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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 3 papers
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Attack type

Jailbreaks3Poisoning and backdoors7Detection evasion13

Impact

Harmful content32Output manipulation3

System type

Models and APIs3

Layer

Prompt layer4Model layer3
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Attack type：JailbreaksImpact：Output manipulationLayer：Model layerClear all

Another 261papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. Analysis and theoryarXiv 2609.36477

    研究发现护栏模型在基座模型不确定处过度自信

    诊断护栏相对基座在对抗提示上的置信失校

    arXiv
    2609.36477
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    Llama-Guard 7B, Llama-Guard-2 8B, Llama-Guard-3 8B and others10
    Abstract对抗包装使 guard 高置信漏检，而对应 base 在同一输入上常更不确定。

    诊断性分析：五个提示词分类 guard 的置信度，在清洁输入上可以较校准，在越狱包装后则变成高置信度的错误判定。

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  3. Evaluation and benchmarksarXiv 2602.19450

    对面向可信执行环境的 Claude Opus 与 ChatGPT 安全顾问进行红队测试

    用 TEE-REDBENCH 评测 TEE 顾问的机制幻觉与提示诱导失败

    arXiv
    2602.19450
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    ChatGPT-5.2, Claude Opus-4.6
    Abstract作者用 TEE-REDBENCH 测两款顾问，称失败可迁移且流水线控制可降低发生率。

    TEE-REDBENCH 红队评测被当作 Intel SGX 与 Arm TrustZone 安全顾问的 ChatGPT-5.2 和 Claude Opus-4.6，看架构推理、远程证明语义、缓解建议和策略约束下的拒答，并测提示诱导失败能否跨助手迁移。作者把助手看成随机策略。

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