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Oct 12 · Monday

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2609.15383

    微软团队提出 capability laundering 攻击:弱模型拆分任务向对齐前沿模型套取能力

    提出能力洗钱攻击,拆分任务向对齐模型套取能力

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.5, Claude Opus 4.8, Grok-4.3 and others7

    Abstract作者提出了能力洗钱攻击,发现未对齐编排器分解咨询对齐模型可恢复能力差距,指出需建立跨会话防御。

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  2. AttacksarXiv 2607.03968

    The study reveals workflow-level jailbreaks in IDE programming agents: GitHub Copilot generated harmful content across four backends at 816/816

    提出工作流级越狱,让编程 Agent 在开发任务中写入有害示例

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro and others4
    Abstract作者报告 Copilot 后端会在编码工作流中生成其在单轮条件下通常拒绝的有害答案。

    这是一项生产 IDE 编码智能体的工作流越狱研究,受测对象是 Copilot 的四个模型后端,而非评测流水线中的名义目标。

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  3. AttacksarXiv 2601.05466

    Jailbreaking large language models through reinforcement learning with iterative tool disguise attacks

    提出 iMIST,用工具伪装和 PPO 迭代越狱大语言模型

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    DeepSeek-V3, Qwen3-32B, GPT-OSS-120B
    AbstractiMIST 用工具伪装和在线 PPO 做黑盒越狱,Table I 中 JADES 高于同格基线。

    iMIST是黑盒越狱方法:把恶意查询伪装成合法工具调用,再用在线强化学习把响应的有害性分数往上推。

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  4. AttacksarXiv 2509.25624

    STAC:看似无害的工具调用链如何攻破 LLM Agent

    提出 STAC 框架,把恶意目标拆成多轮看似无害的工具调用链

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4.1-2025-04-14, GPT-4.1-mini-2025-04-14, Qwen3-32B and others8

    Abstract作者提出并验证了智能体在序列化工具攻击下的普遍脆弱性,指出针对累积动作序列防御的必要性。

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