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Oct 12 · Monday

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Found 2 papers
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Jailbreaks2

Model risks

Inappropriate refusal4Hallucination and fabrication2
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Attack type：JailbreaksModel risks：Hallucination and fabricationClear all

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  1. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2608.20554

    aiXamine：跨维度评测 LLM 安全、安全（security）与隐私权衡

    提出 aiXamine 黑盒基准，统一评测 LLM 安全、稳健与隐私权衡

    arXiv
    2608.20554
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    openai/gpt-5-mini, openai/gpt-4o, anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5 and others15
    AbstractaiXamine 用九服务黑盒协议比较百余个模型，作者称单轴信任度进展可能削弱其他轴。

    aiXamine 是一套黑盒评测协议，用来在同一条件下比较 LLM 的 safety、security 与 privacy，而不是再产出一个能力分。

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  2. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2602.19450

    对面向可信执行环境的 Claude Opus 与 ChatGPT 安全顾问进行红队测试

    用 TEE-REDBENCH 评测 TEE 顾问的机制幻觉与提示诱导失败

    arXiv
    2602.19450
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    ChatGPT-5.2, Claude Opus-4.6
    Abstract作者用 TEE-REDBENCH 测两款顾问，称失败可迁移且流水线控制可降低发生率。

    TEE-REDBENCH 红队评测被当作 Intel SGX 与 Arm TrustZone 安全顾问的 ChatGPT-5.2 和 Claude Opus-4.6，看架构推理、远程证明语义、缓解建议和策略约束下的拒答，并测提示诱导失败能否跨助手迁移。作者把助手看成随机策略。

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