Skip to content

Translation in progress Some entries still include text in the original language.

Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 2 papers
Filter3

Attack type

Jailbreaks27Prompt injection21Poisoning and backdoors18Model tampering10Extraction and theft2Detection evasion26

Attack technique

Gradient and representation optimization1Automated search6Role-play and persuasion3Side channels4Defense-targeted1
Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 261papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
Attack type：Extraction and theftAttack technique：Gradient and representation optimizationAttack technique：Defense-targetedClear all

Another 261papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. AttacksarXiv 2609.10117

    研究揭示基于混淆的端侧 LLM 保护方案的安全边界

    提出 Collapse，从端侧混淆暴露视图抽取高效用替代模型

    arXiv
    2609.10117
    Published
    Layer
    Model layer
    Setting
    Models and APIs
    Evaluated models
    BERT-Base, ViT-Base, Qwen2.5-0.5B and others4
    AbstractOprior 是四原语复合的安全边界，Collapse 利用列方向泄漏抽取替代模型，Oext 只被同一攻击评测。

    这篇工作用代数原语统一若干 TEE 卸载混淆，给出该族的典范边界，再说明该边界挡不住一种分阶段模型抽取。。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
  2. AttacksarXiv 2603.11132

    WebWeaver：以隐蔽的上下文推断攻破 LLM 多智能体系统拓扑机密性

    提出 WebWeaver ，只攻陷单个智能体并从对话上下文恢复多智能体通信拓扑

    arXiv
    2603.11132
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    Multi-agent systems
    Evaluated models
    Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, Mistral NeMo 12B and others6
    AbstractWebWeaver 用上下文推断拓扑。

    WebWeaver 是针对 LLM-MAS 通信拓扑机密性的推断攻击：只控制一个任意智能体，从对话上下文恢复全图，而不是查询智能体 ID。

    Paper analysisRead analysis
You have reached the end