first systematic red-teaming framework in this setting.
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