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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 35 papers

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  1. AttacksarXiv 2610.06670

    研究者提出 Reward Stealing Attack,从对齐模型行为反推安全奖励实施攻击

    提出 ReSA,从对齐模型行为恢复安全奖励并在解码时反转

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama3.1-8B-Instruct, Gemma-7B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and others9
    AbstractReSA 用最大熵 IRL 从对齐模型行为恢复代理安全奖励,并在解码时反转以诱导有害输出。

    ReSA 是一种对抗攻击:从对齐模型的可观察行为恢复代理安全奖励,再在解码时把该奖励反过来用。。

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  2. AttacksarXiv 2610.05943

    CRIME 框架利用良性 Agent 技能组合诱发恶意行为

    提出 CRIME 框架,组合良性 Agent 技能诱发恶意行为

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    DeepSeek-V4-Flash, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-4o and others6
    Abstract良性技能经 DCA 或 ACA 组合后可产生恶意环境后果,单独审查对不上。

    CRIME 把公共技能库中各自通过审查的技能配成两两组合,看联合执行能否实现指定恶意任务。。

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  3. 研究评估 GradSafe 在多轮对话中的越狱检测脆弱性

    评测多轮对话中 GradSafe 越狱检测的可分性与脆弱性

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct
    AbstractCWS 显示不安全梯度在真实多轮流量中变弱,且随攻击族和模型而变。

    作者评估梯度越狱检测从单条提示词迁到多轮对话后还剩多少可分性,方法是用 Context Window Scanner 把 GradSafe 原封不动地套到用户轮窗口上。

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  4. AttacksarXiv 2609.15383

    微软团队提出 capability laundering 攻击:弱模型拆分任务向对齐前沿模型套取能力

    提出能力洗钱攻击,拆分任务向对齐模型套取能力

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GPT-5.5, Claude Opus 4.8, Grok-4.3 and others7

    Abstract作者提出了能力洗钱攻击,发现未对齐编排器分解咨询对齐模型可恢复能力差距,指出需建立跨会话防御。

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  5. AttacksarXiv 2609.03247

    研究揭示大语言模型的自发身份认证失败:五款模型的分阶段开发者身份实验

    提出 MIPC 与 CFA,观察模型自拟测验后接受开发者身份

    Published
    Evaluated models
    ChatGPT, Claude, Qwen3.7-Plus and others5
    Abstract自拟测验可造成对话层虚假认证,但所测授权边界并未因此改变。

    这项工作把“模型自己出题、自己批改、再宣布身份已核验”定义成对话层认证失败,并与后端提权分开。

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  6. AttacksarXiv 2609.02414

    Blueprint 框架用世界观模拟与 18 个影响因子提升多轮越狱成功率

    提出多轮越狱框架 BLUEPRINT,用世界观模拟与心理因素诱导有害输出

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Qwen3-Next-80B, DeepSeek-V3.2, GLM-4.7 and others6
    AbstractBLUEPRINT 解耦多轮越狱策略与情境模拟,揭示任务具象化是摆脱拒绝的核心机制,为多轮安全防御提供新视角。

    BLUEPRINT 是一个将因子化社会影响力策略空间与跨轮世界观模拟解耦的多轮大语言模型安全评测框架。

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  7. OtherarXiv 2608.01117

    SoK 论文提出面向意图的多轮 LLM 越狱分类体系

    提出面向意图的多轮 LLM 越狱分类体系

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3, Llama-3.3-70B, DeepSeek-V3 and others11
    Abstract作者用四维意图分类整理多轮越狱,并称组织方式影响效果与观察范围。

    这是一篇关于多轮 LLM 越狱的 SoK:按有害意图在交互中的组织位置分类,而不是按单步提示技巧分类。

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  8. AttacksarXiv 2607.18056

    上海 AI 实验室提出 Intern-BioBreaker,在 14 个前沿模型上暴露生物安全越狱风险

    提出生物红队模型 Intern-BioBreaker,多轮越狱诱导模型输出可操作生物危害

    Published
    Evaluated models
    DeepSeek-V3, Kimi-K2.6, DeepSeek-V4-Pro and others14

    Abstract论文通过构建专用红队模型评估前沿大模型的生物安全漏洞与物理转化风险。

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  9. AttacksarXiv 2607.03968

    The study reveals workflow-level jailbreaks in IDE programming agents: GitHub Copilot generated harmful content across four backends at 816/816

    提出工作流级越狱,让编程 Agent 在开发任务中写入有害示例

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro and others4
    Abstract作者报告 Copilot 后端会在编码工作流中生成其在单轮条件下通常拒绝的有害答案。

    这是一项生产 IDE 编码智能体的工作流越狱研究,受测对象是 Copilot 的四个模型后端,而非评测流水线中的名义目标。

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  10. AttacksarXiv 2606.21077

    OTTER:仅替换五个 token 即可绕过 GPT 系列毒性审核

    提出 OTTER 词元替换越狱,绕过表面毒性审核诱导有害回答

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    gpt-4-turbo, gpt-4o, gpt-4o-mini and others4

    Abstract论文展示了表面毒性与恶意意图的解耦现象,通过标准 API 实现黑盒越狱测试,并提出闭环分类器加固建议。

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  11. AttacksarXiv 2606.09084

    研究者提出 Context-Fractured Decomposition 攻击

    提出 CFD 跨会话分解攻击,利用工件来源缺口绕过工具型 Agent 的本地检查

    Published
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4.1, GPT-5-nano, Claude-3.5-Sonnet and others6
    AbstractCFD 用无指令 artifact 把越狱拆到跨会话。

    CFD针对工具型 LLM 智能体:利用 artifact 来源不被跟踪这一部署失败模式,把有害目标拆开后延迟组合。

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  12. MultiTurnPSB

    构建 MultiTurnPSB,评测四轮医疗越狱与分类器输入防御

    Published
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4.1-mini, Claude Sonnet 4.5
    Abstract多轮攻击加剧医疗模型风险,分类器干预有效但受高误报率制约。

    MultiTurnPSB 针对患者端医疗大模型在持续交互中的安全风险,构建了包含三种攻击模态的四轮对抗评测基准。

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  13. AttacksarXiv 2604.24082

    研究者提出意图伪装多轮越狱方法,可攻破 GPT-5-thinking 与 Claude-Sonnet-4.5

    提出多轮意图欺骗越狱 iDecep,用良性意图伪装引出有害内容

    Published
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Flash, Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and others4
    AbstractiDecep 用意图欺骗做多轮越狱,在 GPT-5 与 Claude-Sonnet-4.5 上同时测到直接成功和 para 成功。

    iDecep 是一种黑盒多轮越狱:用表面良性的意图维持与恶意目标贴近的对话,并单独计入 safe completion 替代内容中的有害信息。。

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  14. ADVERSA: Measuring Multi-Turn Guardrail Degradation and Judge Reliability in Large Language Models

    Using ADVERSA to measure guardrail degradation and reviewer reliability under multi-turn attacks

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.2
    AbstractADVERSA measures multi-turn guardrail changes using per-turn compliance trajectories and three-reviewer consensus.

    ADVERSA is an automated multi-turn red-teaming measurement framework that records guardrail behavior as per-turn compliance trajectories and simultaneously measures whether reviewers agree. The problem it addresses: single-turn binary pass/fail cannot show how safety properties change under sustained adversarial pressure, nor can it separate gradual refusal consolidation from stable scores. The authors argue that real-world adversaries rewrite and persist over multiple turns.

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  15. AttacksarXiv 2603.01414

    Jailbreaking embodied LLMs via action-level manipulation

    Propose Blindfold, jailbreaking embodied LLMs with action-level manipulation

    Published
    Evaluated models
    Llama-3.1-8B, DeepSeek-R1-14B, Gemma-3-27B and others8
    AbstractBlindfold jailbreaks embodied LLMs with action-level proxy planning, and the authors claim it can bypass semantic checks and is effective in both simulation and real-world settings.

    Blindfold is a no-box attack against embodied LLM planning modules, rewriting malicious intent into seemingly benign action sequences.

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