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Oct 12 · Monday

All papers

Found 3 papers
Filter4

Attack type

Prompt injection8Detection evasion3

Attack technique

Automated search6Role-play and persuasion2Conversation structure manipulation1Defense-targeted5

Layer

Application layer3
Select any value within a category; different categories must all match. Counts include the other filters you have selected.Another 254papers have no tags yet and are not included in filtered results.
Attack type：Detection evasionAttack technique：Role-play and persuasionAttack technique：Conversation structure manipulationLayer：Application layerClear all

Another 254papers do not have category tags yet and are not included in filtered results.

  1. AttacksarXiv 2609.27542

    Researchers use control token injection to delete gpt-oss-20b's reasoning chain and bypass chain-of-thought monitoring

    提出控制标记注入，清空工具 Agent 的思维链以绕过推理监控

    arXiv
    2609.27542
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    AI Agent
    Evaluated models
    openai/gpt-oss-20b, google/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it, deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and others4

    Abstract论文阐明控制标记注入可抑制 CoT 使监控失效并促成拒绝绕过，且工具执行受解析器宽容度影响。

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  2. AttacksarXiv 2609.19722

    ALIBI：向二进制注入虚假安全叙事可让 LLM 恶意软件分析器误判

    提出 ALIBI，向恶意二进制注入不执行掩护叙事使分析器误判为良性

    arXiv
    2609.19722
    Published
    Layer
    Application layer
    Setting
    LLM applications
    Attacker
    Black-box
    Evaluated models
    Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5.5 Pro, Claude Opus 4.7
    AbstractALIBI 用二进制内的掩护叙事重释可疑静态证据，Gemini 上翻转多，另两模型主要为降级。

    ALIBI 是针对 LLM 恶意软件分诊的语义掩护叙事攻击：不覆盖系统指令，而把仍可见的可疑静态证据重释成良性安全产品的预期行为。

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